Is Israel the region's new police?
Seven years ago, I wrote about the 'regional rise of Israel.' Today, its presence is greater than ever, and it is behind dramatic geopolitical changes in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks. After all this, how does Israel now view itself?
Israel is unlikely to settle for its old role; it will seek political roles that reflect its military capabilities.
Tel Aviv maintained a policy for over half a century based on protecting its existence, and its old and occupied borders. This included confronting Iran and manipulating opposing powers, including the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Bashar Assad.
Today, Israel is launching a new phase after having dismantled the powers that surrounded it. For the first time in its modern history, there is no regional force declaring a threat against Israel and capable of acting on it. Even Iran, after the destruction of its offensive capabilities, cannot do so. This equation could change in the future if Iran manages to rebuild its internal and external strength, but for now, that seems unlikely or far off.
With changing circumstances, Israel's strategy is also changing. It no longer wants to be just a border guard — it wants to be an offensive player in the region. The region itself is scattered, with no clear alliances, as if it is waiting for someone to resolve its instability, including the Tehran axis, which has significantly shrunk.
There are two possibilities for what Israel could become. The first: It sees itself as a force to preserve the new status quo and 'stability,' engaging peacefully with its neighbors by expanding relations with the rest of the Arab world. This would mean the end of the era of war and boycott. With the fall or weakening of regimes that opposed it, Israel would bolster its interests by entrenching the geopolitical situation, cleaning up its surroundings, and sidelining what remains of movements hostile to it.
The second possibility is that Israel, with its military superiority, wants to reshape the region based on its political vision and interests — and that could mean more confrontations. Regional states have longstanding fears in this regard. Expansionist regimes, such as Saddam's Iraq, and Iran, viewed Israel as an obstacle to their regional ambitions and adopted a confrontational stance, even if their rhetoric was always wrapped in the Palestinian cause.
The attacks by Hamas pulled Israel out of its shell and placed it more squarely in the regional equation than ever before. So, is Israel seeking regional coexistence, or does it aim to appoint itself as the region's police?
Israel is a small country and will likely remain so due to the nature of its system that insists on preserving its Jewish identity.
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
Everything suggests that Israel wants to be a player in regional politics and conflicts. It could act as a military contractor, regional actor, or even the leader of an alliance. It has already quickly blocked Iraqi intervention in Syria and Turkish expansion as well.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu government's appetite for conflict has revived fears of a 'Greater Israel' project and ambitions to expand across the region. But the truth is, most of these narratives are pushed by parties involved in the conflict, such as Iran, Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the left.
Israel may be seeking a dominant role, but geographic expansion seems unlikely. For 50 years, it has remained inward-looking, using its financial, military, and legal capabilities to absorb the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. It is still struggling to hold onto them and has foiled many attempts to return them — either through a Palestinian state or by restoring them to Jordanian and Egyptian administration.
Israel is a small country and will likely remain so due to the nature of its system that insists on preserving its Jewish identity. Today, 20 percent of its citizens are Palestinian. If it were to annex the occupied territories, Palestinians would make up half the population. That makes the real challenge absorbing, not expanding, the West Bank and Gaza.
The fear is that Israeli extremists could try to exploit the current chaos for this purpose. That happened after the Oct. 7 attack, which was used as justification to expel part of the West Bank and Gaza population. This is a real possibility with dangerous consequences.
However, there is exaggeration in the rhetoric pushed by ideologues warning of a so-called 'Greater Israel,' often citing images and articles calling for expansion beyond the Jordan River. These may exist within Talmudic or political narratives, just as some dream of 'Al-Andalus' in old Arab-Islamic history.
Demographically, Israel is bound by its concept of a Jewish state and fears ethnic dilution, unlike most countries in the region, which were formed through and accepted ethnic and cultural diversity. Israel seeks dominance, but it fears the inevitable demographic integration that comes with occupation.
Politically, the future strategy of the Jewish state — after its recent military victories — remains unclear and may still be taking shape. Regardless of what it wants — whether a peaceful state open to its Arab neighbors or a regional police entangled in constant battles — the region has its own dynamics. Competing and complex factors drive it, and no single power can dominate it.
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