Brics countries eye multilateral mechanism to help global economy: Brazilian official
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Brazil's secretary for international affairs in its finance ministry, Tatiana Rosito, said the talks took place after a Brics meeting on the sidelines of the
International Monetary Fund and
World Bank spring meetings in Washington.
The proposed mechanism would be modelled on the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, or Miga, which helps developing countries lure foreign direct investment by offering political risk insurance and credit guarantees.
Miga covers risks such as expropriation, currency inconvertibility, contract breaches and conflict-related disruptions. Established in 1988, the agency has helped de-risk infrastructure and energy projects in some of the world's most volatile environments.
Tatiana Rosito, Brazil's secretary for international affairs in its finance ministry, attends an International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington on Thursday. Photo: Handout
If created, a Brics version of Miga could be added to the group's financial toolkit alongside its Contingent Reserve Arrangement, signed in 2014 and in operation since 2016.
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