Latest news with #Brics
Mail & Guardian
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Mail & Guardian
Egypt marks 73rd Revolution anniversary
Ties: Egypt's ambassador, Ahmad Sharief (centre) and South Africa's deputy minister Pinky Kekana (centre right) addressed the gathering at the Egyptian embassy. Photos: Marion Smith The Embassy of Egypt in Pretoria commemorated 73 years since the Egyptian Revolution which took place on 23 July 1952. Ahmad Sharief, Egypt's ambassador to South Africa reviewed the historical and symbolic dimension of the revolution, and how it was a major turning point in the path of national liberation, not only in Egypt but also in various parts of the African continent. Sharief condemned the violations of humanitarian law in the ongoing conflict in Palestine. 'On the humanitarian front, Egypt has led the global response to the Gaza crisis,' he said. 'Over the past two years Egypt has been the one country that contributed the most to humanitarian aid getting into Gaza, hosting hundreds of conveys and field hospitals on its territory.' Addressing the audience in isiZulu for a portion of his speech, Sharief stressed the depth of the strategic partnership between Egypt and South Africa, as well as the history of solidarity. Although located at the northern and southern most points of Africa, the two countries share a historical and good relationship based on upholding the principles of liberation, human dignity and the fight against injustice. 'We look to the future, Egypt and South Africa today stand shoulder to shoulder in a new struggle for economic liberation, sustainable development and continental integration.' He said Egypt and South Africa are committed to building a strategic partnership that serves both countries' aspirations of the continent and the Global South. High-level engagements have intensified, the joint committee has been revived and convened (twice in 2022) and preparations are under way for its 11th session in 2026. 'We aim to accelerate the African Continental Free Trade Area, complete the Cairo to Cape Town highway and deepen cooperation under the Brics framework,' the ambassador said. 'We are deeply grateful for South Africa, for supporting Egypt's accession to Brics and for inviting Egypt to this year's G20 deliberations and ensuring Africa's voice is heard.' South Africa's deputy minister of public service and administration, Pinky Kekana, gave an address on behalf of the government and people of South Africa. Reflecting on the longstanding relationship between the two countries, Kekana said: 'Our two countries therefore acknowledge that it is important to further translate the existing good political relations into concrete trade and investment ties between South Africa and Egypt.' She went on to say that more emphasis would be put on expanding cooperation in various sectors including defence, security, law enforcement, energy, mining, petrochemicals, infrastructure and industrial development, pharmaceuticals, information, communication and technology, science and research, as well as agriculture. This decision to expand cooperation came in the aftermath of the 10th Joint Commission for Cooperation held in Pretoria in April 2024 at ministerial level. This year coincides with the 31st anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and South Africa after the end of apartheid in 1994. In closing Ambassador Sharief said that the two countries 'are brought together by one spirit — the spirit of liberation, dignity and ubuntu'.
The National
a day ago
- Business
- The National
If I was John Swinney, here's what I would say to Donald Trump
You might expect me to want the First Minister to boycott a meeting with the current US president. I personally would not have actively sought out a meeting, but heads of state meet heads of state and talking to people you don't like is part of geopolitics. That does not mean prostrating yourself, or complying – but it also doesn't mean grandstanding. This is not a serious meeting and there is nothing at stake. Talk about the weather for a bit and smile for the camera. It won't change US policy. READ MORE: Donald Trump protest planned near mother's birthplace during Scotland visit Of course most of us want to see someone put Donald Trump in his place, but posing is meaningless – it is what you do that counts. So Scotland's First Minister should courteously welcome Donald Trump back to Scotland and otherwise do his best to say as little as possible – while the rest of us make boaking gestures in the background. That does not mean Scotland should treat this current incarnation of the USA passively. The US has not only become an unreliable partner, it is much less important to us than it was. In reality the British establishment is clinging to the US almost wholly because we have degraded our defence capabilities to the extent that we are entirely reliant on the US for defence. There are also sectors of the Scottish economy that heavily export to the US (notably whisky and textiles) and in turn the US supplies us with a number of software systems on which we rely. In terms of access to markets, however, it is China that is manufacturing cost-effective batteries, solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles. We need those more than we need Oreos. And yes the US still controls the global reserve currency, but Scotland is less exposed to 'dollar bullying' since we don't have our own distinct currency. This gives us some leeway to insulate ourselves from the erratic behaviour of the US. First, we should be tasking our economic development agencies to work with producers to diversify their markets. If China, India, Brazil, Mexico and others aren't buying enough whisky then we need to help them because they're clearly missing out. In the turbulent world in which we currently live, any exporter overly reliant on a single nation state is vulnerable. Second, we need to start to develop direct trading relationships with what used to be known as the Brics counties – because they are dominant among the emerging economic players and all of them have large-scale production capacity that links to our needs. We assume that US corporations will always act as go-betweens and we need to stop assuming that. Third, we should look at areas of vulnerability which could be exposed if the US's behaviour gets more erratic still (we're only one eighth of the way through Trump's term and it isn't clear what is coming next). If a nation state has indicated a willingness to use economic blackmail as a policy tool then you should look at where you might have exposure. One example of this is in software. Think of the public sector's ability to operate and now ask what would happen if a technology boycott was ever enacted – it has already been used against China. How would we cope?Other nations are quietly already addressing this weakness. Denmark has dropped public sector use of all Microsoft Office products and is exploring dropping Microsoft more generally. It has shifted to using open source applications such as OpenOffice (which is what we use in Common Weal). France has also shifted much of its public sector IT to OpenOffice (or rather a version known as LibreOffice) and Germany has just announced it is doing the same. Extending this to a logical conclusion it is simply mad that Scotland is relying solely on US corporate AI. Other nations are training bespoke, public-good AI systems which they then own. Scotland should do the same. Fourth, we should start to move our soft power diplomacy. There is almost a reflex reaction that 'overseas' means 'US'. How much more might we get tapping in to diaspora in Canada, Australia and New Zealand? Might a Tartan Week in Bejing achieve more than one in New York? Does the average Indian policy-maker know we exist? We are moving rapidly into a multipolar world and Scotland must adapt. Insulting the US President is frankly a stupid way to do business – but pretending he isn't a threat to our national interests is unrealistic and being inactive in the face of that risk is really dangerous. Scotland shouldn't stand on the steps and waggle its bare bum at Trump even if it makes us feel better. We should suck up the reality of global diplomacy, do what is needed to get Trump out the country without having developed one of his crazy grudge matches – and then we should roll up our sleeves and take concrete action to make sure no nation can ever bully us like this again.
Business Times
a day ago
- Business
- Business Times
Brics currencies are no realistic alternative to the US dollar
During our lifetimes, we have taken financial governance somewhat for granted. The US dollar has provided the global unit of account, means of payment and store of value, fulfilling all requirements of money. The benign attitude of the US authorities towards the rest of the world using the currency as the sole international money has made this possible. This system has its advantages but also many well-known drawbacks, including control by one government and the need to convert twice, into the vehicle currency and out again, creating costs and risks. Emerging economies have become more assertive in recent years, while the US apparently has reneged on its role as provider of such global currency. The outcome is the discussion about de-dollarisation, driven by academics as well as politicians, while financial markets sit on the fence waiting for a viable alternative to the US dollar. The state of de-dollarisation Presently, the US dollar is used for global denomination, enacting cross-border transactions for current as well as financial accounts. The currency is used as a store of value for small individual investors as well as larger investors looking for safe havens. The denomination function is used for convenience of comparability. This can easily be replaced by artificial intelligence, which could convert national currencies into a weighted unit, such as a basket of currencies from countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The use of multiple national currencies to settle cross-border payments is beginning to happen in the Brics bloc. The renminbi is reportedly already used in 50 per cent of intra-Brics trade, whereas it made up only 2 per cent of global payments in May 2025, according to Swift. The Brics cross-border payments system is still under discussion. The major issue is the settlement of imbalances, as no mechanism has been devised and no vehicle currency has been mandated. The previous Brics Pay initiative turned out to be a hoax and the present suggestion of XRP is a cryptocurrency, abhorred by countries like China. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up China on its own is neither willing nor ready to play the role of a Brics vehicle currency. A clearing institution like the European Payments Union after World War II is called for. However, this mechanism would circumvent the need for the US dollar in only a small share of cross-border transactions – the trade in goods and services, which totalled some US$33 trillion in 2024, about one-third of global gross domestic product. The lion's share of cross-border financial transactions is still conducted in major currencies, such as the US dollar. Greenback still dominates foreign exchange According to the Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) latest triennial survey, the global foreign exchange market is worth US$7.5 trillion a day, matching a year's trade in goods and services in only five days. This is made up of spot, futures and swaps, where the US dollar was still counterpart in 88 per cent of all transactions in 2022. In comparison, the renminbi made up 7 per cent, well below its share in the special drawing rights basket of close to 12 per cent. The next BIS triennial survey was conducted in April 2025, with results to be published later in the year. Other global financial markets, such as interbank and money markets, stock and bond markets plus derivatives markets, show a similar story. The major players trading in these markets are also the ones looking for store of value, hedging positions in the short as well as long term. These are the global banks, corporations and investors. There has been little evidence of them abandoning major currencies in favour of Brics national currencies, which are at the whim of political leaders. As the US administration is neglecting its responsibility for providing a global currency, the search is on for alternatives. Brics currencies have been mentioned, but a common Brics currency backed by gold was off the agenda at the July Brics summit in Rio de Janeiro. This leaves the national currencies, ranging from the renminbi to the Ethiopian birr. As Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum contributors Gary Smith and Udaibir Das have argued, a new Brics financial governance is highly unlikely. In the absence of such a political agreement, a trustworthy vehicle currency might emerge for settlement of Brics trades that is a far cry from replacing the US dollar. OMFIF The writer is a senior research fellow at Zhejiang University
Bangkok Post
3 days ago
- Business
- Bangkok Post
Will Indonesia regret its trade deal with Trump?
Be careful what you wish for, lest it come true. That ancient proverb comes to mind when considering the eagerness of America's trade partners around the world to negotiate deals with US President Donald Trump's administration. Four countries already have, with Indonesia the latest to do so -- and possibly the first to regret it. The United States has announced a complex, tiered tariff regime, including a 25% tariff on labour-intensive goods such as textiles and footwear, a 40% tariff on goods suspected of being "transshipped" or having content of Chinese origin, and a 50% tariff on so-called "strategic sectors", including aluminium, copper, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. An additional 10% levy applies to exports from Brics countries (including Indonesia). Countries might also face anti-dumping duties, which are often steep, politically driven, and inconsistently applied. While these measures hurt US importers and consumers the most, they also significantly heighten uncertainty for exporters. By guaranteeing that Indonesia will not face tariffs exceeding 19% on its exports to the US through 2029, its new agreement with the US seems to mitigate this uncertainty, providing a level of protection against Mr Trump's tariff escalations. Indonesia can now rest assured that it will not face the kinds of extreme tariffs to which China has been subjected. Indonesia's government argues that such a deal was essential because even though the US accounts for only 9.9% of Indonesia's total exports, the trade relationship is disproportionately important. Indonesian exports to the US -- including apparel, footwear, furniture, rubber products, and integrated circuits -- are labour-intensive, they note, and thus support a substantial number of jobs. But these sectors may remain vulnerable to higher tariffs. As it stands, it is not clear whether the 19% cap applies to all Indonesian exports, or if some products -- particularly those containing Chinese inputs -- could still be subject to steeper duties. In any case, 19% tariffs are very burdensome, and Indonesia has also agreed to impose no tariffs on US goods. At best, the deal reduces losses; it does not deliver gains. Moreover, to secure this dubious victory, Indonesia reportedly agreed to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft and commit to importing US$15 billion (484.8 billion baht) worth of US energy products (nearly 40% of Indonesia's total energy imports) and $4.5 billion worth of American agricultural products. But many important questions remain unanswered. How will these purchases be financed, and on what terms? What are the specifications, unit costs, and delivery timelines? Who will oversee procurement, and how will transparency be ensured? Most importantly, if these exchanges are merely political gestures, they could turn out to be economically damaging. The use of jets from Boeing, which has faced a string of quality and safety scandals in recent years, could create considerable risks for Indonesia's airlines. And imports of US agricultural goods risk undercutting local farmers and breaching commitments to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as other trade agreements. The deal might affect Indonesia's trade relationships in other ways. Indonesia has concluded comprehensive trade agreements with several major partners, including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. It is close to finalising one with the European Union, and it recently launched negotiations with the United Arab Emirates. If US firms are granted preferential treatment and zero-tariff market access, these partners might question Indonesia's commitment to fair competition -- or demand comparable terms. Beyond trade, the agreement risks eroding Indonesia's carefully maintained strategic neutrality. Indonesia has long sought to balance its relationships with the US and China, but this deal could be seen as a lurch towards the US, exposing the country to escalating pressure to choose a side. As Indonesia becomes increasingly politically entangled with one giant -- with far-reaching economic and strategic consequences -- it is at risk of becoming economically dependent on the other. Over the past decade, Indonesia's trade with China has more than doubled, reflecting deepening economic ties. While Indonesia exports mostly commodities and processed metals to China -- especially nickel, iron and steel, mineral fuels, and vegetable oils -- it imports high-value machinery, electrical equipment, vehicles, and plastics from the country. In the face of challenging trade relations with the world's two mightiest powers, Indonesia's government deserves credit for seeking trade assurances. But the deal that it secured with the US lacks clarity, transparency, mutuality, and strategic vision. As a result, it may turn out to be largely symbolic, bringing only a slight reduction in short-term costs. In the long term, it might prove economically and even geopolitically damaging. Three urgent steps can help prevent this outcome. First, Indonesia's government must demand full clarity from the US on the 19% tariff cap: are all its exports shielded from Trump's sector-specific classifications, or is the real cost of the deal hidden in the fine print? Second, the authorities should publish the full details of their procurement commitments, particularly the purchase of Boeing aircraft and US agricultural and energy products, so that these commitments' financial implications and strategic value can be assessed. Finally, Indonesia must reaffirm a long-term trade strategy anchored in diversification, rules-based agreements, and regional leadership. Above all, it needs a strategy that avoids excessive dependence on any single partner and preserves its autonomy in an increasingly polarised global economy. Only then can Indonesia ensure that a handshake in Washington does not become a handcuff at home. ©2025 Project Syndicate
Hindustan Times
3 days ago
- Business
- Hindustan Times
China's Xi Gives Up Air Miles for More Time at Home
Chinese leader Xi Jinping isn't quite the frequent flier he used to be. People are wondering why. The most well-traveled leader in China's history has reduced his international journeys in recent years, easing a once-packed diplomatic schedule that had honed his reputation as a globe-trotting statesman. Xi traveled to 10 countries across four overseas trips in 2024, and five nations over three trips in the first half of this year, compared with his average of visiting about 14 countries a year between 2013 and 2019, and a 20-nation peak he set in 2014. Since resuming foreign travel in 2022 after a 32-month pause during the Covid pandemic, he has yet to match the peripatetic pace he set during his first two terms in power. Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan disembarked from a plane in Bali, Indonesia, in 2022. This month, Xi skipped an annual summit of the Brics bloc of emerging nations after participating in the past 12 meetings—the second time in two years that he missed a major international gathering where he had been a fixture. Both times he sent Premier Li Qiang, one of Xi's top lieutenants, to represent Beijing. Meanwhile, a China-European Union summit originally set to take place in Brussels this year was moved to Beijing after Chinese officials signaled to EU counterparts that Xi had no plans to visit Europe this year, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. Xi is scheduled to meet EU leaders in Beijing on Thursday when they visit for the summit. Chinese officials haven't explained why Xi chose not to travel for these events, or commented on his reduced foreign visits. China's Foreign Ministry didn't respond to a request for comment. Some analysts say Xi, 72, may be dialing back his travels to devolve some of the many responsibilities he wields as leader, particularly as he grows older and approaches the end of his third five-year term as Communist Party chief in 2027. 'Xi is increasingly willing to delegate the operational bits of foreign policy to his trusted interlocutors,' said Dylan Loh, an assistant professor at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University who studies China's diplomacy. Xi may be doing so to better manage his energy, given his age, and to prioritize domestic issues as Beijing grapples with persistent economic headwinds such as weak consumer demand, according to Loh. 'China is certainly not taking its eyes off foreign policy,' Loh said. 'But it seems to me that Xi is now content with exercising broad strategic direction and while selectively choosing his trips abroad.' Since taking power in 2012, Xi has used his foreign excursions to expand China's economic and political reach around the globe—and stamp his mark as a world leader. These trips have often come with promises of infrastructure investment and deeper trade ties, aimed at positioning Beijing as a benign partner and strategic counterweight to Washington. More recently, China is also trying to capitalize on what many see as a U.S. retreat from global leadership, marked by President Trump's moves to cut foreign aid, sideline multilateral institutions and impose tariffs on adversaries and allies alike. Xi has sought to cast China as a responsible power and a source of stability, using a mix of political, economic and soft-power tools to reshape global narratives in Beijing's favor. To that end, Xi has stayed active on the diplomatic circuit—as a host. China lifted its Covid border controls in late 2022, and foreign leaders have been traveling there at a frequency similar to prepandemic levels. In 2023, Xi hosted at least 74 visits by foreign heads of state and government, as well as de facto leaders, according to a Wall Street Journal review of Chinese Foreign Ministry disclosures. The count, which includes repeat visits by some leaders, rose to 84 last year, compared with the average of about 76 trips that Xi hosted annually between 2013 and 2019. Xi has welcomed leaders from more than a dozen countries so far this year, including Australia's prime minister, who visited Beijing this month. Xi is expected to host more foreign counterparts visiting China later this year to attend diplomatic summits and a military parade. Xi's lieutenants have picked up the slack in foreign travel. Li, during his first full year as premier in 2024, journeyed abroad at a pace similar to that set by his predecessor, Li Keqiang, before the pandemic. Li Qiang traveled to 13 countries last year, matching the number that Li Keqiang visited in his most prolific year in 2014. Another frequent flier is Liu Jianchao, a veteran diplomat and chief of the Communist Party's International Department, which handles relations with foreign political parties and socialist states. A candidate for foreign minister, Liu has traveled more often than his predecessor did since getting the job in 2022, including trips to the U.S. and other Western democracies that past International Department chiefs generally hadn't visited. As China's leader, Xi has embarked on more than 50 international trips and visited more than 70 countries, far surpassing what his predecessors did. He has also hosted visiting world leaders more frequently than previous Chinese heads of state or recent U.S. presidents, according to data collated by Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute. The Covid pandemic kept Xi in China between 2020 and 2022. During that time, he mostly relied on phone calls and videoconferencing to engage with foreign counterparts. When he restarted international travel in late 2022, Xi first visited nearby countries in Asia before venturing further in subsequent trips. Xi's evolving travel patterns drew attention in the fall of 2023, when he skipped a summit of the Group of 20 advanced and developing economies that India was hosting. He sent Premier Li instead. Chinese officials didn't say why Xi missed an event where he had been a regular participant. China had typically been represented by its president at G-20 summits since the bloc began arranging leader-level meetings in 2008. In early July, when Xi skipped the Brics summit, Li filled in at the meeting in Brazil, where Xi had gone just seven months earlier to attend a G-20 summit and conduct a state visit. Diplomats and analysts say that Xi's decision to skip a Brics summit is notable given his efforts to boost the relevance of multilateral groupings where China holds greater sway, compared with institutions such as G-20, which Beijing has portrayed as too beholden to the U.S. The Brics group—named after its early members of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—has presented itself as a multilateral counterweight to a U.S.-dominated world order. 'Physical stamina is a precious political resource, and Xi knows it. As Xi grows older, he is carefully managing his travel to preserve his strength,' said Thomas, the fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute. 'Skipping the Brics summit in Brazil likely had less to do with geopolitics and more with jet lag. A 48-hour round-trip for a two-day meeting just was not worth the physical toll.' Write to Chun Han Wong at
