
Little-known U.N. Command bases in Japan play a critical security role in Asia
From Futenma, Kadena and White Beach in Okinawa to Sasebo on Kyushu and Yokota and Yokosuka on Honshu — these flags indicate bases across Japan designated for multinational usage. Alongside the U.S., their operations are overseen by a small but important headquarters west of Tokyo that is part of the United Nations Command (UNC) force structure established in 1950 to support South Korea during the Korean War.
It's called the UNC's rear area headquarters — or UNC-Rear — and the roles it plays could prove crucial in the event of a renewed breakout of hostilities on the peninsula as it would facilitate the flow of forces, assets and materiel from nine UNC member states through Japan.
While not in command of military forces, the five-member team currently led by Royal Australian Air Force Group Capt. Andrew Johnson would support critical logistical operations through the seven U.S./UNC bases, all of which were designated by both Washington and Tokyo in the 1954 UNC-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
'We prepare and plan for contingency operations and engage with UNC member states constantly so that they know how to access Japan under the SOFA and are familiar with the concept of defending the Korean Peninsula in times of crisis,' Johnson told The Japan Times in an exclusive interview at UNC-Rear's Yokota Air Base headquarters.
'We (UNC-Rear) don't own those forces,' he noted, 'but we can facilitate their entry into Japan and so they can prepare through a process known as RSOI — reception, staging, onward movement and integration — to become part of the fighting force.'
UNC-Rear's mission remains as critical as ever, with North Korea improving its nuclear and missile development programs while deepening its military alliance with Russia.
UNC-Rear commander, Royal Australian Air Force Group Capt. Andrew Johnson, at the UNC-Rear Command at Yokota Air Base in Fussa, Tokyo, on Tuesday. |
GABRIEL DOMINGUEZ
Last week, North Korea warned of 'grave consequences' should the United States, Japan and South Korea continue to 'deliberately ignore' its security concerns. The warning followed a recent joint aerial exercise by the three nations that featured at least one U.S. B-52 heavy bomber, marking the aircraft's first deployment to the Korean Peninsula this year.
Amid the heightened tensions, Johnson stressed the importance of keeping destabilizing forces in the region at bay, with UNC keeping a laser focus on its main mission: to enforce the terms of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
'The work that we do as a command, namely to be ready for a contingency or crisis at any moment, has become really important now,' the UNC-Rear director said.
Part of the concern, he noted, is that there are already a number of potential flash points throughout the region.
'If North Korea looks like it could be the one triggering the region, then you'd want to make sure that you do everything to deter them as well as prevent any situation that may, for instance, exacerbate the Russian conflict in Ukraine, or whatever else might flow from it.'
To maintain both readiness and preparedness, UNC member states regularly send ships, aircraft and personnel to the bases in Japan, rehearsing the procedures necessary to conduct missions during a contingency while also carrying out other activities such as monitoring United Nations sanctions against Pyongyang.
However, despite operating under the U.N. Security Council mandate, the UNC is not a subsidiary or subordinate organization of the United Nations.
The United Nations's rear area headquarters — also known as UNC-Rear — could prove crucial in the event of a renewed breakout of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula as it would facilitate the rapid flow of forces, assets and materiel from nine UNC member states through Japan. |
GABRIEL DOMINGUEZ
'Even though it was established under U.N. Security Council Resolution 84, UNC is a multinational, United States-led command,' Johnson noted, explaining that as there is a standing mandate that does not require follow-on U.N. decision, 'no single country, including Russia or China, can block UNC activation in response to North Korean aggression.'
That said, there is no defense treaty between the UNC's 18 member states that binds them to any specific military action in the event of a Korean contingency. Instead, the countries have committed to support the implementation of the armistice and, should North Korea renew hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, be 'united and prompt to resist.'
How they do so, however, remains up to the individual governments.
'There is no obligation,' Johnson said.
'Each member state can contribute in any way they want,' he added, pointing to the diverse range of capabilities each can bring to bear, be it in terms of troops, assets or technologies, including in areas such as cyber and space. Others might choose to contribute through financial or other nonlethal support such as logistics or medical aid, he said.
Yet there is more to the UNC-Rear's role than logistics and contingency plans.
'From my vantage point, our mission is also to continue working closely with the Japanese government to support peace and security in Northeast Asia, which is in our nations' best interests,' Johnson said.
'We give them a broad outline of the types of UNC activities that are occurring so they're aware of both the flow and effect that these have on Japanese security.'
'The work that we do as a command, namely to be ready for a contingency or crisis at any moment, has become really important now,' Johnson said. |
GABRIEL DOMINGUEZ
Maintaining close relations with Japan is important not only with regard to the bases, but also the intermediate staging areas that UNC forces would be using in the event of a conflict.
At the same time, the UNC-Rear coordinates requirements on behalf of the nine SOFA signatories with Tokyo while also relaying Japanese interests to the UNC headquarters in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, which has a staff of around 90 multinational personnel along with three other subordinate organizations such as the U.N. Command Military Armistice Commission.
The much larger UNC, which marked its 75th anniversary this month, fulfills other roles, including co-administering the Korean Demilitarized Zone with the (North) Korean People's Army, building interoperability between allies and facilitating dialogue with North Korea.
These roles have come into focus as Tokyo seeks to manage regional security challenges. While Japan hasn't joined UNC as a formal member state, cooperation with the command allows routine engagement with multinational forces and meaningful contributions to the effort to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Experts say that UNC has played a quiet but consistent role over the years. While it has evolved with time, having an organization specifically dedicated to deterrence through a ready-made coalition has helped temper potential clashes and manage escalation in the region.
They also say that UNC-Rear is a reminder of the important role that Japan plays in any Korean Peninsula conflict.
The small multinational team is prepared to continue this decades-long work in collaboration with the Japanese government and other partners.
'We are in this for the security of Northeast Asia,' Johnson noted, 'so we do work towards the mutual outcome of peace and stability for the region.'
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