Trump reveals 25% tariff on India, unspecified penalties for buying Russian oil
India 'is our friend,' Trump said on his Truth Social platform, but its tariffs on US products 'are far too high'.
The Republican president added India buys military equipment and oil from Russia, enabling Moscow's war in Ukraine. As a result, he intends to charge an additional 'penalty' starting on Friday (local time) as part of the launch of his administration's revised tariffs on multiple countries.
Trump told reporters today the two countries were still in the middle of negotiations on trade despite the tariffs slated to begin in a few days.
'We're talking to India now," the president said. "We'll see what happens.'
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The Indian government said today it's studying the implications of Trump's tariffs announcement.
India and the US have been engaged in negotiations on concluding a 'fair, balanced and mutually beneficial' bilateral trade agreement over the last few months, and New Delhi remains committed to that objective, India's Trade Ministry said in a statement.
Trump today signed separate orders to tax imports of copper at 50% and justify his 50% tariffs on Brazil due to their criminal prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro and treatment of US social media companies. Trump also signed an order saying that government now had the systems in place to close the tariff loophole on 'de minimis' shipments, which had enabled goods priced under $800 (NZ$1355) to enter America duty-free, largely from China.
Trump also said on Truth Social that he was meeting today with a trade delegation from South Korea, which currently faces 25% tariffs starting on Friday (local time). He also said the US has reached a deal with Pakistan that includes the development of its oil reserves. Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was briefing him on trade talks with China.
Trump's view on tariffs
Trump's announcement comes after a slew of negotiated trade frameworks with the European Union, Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia — all of which he said would open markets for American goods while enabling the US to raise tax rates on imports. The president views tariff revenues as a way to help offset the budget deficit increases tied to his recent income tax cuts and generate more domestic factory jobs.
While Trump has effectively wielded tariffs as a cudgel to reset the terms of trade, the economic impact is uncertain as most economists expect a slowdown in US growth and greater inflationary pressures as some of the costs of the taxes are passed along to domestic businesses and consumers.
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There's also the possibility of more tariffs coming on trade partners with Russia as well as on pharmaceutical drugs and computer chips.
Kevin Hassett, director of the White House National Economic Council, said Trump and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer would announce the Russia-related tariff rates on India at a later date.
Tariffs face European pushback
The morning's headlines in 90 seconds, including tsunami threat remains for NZ and quake sparks Russian volcanic eruption, plus the pop star and the politician spotted having dinner. (Source: 1News)
Trump's approach of putting a 15% tariff on America's long-standing allies in the EU is also generating pushback, possibly causing European partners as well as Canada to seek alternatives to US leadership on the world stage.
French President Emmanuel Macron said today in the aftermath of the trade framework that Europe 'does not see itself sufficiently' as a global power, saying in a cabinet meeting that negotiations with the US will continue as the agreement gets formalised.
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'To be free, you have to be feared,' Macron said. 'We have not been feared enough. There is a greater urgency than ever to accelerate the European agenda for sovereignty and competitiveness.'
Seeking a deeper partnership with India
Washington has long sought to develop a deeper partnership with New Delhi, which is seen as a bulwark against China.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has established a good working relationship with Trump, and the two leaders are likely to further boost cooperation between their countries. When Trump in February met with Modi, the US president said that India would start buying American oil and natural gas.
The new tariffs on India could complicate its goal of doubling bilateral trade with the US to $500 billion (NZ$847.3 billion) by 2030. The two countries have had five rounds of negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement. While US has been seeking greater market access and zero tariff on almost all its exports, India has expressed reservations on throwing open sectors such as agriculture and dairy, which employ a bulk of the country's population for livelihood, Indian officials said.
The Census Bureau reported that the US ran a $45.8 billion (NZ$77.6 billion) trade imbalance in goods with India last year, meaning it imported more than it exported.
At a population exceeding 1.4 billion people, India is the world's largest country and a possible geopolitical counterbalance to China. India and Russia have close relations, and New Delhi has not supported Western sanctions on Moscow over its war in Ukraine.
The new tariffs could put India at a disadvantage in the US market relative to Vietnam, Bangladesh and, possibly, China, said Ajay Sahai, director general of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations.
'We are back to square one as Trump hasn't spelled out what the penalties would be in addition to the tariff,' Sahai said. 'The demand for Indian goods is bound to be hit.'
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Written by: Alex Travelli Photographs by: Saumya Khandelwal, Eric Lee ©2025 THE NEW YORK TIMES
