Intense skirmishes in Libya - World - Al-Ahram Weekly

Al-Ahram Weekly

22-05-2025

The flareup of violence in the Libyan capital Tripoli last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation in the country and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war
The Libyan Presidential Council, in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), launched a mechanism to stabilise the truce and ceasefire in Tripoli on 18 May.
Meanwhile, the Libyan capital was rocked by intense skirmishes last week between the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime (RADA), which is affiliated with the Presidential Council, and the 444th Combat Brigade, which is part of the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU).
As these forces clashed, several armed groups in Western Libya attempted to march on the capital. The unrest erupted after a security operation carried out by the GNU against the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) following the assassination of SSA commander Abdulghani Al-Kikli in Tripoli on 12 May. The circumstances surrounding his assassination remain unclear.
Al-Kikli (also known as Ghnewa) had commanded one of the largest militia groups in Tripoli. While nominally subordinate to the Presidential Council, it operated independently. According to some reports, Al-Kikli was killed following disputes with leaders of other armed factions from Tripoli and Misrata over control of key government facilities in the capital, such as the Libyan Telecommunications Holding Company and the Audit Bureau.
During the GNU security operation, government forces took over the Abu Salim district in Southern Libya, which had served as Al-Kikli's and the SSA's stronghold. Tensions in the capital then heightened further when GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah issued a decree dissolving the RADA and dispatched the 444th Brigade to seize the RADA headquarters in Eastern Tripoli.
In response, Abdelraouf Kara, the commander of the RADA, sought support from militia factions in Warshefana and Zawiya, tribal areas west of Tripoli opposed to Dbeibah.
As has occurred before with many of the armed factions that proliferated in post-Gaddafi Libya, Kara and 444th Brigade Commander Mahmoud Hamza had once been allies. Both are from the Souq Al-Jumaa district of eastern Tripoli, share a similar radical Salafi ideological outlook, and worked closely together until their rupture in 2022.
According to Libyan sources, the Warshefana and Zawiya militias aimed not just to defend Kara and the RADA but also to join forces with him to topple Dbeibah and replace him with a new prime minister representative of various influential forces in Western Libya.
The clashes between the RADA and the 444th Brigade last week brought life in the capital to a halt and caused significant damage to public and private property in Tripoli. Although a ceasefire was announced after two days of fierce fighting and neutral forces have been deployed as peacekeepers, the authorities have yet to release any official casualty figures.
Meanwhile, Dbeibah is also facing pressure from other quarters. Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) Aguila Saleh called on the Attorney General to launch an investigation into the GNU prime minister in connection with the assassination of Al-Kikli and the events in the capital and impose a travel ban on him.
Khaled Al-Mishri, who is contesting the validity of the elections that led to his replacement as the head of the High Council of State (HCS) by Mohamed Takala, has called for the formation of a new government in coordination with the HoR.
The GNU has lost its legitimacy, Al-Mishri declared. As though to confirm this, anti-government protests then erupted over the weekend, demanding Dbeibah's removal and the appointment of a new interim prime minister to oversee the rest of the transitional period until national elections are held.
To quell the violence and de-escalate tensions triggered by Dbeibah's actions, Mohamed Al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council, officially annulled Dbeibah's decrees to restructure the security agencies, including the order to dissolve the RADA. He also proclaimed a truce and reached an agreement with UNSMIL to secure the current ceasefire and enhance security in the capital.
The agreement was concluded in the presence of UN Special Representative and UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh and her Deputy for Political Affairs Stephanie Khoury. The mechanism calls for a 'Truce Committee' tasked with promoting a permanent ceasefire among the militia factions in Tripoli, protecting the civilian population, and reaching an agreement on security arrangements for the capital.
In a televised address on 17 May, Dbeibah attempted to explain the government's security operation in Abu Salim. It was part of broader security arrangements for Tripoli that had targeted a militia that was beyond the control of the state, had extorted public institutions, had taken over six banks, and had exploited the Internal Security Agency for private gain, he said.
The militia had committed many violations in the areas it controls and had contributed to the fragmentation of sovereign institutions.
Dbeibah attributed the subsequent violence to an attempted 'coup' masterminded by Aguila Saleh, commander of the Libyan National Army in Benghazi, and Khaled Al-Mishri. He stressed his commitment to restoring order and consolidating state authority in Tripoli and expressed his dismay over the protests calling for his removal and the formation of a new government.
He cast the GNU, which is not an elected body or created by an elected body, as a manifestation of the democratic gains of the 17 February 2011 Revolution.
The sudden flareup of violence in the capital last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war. Dbeibah's insistence on implementing what he called new security arrangements but what others read as a bid to consolidate power is a reflection of his government's fragility, as manifested in the HoR's withdrawal of confidence and the resignation of several ministers.
Some reports suggest that he is now engaged in talks with various political forces to engineer a cabinet reshuffle. Towards this end, he hopes to take advantage of the fragmentation among his political rivals as well as the general animosity between the HoR and HSC, which continue to haggle over details regarding the electoral laws and the constitutional framework.
Meanwhile, international stakeholders are still divided over how to handle the Libyan crisis.
Dbeibah is in a delicate position. He wants to demonstrate his ability to enforce the new security arrangements in Tripoli, dismantle the power centres of rival militias, and remove them from government institutions that they saw as their own turf.
However, achieving this will require international support, something that was largely absent during the recent clashes, although now it may have quietly reemerged in the form of UNSMIL's coordination with the Presidential Council on ceasefire stabilisation.
If Dbeibah succeeds in eliminating the RADA, as he did the SSA last week, he will have secured his personal control over the capital, sidelining rivals and bolstering his influence as the main power in Western Libya. This presents a dilemma for both Libyans and the international community.
On the one hand, if the Tripoli-based GNU can assert its control over the capital and Western Libya, this might ensure the success of efforts to reform the government institutions. However, tensions would seethe dangerously beneath the surface due to the ongoing opposition to Dbeibah and his government among significant political forces.
Conversely, Dbeibeh's failure to secure control over the capital would contribute to perpetuating the ongoing security chaos and institutional collapse, which are hampering efforts to rebuild and improve the country's degraded public services.
This is why many believe that institutional and structural reform should take priority, especially given the ongoing deadlock in the political process. The aim of this is to lay the legislative and practical groundwork for the long overdue Libyan presidential and parliamentary elections to restore the legitimacy of the country's institutions and leadership.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Follow us on:
Facebook
Instagram
Whatsapp
Short link: