Civilian death toll mounts in Syria's Alawite heartland despite end of government offensive
The continuation of arbitrary killings indicates a lack of protection in the area, to where many of the Alawite minority in urban centres in the interior fled when it became apparent in December that former president Bashar Al Assad would fall. Syria's new government called off the campaign to spread control throughout the west coast after 1,383 civilians, the vast majority of them Alawites, were killed in the four-day offensive, the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights estimates.
It was one of the largest killing sprees since the civil war started in 2011 after peaceful demonstrations demanding the removal of the Assad regime. Mr Al Assad was eventually ousted on December 8 last year as a result of a brief offensive led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), the group formerly linked with Al Qaeda, now in control of the government in Damascus.
A physics teacher in the Amara neighbourhood of Jableh, a mixed city on the Mediterranean that also has Sunni inhabitants, said militiamen entered the district on Monday night, after the government announced military operations had ended. They stormed houses, took ten men, then shot them in the street.
'They left the women and children," the teacher said. "Some of them appeared to be Chechen. We did not understand what they were saying."
Foreign fighters have been a component of HTS-raids in the area, which started in December, to disarm former Assad loyalists and seize what the government calls regime remnants, particularly former senior officers and those suspected of committing atrocities.
However, the HTS-led forces had been facing increased resistance, including ambushes that prompted the government to pour thousands of security personnel and auxiliaries into the coastal area last week.
The deployment ushered in a new phase of the campaign, with the attacking forces bombing urban neighbourhoods and villages into submission, with seemingly little regard for civilian casualties, before sending in infantry brigades to seize control.
Ahmad Al Zuaiter, an Alawite who spent years as a political prisoner over his opposition to the Assad regime, said five people were taken from their homes in Hureison village on Tuesday and executed. Other sources put the death toll at 21 in Hureison alone, with houses having been burnt by the militiamen, who withdrew from the village on Wednesday. Bodies were found several hours later scattered around the area, which is located on the M1 motorway, south of the city of Baniyas.
"A sweet maker and his brother were among the dead," Mr Al Zuaiter said. Another set of brothers were also executed, he added.
A shopkeeper said two of his relatives were killed in the nearby village of Qurfays. He said he was among the many to have fled their homes in the area since last week to the Alawite Mountains overlooking the west coast. "We are surviving [mainly] on what the wilderness is providing," he said.
Many in the community regard the ascendancy of HTS to power as a mortal threat to the Alawites' existence, after dominating power in Syria from 1963 until the Assad regime's downfall last year. Ahmad Al Shara, Syria's new interim President and the leader of HTS, has appointed a committee to investigate the recent bloodshed on the coast but he blamed regime remnants for the violence.
On Thursday, senior UN official Stephane Dujarric said the organisation is concerned about "escalating tensions among communities in Syria." All parties must "protect civilians and stop inflammatory rhetoric and actions", he said.
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In the northeast, as in the south, the core issue is not just who controls territory, but what kind of Syria will emerge from the ruins of the old regime. The standoff reflects a deeper failure of the transitional government to offer a political framework broad enough to accommodate competing demands. Instead of drawing diverse factions into a shared national project, the new state risks becoming just another centre to resist. As President Ahmad al-Sharaa's transitional government struggles to assert meaningful authority over a deeply fractured landscape, the real power in many areas lies not with national institutions, but with local militias and tribal councils. Public services are inconsistent, state institutions are under-resourced, and accountability mechanisms remain largely absent. Efforts to centralise power have not restored confidence. The presence of government troops is viewed by many communities not as a step towards rebuilding trust, but as the reappearance of a coercive state they had long rejected. Broader disengagement Sweida has thus exposed the limits of the transitional government's model. Without a credible vision for political inclusion and power-sharing, the risk is not merely that Sweida remains restive. It is that its experience becomes a template for other regions - each turning inward, asserting its own structures of authority, and disengaging from a centre that offers little beyond rhetoric. Syria's political future remains deeply uncertain. The transitional government has inherited not just a broken state, but a fragmented society without a shared vision for what comes next. The most constructive outcome would be a negotiated form of decentralisation - one that acknowledges the realities on the ground and grants regions like Sweida and the northeast meaningful self-governance within a broader national framework. Such a model would not resolve all tensions, but it could offer a foundation for coexistence, recognising diversity as a structural feature of the new Syria, rather than a threat to its unity. A more likely path, however, is continued fragmentation. In this scenario, the country would remain formally intact, but functionally divided into competing zones of influence - each with its own political logic, security apparatus and external patrons. This model would risk institutionalising inequality and fuelling resentment between regions. The most dangerous trajectory is a renewed descent into civil war. If the transitional government continues to assert central control without legitimacy, and if local actors see no space for genuine political participation, identity-based mobilisations could spark a new cycle of violence. But this time, the battle lines would not be drawn between the regime and opposition; they would emerge instead from rival communities, self-declared authorities and contested visions for the state. Regional influences While domestic dynamics are driving much of Syria's fragmentation, regional actors continue to shape the boundaries of what is possible - and what is not. In the current phase, two powers stand out in their influence: Israel and Turkey. Israel has made clear that it will not tolerate any security vacuum along its borders, especially where it perceives threats linked to Hezbollah or other Iranian proxies. Its recent air strikes served as a stark reminder of Israel's red lines - and its readiness to act unilaterally in defence of its strategic interests. Turkey, meanwhile, has expanded its influence in northern Syria through affiliated armed groups and administrative control over key areas. Its overriding concern remains the containment of Kurdish autonomy, complicating any attempts at national reconciliation or unified governance in Syria. The fall of the Assad regime removed a central pillar of authoritarian control, but it did not resolve the deeper questions of identity, representation and governance By contrast, Iran and Russia, once central actors in Syria's war, have receded into the background. Preoccupied with internal crises and overstretched internationally, both have limited capacity or will to shape Syria's post-Assad order. Their reduced presence has left a vacuum that is being filled not by diplomacy or reconstruction, but by local actors and foreign powers with narrow agendas. For the transitional government, in the absence of a clear regional consensus or sustained international commitment, the new Syrian state faces the challenge of rebuilding under the shadow of fragmentation - often with external actors working at cross purposes. Syria is no longer at war, but neither is it at peace. The fall of the Assad regime removed a central pillar of authoritarian control, but it did not resolve the deeper questions of identity, representation and governance that continue to divide the country. In Sweida, a long-marginalised community has moved from quiet discontent to open mobilisation. In the northeast, the SDF refuses to integrate into a national framework it does not trust. Across the country, the transitional government has failed to offer a political model capable of bridging these divides; instead, its actions have often deepened mistrust. The crisis in Sweida is not an isolated episode. It is a warning that without structural changes, other regions may follow a similar path, turning inwards to defend their own interests. What we are witnessing may not be the exception - it may be the future. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
