Pakistan Sets Sights On Moon, Hopes China Can Give It A Lift By 2035
Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) will oversee the lunar exploration mission as Islamabad deepens its reliance on Chinese assistance.
Pakistan is gearing up to land its first spacecraft on the Moon by 2035 with the help of its all-weather friend China, despite starting its space research programme almost a decade before India, which successfully accomplished the task in 2023.
During a meeting with Chinese officials, Pakistan's Minister for Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, Ahsan Iqbal, called for deeper reliance on China to fill gaps in Pakistan's space and nuclear programmes, according to Geo News.
Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) has been tasked with overseeing the lunar exploration mission. SUPARCO is yet to launch a satellite or space mission on its own to space.
Pakistan's Dependence On China
Iqbal said Pakistan would create and attach a 35-kg lunar rover to China's Chang'e-8 mission in 2028 to explore the Moon's South Pole. The rover will conduct scientific experiments, analyse terrain, and assess resource utilisation.
The meeting also included Head of China's Atomic Energy Authority and Space Agency, Shan Zhongde. The discussion largely highlighted Pakistan's growing dependence on Chinese technology and expertise.
Iqbal claimed that the country's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has reinvigorated the country's stagnant space science sector through the 'Uraan Pakistan" initiative. He also said three Pakistani-made satellites were launched recently with China's assistance, and Islamabad aims to send its first astronaut to space by 2026 by relying again on China's space station, clearly lacking independent capability.
Pakistan's Problems
Notably, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has made significant strides in space exploration compared to its neighbour, with notable success with its lunar mission, Chandrayaan, in 2023, and its Mars mission, Mangalyaan. India is now also on its way to its first manned mission in space, Gaganyaan, scheduled for the first quarter of early 2027.
On the other hand, Pakistan has been struggling with the rise of terrorist attacks, basic infrastructure and economic instability. The SUPARCO has been impeded by limited government spending and leadership issues, with retired army generals heading the agency for the past 11 years.
Pakistan relies heavily on China for satellite launches and development, limiting its indigenous capabilities. The battered country has sought more Chinese help in nuclear power and quantum computing amid a domestic resource crunch.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani government once again failed to meet its financial obligations under CPEC, with overdue payments to Chinese power producers soaring to PKR 423 billion by June 2025, according to The Express Tribune.
(with ANI inputs)
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