Nuclear nightmare: Will India-Pakistan's precarious peace last?
The Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, said on May 12 that India has only 'paused' its military action against Pakistan and would 'retaliate on its own terms' to any attacks.
The latest episode in the long-running conflict between these nuclear powers was triggered on April 22. Militants from a group known as The Resistance Front, which India says is a proxy for the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group, killed 26 tourists in the picturesque resort town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. India alleges Pakistan's involvement, which it denies.
The fact that India and Pakistan were able to agree to a ceasefire as escalations spiralled is reason for optimism. It shows that internal calculations and international pressure can pull the two parties back from the brink. However, the ceasefire represents an incredibly precarious peace. Can it be sustained?
Recent experience shows that sustained ceasefires are possible between the two states. In February 2021, India and Pakistan's militaries signed a ceasefire to end four months of cross-border skirmishes. The agreement was a reaffirmation of an original ceasefire understanding from 2003.
Only two violations were recorded across the line of control separating Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir for the rest of the year, dropping to one in 2022. This compared to 4,645 such incidents in 2020.
The reduction led to optimism that armed rebellion in Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan claim in full, was in persistent decline. In March 2025, just one month before the deadly Pahalgam attack, security sources in India estimated that there were only 77 active militants operating on the Indian side of the border.
The drop in violence was a result of combined international and domestic pressure on Pakistan. The Financial Action Task Force, an organisation that monitors countries' efforts to tackle terrorist financing and recommends financial sanctions against non-compliant states, added Pakistan to its 'grey list' in 2018.
This listing forced Pakistan to introduce a string of policy measures to curb terrorism financing. Pakistan was removed from the list in 2022 due to significant improvements in its counter-terrorism framework.
But, as the Kashmir conundrum is at the heart of Pakistani national identity, it has often been employed as a political strategy to shore up domestic support. And in recent years, as Pakistan's powerful army has grappled with overlapping economic and political crises, this strategy has been rolled out again.
The popularity of Pakistan's army, for example, diminished significantly following the arrest of Pakistan's leader, Imran Khan, in 2023. This has prompted Army Chief Asim Munir to use tensions with India to deflect attention.
Munir has called Kashmir 'our jugular vein,' and has promised not to 'leave our Kashmiri brothers in their historical struggle.'
These comments followed an increase in the number and frequency of insurgent attempts to cross the border into India after India's May 2024 general elections were held peacefully in Kashmir, a rare occurrence since the separatist insurgency began in 1987.
These cross-border operations are allegedly carried out by Pakistan's so-called Border Action Teams, comprised of Pakistani special forces and militants from insurgent groups. Pakistan has never acknowledged the existence of such teams.
By April 1, tit-for-tat firing across the line of control had already surpassed the total number of incidents in 2023 and 2024 combined.
The latest ceasefire was agreed in the context of hostilities escalating beyond previous levels. Military strikes were launched outside Kashmir itself at military bases deep in Pakistani territory and in north-western India.
Certain actions by Islamabad were also widely interpreted as attempts to signal the country's nuclear capabilities. These included the decision to convene the National Command Authority, the body responsible for control and use of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
The move may not have been a genuine alert. But the possible willingness to resort to nuclear threats is particularly concerning as, unlike India, Pakistan does not have a 'no-first-use' nuclear weapons policy.
India, as an aspiring political and economic power, has clear interests in preserving the ceasefire. New Delhi wants to project itself as rational and responsible, worthy of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
At the same time, some of the decisions taken by India after the Pahalgam attack may compel further support for the insurgency in Kashmir. This brings with it the risk of further escalation between India and Pakistan in the future.
India has suspended the Indus Water Treaty, which governs the use of water from the Indus River. Pakistan lies downstream from India and is heavily dependent on the river for irrigation and public consumption.
Intervention from global powers such as the US may again be able to prevent future hostility from spiralling out of control. However, substantive talks are unlikely.
The US, which is in advanced negotiations with New Delhi over reducing tariffs on Indian imports, has offered to act as a mediator. This has been welcomed by Pakistan. But India maintains that, on the question of Kashmir, it would prefer bilateral talks rather than involving a third party.
While the Trump administration initially signalled a hands-off approach to relations between India and Pakistan, deeming it 'none of our business', it is now clear how rapidly matters can escalate between them.
The US and other interested parties like China will probably continue in their efforts to regulate and manage the conflict, openly or covertly, even if deeper resolution appears unlikely.
Alex Waterman is lecturer in peace studies and international development, University of Bradford and M Sudhir Selvaraj is assistant professor, peace studies and international development, University of Bradford
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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