
China, Russia should bolster mutual support: Xi
President Xi Jinping meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Beijing. Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry via Reuters
President Xi Jinping said on Tuesday China and Russia should strengthen mutual support in his meeting with visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi said "China and Russia should bolster mutual support within multilateral frameworks, safeguard their development and security interests, unite the Global South countries, and push the international order toward a more just and equitable direction".
The president added that Beijing and Moscow should support each other in steering the development direction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and injecting new momentum into the alliance.
Xi also urged the SCO to do more to achieve global stability in a meeting with the group's foreign ministers gathered in Beijing for talks.
The meeting paved the way for an SCO summit in Tianjin later this year.
Xi said China is committed to making the organisation stronger and to safeguarding regional security and stability.
On the meeting between Xi and Lavrov, Russia's foreign ministry said in an earlier statement that "a number of issues of bilateral political contacts at the highest and high levels were discussed".
They included preparations for President Vladimir Putin's visit to China to join the SCO summit and celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. (Xinhua/AFP)
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