Australia, India, Japan, US declare economic war on China's rare earth empire
The leaders launched the Quad
Critical Minerals Initiative
, explicitly targeting China's monopolistic dominance of
rare earths
and critical materials vital to defence and high-tech industries. The joint statement affirmed their determination "to uphold a region free from coercion" and oppose "any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion".
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In language thinly veiled yet unmistakably directed at Beijing, the Quad ministers expressed "deep concern" about the reliability of supply chains dependent on a single actor and criticised China's economic pressure tactics, price manipulation, and threat to critical infrastructure security.
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At the summit hosted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Quad countries committed to diversifying their sources of lithium, nickel, graphite, and other strategic minerals. Rubio emphasised that resilience in supply chains is essential to safeguard against Beijing's ability to weaponise trade flows, reinforcing the need for allied cooperation to break free from China's industrial grip.
Analysts see this move as part of a broader strategy to economically sideline China. The Japan Times in its article on July 2 noted that the initiative is "an ambitious expansion" of the Quad's partnership and a clear attempt to undercut Beijing's regional leverage. China's dominance in critical mineral processing has raised alarms about future industrial disruption and geopolitical manipulation.
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Strategic voices within and outside of the group warn against complacency. Former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, speaking at a US congressional hearing, recalled Beijing's retaliatory trade sanctions against Australia and urged deeper coordination with Quad partners to counter Chinese economic coercion. Likewise, former US ambassador Rahm Emanuel advocated for a NATO-style "anti-coercion coalition" pooling diplomatic and economic power to deter Beijing's global bullying.
China's muted response to the Quad communique marks a notable departure from its past alarm, leading analysts to suggest that Beijing may be quietly assessing its options as its dominance over rare earth markets comes under strain.
Beyond critical minerals, the Quad summit addressed broader challenges: increasing military assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, cyber threats, and North Korea's destabilising activity. All ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to peaceful conflict resolution and rule-of-law principles in the region.
While still informal, the Quad's evolving cohesion signals a significant shift in the
Indo-Pacific security
architecture. As The Japan Times reports, its bold new initiative sends a clear message: regional democracies will not tolerate Beijing's attempts at economic subjugation and geopolitical coercion.
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