This Muslim Country is joining hands with China, making joint ammunition manufacturing facility for..., not Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
Even with Kuwait identifying itself as a nation of peace, they have started to invest heavily in weapons. Interestingly, Kuwait has now reached a new milestone by agreeing to cooperate with China to make these weapons on a mass scale. In particular, the important defense project between Kuwait and China—an ammunition manufacturing factory —is near completion and is expected to be unveiled shortly. This was announced by Kuwait's Deputy Defense Minister, Sheikh Abdullah Mashal Al-Sabah.
According to The TimesKuwait, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense, Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Mishaal Al-Sabha, stated that a joint ammunition manufacturing facility for light and medium calibers is nearly completed and will be operational soon as part of larger cooperative projects with China.
As reported in the Kuwait Times, Sheikh Abdullah made the statement at an event arranged by the Chinese Embassy in Kuwait on the 98th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Sheikh Abdullah described the project as a milestone in military cooperation between the two nations and explained that the scope of several military training programs, which started in 2019, is expanding yearly.
While details of the factory location and other information has not been publicly disclosed, there is speculation that this factory will produce light and medium-grade munitions.
Importantly, Kuwait has been a close military partner of the United States. During the Gulf War in 1991, a coalition led by the United States freed Kuwait from the Iraqi army. Currently there are about 13,500 American military personnel and 2,200 MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles in Kuwait Even though Kuwait has a good relationship with the United States, there is an orientation towards China. In 1995 it was the first Gulf state to sign a military agreement with China. Since then, China has provided Kuwait 155mm artillery guns and People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval teams have visited Kuwait three times.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Kuwait was the 10th largest arms importer in the world from 2020 to 2024, with a 466% increase in imports. The U.S. accounted for 63% of Kuwait's arms during that time. An intelligence agency known as Tactical Report states that China has also offered to address most of Kuwait's defense needs with no conditions. However, it is unclear if this fact is independently verifiable.
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