Is West's corruption fight in Ukraine veering into colonialism?
In a speech to the Ukrainian parliament in July, she welcomed the passage of a law bringing two anti-corruption bodies under greater government control (which led to protests across the country and eventually government backtracking). She described it as the first step towards the restoration of the country's sovereignty and called for lawmakers to go further.
Tymoshenko was referring to the role played by foreigners – mainly representatives of Western donors supporting Ukraine's political reforms – in approving appointments to key Ukrainian state institutions.
This practice is one of the measures that Ukraine has introduced to tackle corruption. Its purpose is to introduce external scrutiny to ensure the independence of the organisations and especially the judges who deal with allegations of corruption.
One example of this is the Ethics Council. Created in 2021 by a law passed by Ukraine's parliament, it is composed of six members: three Ukrainians and three foreigners.
The council vets nominations for the High Council of Justice (HCJ), which is the most important institution in Ukraine's judiciary. The HCJ not only appoints judges but also makes decisions on their suspension and arrest when they are accused of wrongdoing.
While the membership of the Ethics Council is equally divided between Ukrainian and foreign members, in practice, the votes of the foreigners are weighted more heavily than those of the Ukrainians. This means that its foreign members can veto any nomination that comes before the council.
At first glance, Tymoshenko's critique of this type of international oversight seems reasonable. Why should a sovereign state subject its own internal processes – especially processes of such sensitivity as judicial appointments – to close scrutiny by foreign citizens?
In a recent interview with the Times newspaper, Tymoshenko elaborated on her speech, arguing that these measures exist because of pressure from Western governments and international organisations. She also pointed to 'threats' to withdraw support, especially financial support, if Ukraine does not comply.
Ukraine's international donors have certainly made it clear that they expect Kyiv to undertake judicial reform and other meaningful measures to tackle corruption. The International Monetary Fund routinely reviews Ukraine's progress in these areas when it decides whether to release of the next tranche of funding.
Since the start of Russia's full- scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has received approximately US$12.8 billion from the IMF. Ukraine's former prime minister argues that there's too much Western involvement in domestic affairs in her country.
Similarly, the European Union has made addressing corruption and ensuring the independence of the judiciary key conditions for Ukraine to progress towards full EU membership.
Volodymyr Zelensky's government cannot afford to risk losing the money Ukraine receives from international donors such as the IMF, which helps to keep the country's economy functioning while it is at war. Neither can he afford to ignore the requirements of EU membership.
Joining the European Union is a goal that Zelensky has championed for Ukraine. It is also very popular among Ukrainians. According to a May 2024 opinion survey, 90% of Ukrainians would like to see Ukraine join the EU by 2030.
But Western pressure is not the only reason for foreign oversight of key institutions and processes in Ukraine. It is a step that has received strong support from Ukrainian civil society.
The Dejure Foundation, a Ukrainian legal organization that promotes the rule of law and judicial reform, regards the involvement of international experts as essential to ensure a professional and independent legal system.
External scrutiny is also regarded as a way of increasing public trust in the judiciary. A December 2024 opinion poll found that only 12% of Ukrainians trust the courts, mainly because of perceptions that judges are corrupt.
To be sure, the involvement of foreign experts is not a magic bullet. Even supporters of the measure claim that foreigners lack the knowledge of the local context and can be manipulated into supporting bad decisions. But supporters argue that international scrutiny should be supplemented by greater involvement of Ukrainian civil society organisations, not removed.
The issue of corruption and how to address it remains a live one in Ukraine, and has no straightforward solution. The introduction of international legal experts into the process of scrutinising key appointments has not eliminated the problem or restored public faith in the judiciary.
Zelensky and his government are coming under increasing pressure from Tymoshenko and her supporters' attempts to make political capital out of the issue. In particular, her call to remove foreigners from these roles and replace them with war veterans is a clear appeal to nationalist sentiment.
On the other hand, Ukrainians do not seem to object to meeting the requirements of Western organizations. More than 70% of Ukrainians surveyed in 2023 agreed that it was right that the EU should require political reforms before opening negotiations for Ukraine's accession.
Moreover, protests erupted in July in cities across Ukraine against the legislation that would have brought Ukraine's national anti-corruption bodies under the direct control of the government-appointed prosecutor general. Zelensky has now submitted a new bill to reinstate the agencies' independence.
These demonstrations revealed a strength of feeling against any dilution of the independence of those who are charged with dealing with corruption. This suggests that Tymoshenko may not gain much traction in any attempts to dismantle existing systems, however imperfect they may be.
Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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