France can't solve Britain's reliance on America and China

Spectator

3 days ago

When President Emmanuel Macron of France addressed the British parliament this week, he emphasised the need for both countries to reduce the risk from their 'excessive dependencies on both the US and China'. This reliance on the Great Powers, Macron suggested, was a threat for Europe to be able 'to invest in key technologies of the future' and 'avoid strategic dependencies and disengagement that would put us at risk of a slow death'.
In many ways President Macron is right. The UK and Europe are absolutely dependent on America and China for critical technologies and industrial inputs. As noted by the EU in various recent reports, China dominates in rare earth elements and critical minerals, supplying nearly all of Europe's needs: 98 per cent of the rare earth magnets, 100 per cent of the heavy rare earths, and 97 per cent of the magnesium used in sectors from aerospace to defence are supplied by Beijing. Europe is also reliant on China for lithium and cobalt processing, as well as solar panels and EV batteries, of which the vast majority originate from Chinese supply chains.
Macron envisages Europe coming together to compete against the US and China
On the digital side, the US giants Amazon, Microsoft, and Google control about 65 per cent of Europe's cloud computing market, while American firms supply nearly all data centre chips and enterprise software. Europe's semiconductor industry covers only a small share of global production, and cutting-edge chip manufacturing remains centred in Asia and the US, leaving the continent technologically dependent. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution in the UK and Europe, which is central to future economic and military effectiveness, is being led by American firms like OpenAI and Google.
This might sound like it's just globalisation in action. After all, why would we want to invest in industrial and technological inputs if someone else has the ability and desire to do so? For decades, this 'comparative advantage' has been at the centre of British and European government thinking, and the mantra behind deindustrialisation.
Yet this technological and industrial dependence has real-world consequences as we move into a more nationalistic era. For a start, it severely constrains Europe's ability to rearm in response to Russian aggression. High-end defence systems rely on supply chains outside Europe – minerals and components from China, chips from Asia and the US, and cloud infrastructure and AI from American firms. In effect, the ability for the UK and Europe to rearm depends on the acquiescence and support of the US and China.
Industrial and technological dependency is mirrored in defence capabilities. Europe's strategic airlift depends on US-made aircraft like the C-17 Globemaster, and nuclear deterrents such as the UK's Trident system are integrated with American technology.
Although programmes like the EU's Chips Act and joint fighter jet projects (Europe's future combat air system, and the UK-led Tempest programme) aim to rebuild sovereignty, analysts agree that Europe remains years away from autonomy. Without a secure and sovereign technological industrial base, European nations face structural limitations on their ability to scale up defence production independently.
To answer the question of self-reliance, Macron envisages Europe coming together to compete against the US and China. At first glance, this would be a step in the right direction for the UK, coming as it does when even the 'special relationship' with the US is under pressure. However, the reality is somewhat different and prompts some suspicion of Macron's proposal.
For a start, France has not been overly supportive of British involvement in Europe's defence in recent years. For example, under French pressure, Britain was locked out of a €150 billion (£129 billion) EU defence fund until it signed up to a wider defence pact. Critics said this held the risk of both undermining Nato and rolling back on Brexit. (Naturally, the British government rejected both these claims.)
And while it is true that France has created a defence industry that is less dependent on the US than Britain's, this does not necessarily lead to an advantage on the battlefield. That Pakistan-operated Chinese jets were able to destroy at least one French Rafaele fighter plane operated by the Indian Air Force in their recent clash shows that France's military technology isn't perhaps as cutting-edge as Paris would have the world believe.
Military capabilities aside, the fact is that Europe, even with the UK, does not have the technological and industrial base to wean us off the US and China. What could work, however, is adopting a global approach.
Countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Canada have immense resources and technological competencies that can – and should – be brought into the UK and Europe's resilience plans. All of these are allies: Canada is in Nato already, and the other three (plus New Zealand) are in the so-called 'Indo-Pacific four', a group of countries that are officially partnered with the alliance because of fears of Chinese and Russian aggression.
Furthermore, these countries are increasingly involved in Europe's defence posture. Japan is part of Britain's Tempest programme; South Korea is providing arms to Poland, Romania, and Norway amongst others; Australia and Canada are buying British naval vessels, including submarines and destroyers.
Japan, Canada, and Australia are already part of the Starmer government's 'coalition of the willing' in support of Ukraine, a group assembled to provide more resilience against a US withdrawal of military backing to Kyiv in the conflict. This is a good platform for wider collaboration. As the AUKUS programme between Australia, the UK and US has shown, it is feasible to turn a military-specific initiative into a broader technological and industrial one. AUKUS was originally designed as a way to provide new submarines for Australia, the UK and US; it is now exploring partnerships on quantum, hypersonic missiles, and AI.
As is normal with French efforts to bring Europe together on joint initiatives, Macron's vision for European self-reliance would almost certainly entail building this around France. This would not be in the interests of either Britain or the EU.
Instead, the only realistic approach to decreasing reliance on the US and China is a global one. The threat from Russia and China is not confined to Europe. Our response should not be either.