400 cases withdrawn as China tackles ‘illegal' targeting of private enterprise
According to a report released on Thursday by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, more than 6,500 corrective instructions were issued between January and November last year – targeting 'illegal investigative actions that jeopardised the socialist market economy'.
Du Xueyi, head of economic crime prosecution, said addressing corrupt and harmful practices such as profit-driven law enforcement was a 'pivotal responsibility'.
The actions taken last year were part of a systematic effort to 'rectify opportunistic law enforcement practices that … run counter to fair justice, severely undermine the credibility and authority of the judiciary, disrupt the rule of law, and harm the business environment', the report quoted Du as saying. China has intensified efforts to stabilise its post-pandemic economy and restore confidence in the business environment – amid challenges including high youth joblessness , weak domestic consumption and a renewed trade war with the United States.
Beijing has also vowed to establish a fair and just legal framework that respects and protects the integrity of private enterprises – seen as crucial to economic vitality, innovation and job creation.
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'50% tariff won't impact us': Chinese traders shrug off Trump's tariffs '50% tariff won't impact us': Chinese traders shrug off Trump's tariffs
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A genuinely realist approach to the Ukraine crisis would begin with honest acknowledgment of American limitations rather than grandiose promises of support. The United States has legitimate interests in preventing the crisis from escalating into a broader European war and in maintaining stable relationships with both Russia and its European allies. It has no compelling interest in determining the precise configuration of Ukraine's borders or government. The Ukrainian delegation's 'readiness to accept the US proposal to enact an immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire' suggests that even Kiev recognizes the need for pragmatic accommodation with military realities. Yet American policy continues to oscillate between maximalist rhetoric about Ukrainian sovereignty and ad hoc diplomatic initiatives that fail to address the conflict's underlying dynamics. The diplomatic scrambling over Ukraine reflects a broader pathology in American grand strategy: the tendency to treat every international dispute as a test of American credibility that requires decisive intervention. This approach has consistently produced outcomes that serve neither American interests nor regional stability, from Iraq and Libya to Afghanistan and now potentially Ukraine. The alternative is not isolationism but strategic selectivity – the recognition that American power, however substantial, is finite and must be husbanded for genuinely vital interests. In the case of Ukraine, this would mean accepting a negotiated settlement that reflects the military balance of forces rather than the preferences of Washington policymakers. 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