The tiny Philippine island denying and defying China at sea
While other 21-year-olds are busy with other young adult pursuits, Lobendino went about his task with a seriousness normally associated with veterans who have seen terrible wars waged and blood spilled in the name of national patrimony.
Like many of his fellow soldiers assigned to this remote and lonely outpost, Lobendino says he is willing to fight to the end.
'Because this is ours,' he said quietly when asked by Asia Times, which joined a recent maritime patrol operation in the South China Sea to check on the area ahead of the Philippines' Independence Day this week (June 12)
He was accompanied by a fellow marine who was also in his 20s. He wore a pair of shades to protect his eyes from the sun's glare that intensely reflected the stretch of fine white sand of Likas (West York Island), the second-largest of the nine Philippine-controlled features in the disputed Spratly island chain.
The military took journalists for the first time in patrolling the West Philippine Sea, the name the Southeast Asian country uses to refer to areas in the South China Sea that are within its jurisdiction. A crew member aboard the Philippine Navy's BRP Andres Bonifacio scans the horizon as the ship embarks on a maritime patrol of Manila-controlled areas in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) on June 5, 2025. Picture: Jason Gutierrez
Regularly, troops among the claimants are often in the background, preferring their respective coast guards – which are technically civilian in nature – to patrol the disputed sea lest a sudden miscalculation triggers outright hostility.
But the mission is meant to assert the Philippines' sovereignty and sovereign rights over the waters amid an increasingly assertive China that rejected a 2016 arbitral ruling by an international court in The Hague, which invalidated Beijing's expansive nine-dash line claims in the region.
That case was brought by the Philippines, a long-time military ally of the United States and the most vocal Southeast Asian region that has stood up to China in the contested maritime area. The patrol is part of the government's 'transparency initiative' to show the public that the distant shores are vital to the country's interests.
Visitors to the island are greeted by weather-beaten green signage that welcomes them to the naval detachment.
In the postcard-perfect background, a Philippine flag flutters in the gentle wind. Written on a fading-green board is a reminder of PD 1596, a presidential decree signed in 1978 that formally recognized Likas as part of the Kalayaan island group in the country's map.
The 18-hectare island is home to a rotating number of Marines tasked with guarding the paradise island in the middle of the ocean and watched by the People's Liberation Army Navy forces backed by their coast guard and a fleet of militia vessels posing as fishermen.
Last year, a Filipino soldier was wounded when China Coast Guard men armed with pikes and machetes violently seized firearms from Filipino supply boats near the Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, called Ren'ai Jiao by Beijing, in another part of the disputed sea. An armed soldier guards the coast of Pag-Asa Island in the West Philippine Sea. Picture: Jason Gutierrez
The United States has repeatedly said it is prepared to step in if Manila invoked a 1951 treaty that calls on both sides to defend each other in times of outside aggression, a scenario that could trigger a larger conflict. For now, cooler heads are prevailing despite China's provocations.
For corpsman Ibasco, who was recently transferred to the Likas detachment, there was no time to think before he shipped out from home. 'To us, it is a privilege to serve,' said Ibasco, who did not want to give out his first name citing the sensitivity of his post.
He said he took his mission to heart, though time can be an adversary. To break the monotony, he swims in the morning and catches fish 'because our provisions are all preserved food.' While a satellite connection allows him to connect with his wife and young daughter at times, much of his free time is spent on self-reflection.
Veteran combatant Technical Sergeant Nino Calbog, who has seen action in the strife-torn southern Philippine region against homegrown insurgents, said it was an honor to be on the ground protecting the country from foreign aggressors. A father of two, he said his service is for the country and family.
'I always tell them that my job as a soldier is for them. It is difficult for a soldier to be away from family, but my wife is there explaining to them why I need to be away for three months,' he said.
There is an improvised basketball court, where the men shoot hoops beside a garden patch, while two goats roam in the back. They can be slaughtered for food but are considered more like pets. Philippine soldiers hooping in their spare time on the island, June 5, 2025. Photo: Jason Gutierrez
Power is provided by a generator and solar generators, although it can be pitch black at night here. Drinking water, however, is shipped on regular resupply missions or is collected through rainfall.
'Our flag is always waving because this island is ours,' said Naval Task Force 42 chief Colonel Joel Bonavente. 'It symbolizes that our troops are here to always guard and defend our territory in the West Philippine Sea.'
Isolation, he said, could be the biggest enemy for some, but assured that 'the attitude of our soldiers is well adjusted.' 'They are well-motivated and stand ready to defend our territory,' Bonavente said, adding that protocol requires them to challenge anyone who is passing by nearby.
Plans to upgrade the 'hospitability of our patrol base' are in the pipeline, he said.
Filipino maritime expert Chester Cabalza said frequent military patrols were necessary to further the country's win in the legal battle in the face of the arbitral ruling that China continues to ignore.
'Frequent maritime patrols exercise our right to use, possess and control all resources in the shoal,' he told Asia Times. 'It also increases familiarity to the maritime domain as a means of readiness to the potential disputes amid flashpoints in the contested islands.'
More importantly, Cabalza notes, it ensures that military forces are prepared against all 'unauthorized access that would lead to annexation.'
'The government must fulfill its aspiration of a self-reliant defense posture to sustain its massive military and coast guard operations,' he said, pointing out that Japan has also recently ratified a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that allows its troops to participate in joint drills with the Philippines, similar to the Americans.
'Beijing will feel a pinch of insecurity in view of this because they view the RAA as an impediment to their bigger goals in securing the entirety of the South China Sea,' he asserted.
Jason Gutierrez was head of Philippine news at BenarNews, an online news service affiliated with Radio Free Asia (RFA), a Washington-based news organization that covered many under-reported countries in the region. A veteran foreign correspondent, he has also worked with The New York Times and Agence France-Presse (AFP).
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