Zuma's visit to Morocco triggers a relook at SA foreign policy
South Africa's foreign policy since democracy in 1994 has been committed to the advancement of human rights and international solidarity with the oppressed. It has also placed emphasis on the economic growth and development of the African continent.
South Africa's foreign policy continues to seek to advance democracy globally, the rule of international law and multilateralism, including the need to attain international peace. It is also committed to South-South cooperation, impressing on the Global South nations 'to assert their newfound role and how this will balance with traditional powers'.
South African foreign policy continues to leverage the country's exceptionalism in conflict resolution and reconciliation. South Africa has assisted Northern Ireland, Rwanda, South Sudan and several other countries in conflict resolution, negotiations and reconciliation. It even attempted at some point to advance peace and negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. In 2002, South Africa launched the Presidential Peace Initiative (Spier Initiative) to mediate between the Palestinians and Israelis.
Over the years, South Africa's ambitious foreign policy has been gradually imploding. While wishing to continue exporting negotiations and reconciliation — as essential mechanisms to ending conflicts and wars in the world — it has also been supporting both armed and peaceful resistance of those still fighting decolonisation and for self-determination.
The support and solidarity with the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara is a case in point. The Polisario Front is a politico-military organisation striving to end Moroccan control of Western Sahara and to gain independence from Morocco. Morocco has had a long history of colonisation with Europe, which polarised the demographics and geography of that country. The abrupt relinquishing by Spain of the governance of the semi-autonomous region of Western Sahara after years of occupation in 1976 left behind confusion and political instability. Spain ceded the administration of the Western Sahara region to Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania relinquished its responsibilities in Western Sahara in 1979 and recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) led by the Polisario Front. Morocco took over the territory previously held by Mauritania and has governed the territory ever since.
South Africa and Morocco enjoy full diplomatic relations. But the continual diplomatic spats between South Africa and Morocco complicate relations between the two countries. Notwithstanding, both countries continue to do business. Sanlam Maroc SA, headquartered in Casablanca, is one of South Africa's largest financial services groups and has a visible presence in Morocco. The company signed a deal worth $1-billion with Morocco's Saham Group, making it the largest company in Africa in the non-banking financial sector. Despite big business dealings, soured relations impede potential business growth and cooperation between the two countries.
Morocco recently dropped visa requirements for Ghanaians wishing to visit Morocco. South Africa still requires entry visas. Moroccans also require a visa to enter South Africa.
South Africa's pursuit of human rights and solidarity with those still battling decolonisation around the world needs a relook, given changes in global politics. The South African insistence on solidarity with the Polisario Front requires at a minimum a tweak and at most a review.
The Moroccan-backed Advisory Council on Western Sahara submitted a proposal to the United Nations in April 2006 that would grant autonomy to the people of Western Sahara. The plan would also allow the Sahrawis to run their government under Moroccan sovereignty. Morocco would control the defence and foreign affairs of Western Sahara. About 120 countries support Morocco's autonomy plan. South Africa and Algeria have rejected the plan and continue to lead a pro-Polisario bloc with about 15 African Union states supporting the total independence of Western Sahara.
Speaking on a South African radio talk show, the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Alvin Botes, said the situation in Western Sahara is 'a mirror image of Gaza'. But the Sahrawi people are not bombed and killed daily while queuing for aid, as is the case in Gaza. Nor are they prevented from partaking in economic activities with the world. They are free to travel and have their rights guaranteed by the constitution of Morocco as citizens of that country.
The potential business and economic growth between the two countries is enormous. Cooperation with Morocco could improve economic conditions in South Africa. Calls for rapprochement between South Africa and Morocco have been amplified after uMkhonto weSizwe leader and former president Jacob Zuma recently visited Morocco. The ANC accuses Zuma of wrongfully claiming to represent the whole of South Africa by meeting senior government officials in Morocco. Supporters of Zuma have scoffed at those criticisms, saying that 'there are no laws in South Africa preventing any citizen from speaking behind the national flag'.
Importantly, Zuma's visit to Morocco was not out of the blue — it has a historical context. First, Morocco supported the ANC during the struggle against apartheid. Zuma was the head of intelligence for the ANC during those years. In fact, among the first international official visits undertaken by Nelson Mandela was a visit to Morocco. This occurred in the midst of political acrimony between the Polisario Front and Morocco. Second, it was during Zuma's government that relations between South Africa and Morocco were normalised. In November 2017, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Zuma met during the African Union-European Union Summit in Côte d'Ivoire. As part of the agreement, they decided to appoint ambassadors to each other's capitals.
Zuma's visit to Morocco has helped to bring the discussion of Morocco and the Western Sahara to the fore. These discussions may also trigger a national debate on South Africa's national interests and foreign policy stance amid a changing world order, fractured alliances and redrawn geopolitical interests. The ambitions of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara are secessionist in spirit. They are not that different to those of Afrikaners in Orania who are demanding independent and autonomous states. They are also not different from those of the Cape Independence movement, a fringe group in the Western Cape calling for independence for the province.
Thembisa Fakude is a senior research fellow at Africa Asia Dialogues and a director at the Mail & Guardian.
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It must diversify its trading partners, strengthen intra-African markets, develop robust trade remedy frameworks and reduce its vulnerability to the whims of any single superpower. If Trump's tariffs represent the thunder, then the lightning must be Africa's resolve to trade with itself and chart its own economic course. Anything less would be economic negligence. The unpredictability of Trump's tariff doctrine underlines a broader truth: no African country can afford to hinge its economic future on the benevolence or volatility of a single trading partner. For South Africa, the US remains its second-largest trading partner, with $17.64-billion in bilateral trade in 2023. But such exposure comes with risks, especially when preferential access can be withdrawn overnight. The International Trade Centre and UN Trade and Development have long warned of these vulnerabilities, urging diversification and intra-African trade expansion as long-term solutions. If this trade turbulence does anything, let it be a clarion call to accelerate the building of resilient, intra-continental supply chains, create robust trade remedy institutions and reduce overexposure to foreign economic storms. African countries must learn to trade more with each other and less at the mercy of superpowers with shifting agendas. For Africa, the path forward is not looking outwards for salvation — it is looking inwards for strength. DM
