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Why the LDP Lost the Election — and Still Doesn't Get It

Why the LDP Lost the Election — and Still Doesn't Get It

Japan Forward24-07-2025
Despite suffering a historic defeat in the 2025 Upper House election, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba initially made clear he had no intention of stepping down.
He cited mounting economic pressures, trade tensions with the United States, and the risk of major natural disasters as justification for remaining in office. Ishiba then argued that his leadership is essential to avoid "political stagnation."
At a July 21 press conference, Ishiba acknowledged the ruling coalition's losses but said his decision to stay or go "would not be guided by personal interest." However, facing mounting criticism within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Ishiba has since indicated that he will make a final decision on whether to resign sometime in August.
On July 23, he said he plans to make a decision after attending a series of key events including the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing memorial ceremonies and the upcoming Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).
If he chooses to step down, a party leadership election is likely to take place in September, with a special Diet session to select a new prime minister expected by October.
But to many observers, the problem isn't just stagnation. It's that Ishiba and the LDP don't seem to grasp why voters turned against them in the first place.
This isn't Ishiba's first time at the center of a post-election crisis. In 2007, following a major LDP loss under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Ishiba publicly urged Abe to resign unless he could convincingly explain why he should remain in office. Now, under strikingly similar circumstances, Ishiba insists he's applying the same logic to himself. But voters seem to see a contradiction and, worse, a lack of accountability. It is worth noting that Ishiba's defeat marks the first time in 70 years the LDP has not led either house.
It's not just perceived hypocrisy. Ishiba's aloof demeanor, lack of charisma, and chronically somber expression have drawn criticism. Some have noted his perpetually gloomy expression and piercing glare stand in stark contrast to his message about building a "fun Japan."
Yet personality is only part of the story. The deeper issue is a growing perception that the LDP has become detached from its voter base, especially its conservative core. Instead of reaching out to those voters or expanding to the left to attract swing voters, the party did neither. It stood still and paid the price.
Sanseito, a right-leaning populist party, capitalized on the void. It gained support across diverse demographics and geographic areas. In places like Kutchan (Hokkaido), Kawaguchi (Saitama), Oizumi (Gunma), and Ichinomiya (Aichi), towns struggling with tensions tied to large foreign populations, Sanseito saw its strongest showings. It directly addressed long-ignored local grievances about migrant rule-breaking and social disruption. Meanwhile, the LDP offered little more than platitudes or silence, largely avoiding public debate on immigration until late in the campaign. Sanseito lawmaker Saya at the National Diet, July 22 (©Sankei by Shimpei Okuhara)
According to LDP insiders speaking on Fuji TV's July 20 Live Election Sunday, Sanseito's rise was a key factor in the coalition's loss of a majority for the first time in history. However, instead of reflection, many in the LDP turned to blame, targeting Sanseito, social media, or even the voters themselves.
Former Upper House LDP leader Keizo Takemi, who lost his seat in Tokyo, became a symbol of this disconnect. Takemi insisted that all new tax revenues be devoted to social security, dismissed tax cut proposals as "populist," and called for restrictions on political discourse on social media. The result? A decisive defeat.
Some within the party continue to insist that the defeat was due to last year's political fundraising scandals. But, as journalist Rui Abiru made clear, that's a shallow excuse. The core issue is policy arrogance and a refusal to engage with dissenting voices. "The LDP's message got through just fine," Abiru said on a July 22 broadcast. "Voters understood it, and rejected it."
Perhaps the most damning was the symbolic loss of Wakayama, an LDP stronghold. Nobuyasu Nikai, the son of LDP heavyweight Toshihiro Nikai, ran an aggressive campaign bolstered by senior party figures, but still lost. His pledge? "Bring back the pandas," a callback to his father's pet soft-power project. Adventure World in Wakayama had just recently returned all of its giant pandas to China.
Furthermore, the LDP's refusal to evolve is also visible in its outdated communication strategy. Few party members use X (formerly Twitter) effectively. Those who do often post innocuous photos of bento lunches or train rides. In contrast, Sanseito ran a data-driven, aggressive campaign that tapped into local frustrations and national sentiment.
The final tally confirmed what voters had been signaling for months: that the LDP's support was eroding not just among swing voters, but among its conservative base. And unless the party begins listening to its own constituents, to critics, and to the data, it risks falling further behind.
"There's no such thing as a mysterious loss," said analyst Yosuke Naito on a July 22 news broadcast. "When you ignore the electorate, eventually they return the favor."
The question now is whether the LDP will take that lesson to heart, or keep blaming everyone but itself. Unless it can do that, it may make little difference who leads the party.
Author: Daniel Manning
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