Top shoemaker Yue Yuen's China woes wipe out front-loading gains
Tariffs cloud outlook at Taiwanese contract manufacturer for Nike and Adidas
Chinese contract footwear maker Yue Yuen foresees near-term challenges due to tariffs and other uncertainties (Nikkei montage/Source photos by screenshot from Yue Yuen's website)
KENJI KAWASE
August 12, 2025 14:04 JST
TOKYO -- Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings, the largest contract footwear manufacturer for global brands like Nike and Adidas, benefited from order front-loading to get ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs in the first half of the year, but weak consumption in mainland China has virtually canceled out those gains.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Nikkei Asia
3 hours ago
- Nikkei Asia
Chip tools maker Applied Materials hits China rough patch
Applied Materials forecasts a drop in revenue this quarter, citing uncertainty in its China operations. (Photo by Kosuke Shimizu) KOSUKE SHIMIZU August 16, 2025 06:52 JST PALO ALTO, California -- Applied Materials, the top U.S. supplier of chipmaking tools, is under pressure in the crucial Chinese market as Washington's export restrictions hurt its access and spur the rise of homegrown players.
Japan Today
3 hours ago
- Japan Today
China's economy lags in July under pressure from tariffs and a weak property market
Workers install a platform for a up-coming basketball games event by Chinese sports brand Li Ning at the capital popular commercial district, in Beijing, Wednesday, Aug. 6, 2025. (AP Photo/Andy Wong) By ELAINE KURTENBACH China's economy showed signs of slowing in July as factory output and retail sales slowed and housing prices dropped further, according to data released Friday. Uncertainty over tariffs on exports to the United States is still looming over the world's second-largest economy after President Donald Trump extended a pause in sharp hikes in import duties for 90 days, beginning Monday, following a 90-day pause that began in May. As officials worked toward a broader trade agreement, China reported earlier that its exports surged 7.2% in July year-on-year, while its imports grew at the fastest pace in a year, as businesses rushed to take advantage of the truce in Trump's trade war with Beijing. But that also reflected a lower base for comparison, and manufacturers have slowed investments, hiring and production as they watch to see what comes. Chinese manufacturers also have ramped up shipments to Southeast Asia, Africa and other regions to help offset lost business in the U.S. Still, annual growth in industrial output fell to 5.7% in July from 6.8% in June, the National Bureau of Statistics said. Investments in factory equipment and other fixed assets rose a meager 1.6% in January-July, compared with 2.8% growth in the first half of the year. Property investments plunged 12% in the first seven months of the year, with residential housing investment dropping nearly 11%. Prices for newly built housing in major cities fell 1.1%, as a prolonged downturn in the property industry lingered. The meltdown in the housing market hit just as the COVID -19 pandemic began, sapping one of the economy's main drivers of growth and causing dozens of developers to default on their debts. The crisis rippled throughout the economy, destroying jobs for millions of people. The government has sought to ensure that most housing that was paid for gets built, but sales remain weak despite a series of moves meant to entice families into back into the market. Since most Chinese families have their wealth tied up in property, the anemic housing market has been a major factor crimping consumer spending. In July, retail sales rose 3.7%, the slowest rate in seven months and down from a 4.8% increase in June. The unemployment rate rose to 5.2% from 5% as university graduates began looking for work. While consumer prices rose 0.4% in July from the month before, prices at the wholesale level slipped 3.6% from a year earlier in another indicator of relatively weak demand. © Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- The Diplomat
America's Support for Taiwan Is at a Critical Juncture
For decades, the United States has been a steadfast partner to Taiwan, providing diplomatic, economic, and military support to ensure the island's autonomy, security, and prosperity are safeguarded in the face of growing threats from Beijing. This partnership has been a cornerstone of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Ensuring that Taiwan remains free from outside coercion remains a paramount U.S. national interest. But today, the strength of this relationship is being tested, not by a lack of goodwill, but by shifting perceptions in Washington and a growing sense of urgency about the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. Like great powers throughout history, the United States undergoes cyclical fatigue with its overseas commitments. After three decades of global overcommitment, Americans are increasingly questioning the cost and necessity of seemingly distant obligations. This fatigue is compounded by a growing perception that Taiwan, compared to other frontline states like Ukraine and Israel, is not sufficiently serious about its own defense. Fair or not, this perception is a dangerous undercurrent that threatens to erode bipartisan support in Washington, including in a Republican Party traditionally committed to Taiwan's defense. For Taiwan to remain a U.S. priority, it must address this skepticism head-on and tangibly demonstrate it is willing to bear the burdens of its own security. This perception stems significantly from Taiwan's domestic politics, particularly the approach of the principal opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT's insistence earlier this year on slow rolling defense spending increases, by instituting freezes on certain programs, politicized an issue that should be a strong point for unity. National Taiwanese reluctance to prioritize adequate defense spending has raised concerns in Washington. The KMT must recognize that defense spending is not a luxury but a necessity, and its hesitation risks signaling to adversaries and allies that Taiwan is not fully committed to its own survival. It also risks fundamentally undermining U.S. support for Taiwan's defense over the long term. At the same time, China's military modernization has dramatically shifted the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. The People's Liberation Army has invested heavily in advanced weaponry, cyber capabilities, and naval power. Taiwan's defense spending, though increasing in recent years, remains woefully insufficient to counter this growing threat. Last year, Taiwan's defense budget was approximately $19 billion, or roughly 2.5 percent of GDP. In contrast, China's defense budget is almost $240 billion, with a focus on capabilities that directly threaten Taiwan, like amphibious landing craft and weapons vital to China's anti-access/area denial strategy. This disparity is not just a matter of numbers; it signals to the world that Taiwan is not keeping pace, and acts as a form of political warfare on Beijing's behalf. Defense spending isn't just about dollars spent; it's also how they're spent. Taiwan must invest in asymmetric capabilities, like drones, air defenses, and anti-ship missiles, to deter China's overwhelming conventional forces. At the same time, it must modernize its aging military hardware, enhance and extend training for its reservists, address its manpower retention problems, and fortify critical infrastructure against cyberattacks and blockades, which were identified in Taiwan's Quadrennial Defense Review as persistent issues. These steps are not optional; they are the bare minimum to demonstrate to the United States, across the political spectrum, that Taiwan is a credible partner capable of holding the line. Without a clear commitment to closing the military gap, Taiwan risks being seen as a liability rather than an asset in Washington's strategic calculus. The sobering reality is that there is a growing feeling in some U.S. circles that the military balance has tipped so far in China's favor that neither Taiwan nor the U.S. can realistically counter it. This perception is dangerous because it breeds defeatism and encourages miscalculation by Beijing. Analysts point to China's numerical superiority in ships, aircraft, and missiles, as well as its ability to sustain a prolonged campaign, and question whether Taiwan can hold out long enough for U.S. forces to intervene effectively. Time is running out to reverse this trajectory. Every year, the gap widens, and American patience wears thinner. Action by both the U.S. and Taiwan will be required to meet the military moment but also to uphold political legitimacy. Taiwan's domestic concerns cannot serve as a reasonable excuse for neglecting an existential issue. Economic challenges, political polarization, and social debates are real but pale in comparison to the threat of a Chinese invasion or blockade. Taiwan's leaders must clearly communicate this reality to their people and rally public support for increased defense spending and preparedness, or accept a steady diminution of U.S. commitment. The United States has its own domestic pressures to contend with. The bipartisan consensus that has long underpinned support for Taiwan is not guaranteed to hold indefinitely. In the Republican Party, there are voices rightly questioning the wisdom of committing resources to distant conflicts not core to our national interests. On the Democratic side, support for Taiwan is often tempered by a focus on avoiding escalation with Beijing. Taiwan cannot assume that either party will remain indefinitely committed to its defense for reasons of history or tradition. Political winds can shift, and Taiwan must act now to solidify its standing as a worthy partner, and to justify its current standing as a core geopolitical interest of the United States. To secure Washington's continued support, Taiwan must significantly increase defense spending, aiming for at least 5 percent of GDP in coming years, and prioritize asymmetric and defensive capabilities that maximize cross-strait deterrence. It must also foster bipartisan unity on defense policy, setting aside partisan differences to present a united consensus and engage in public diplomacy to reassure the U.S. and its citizens that it is serious about its security. Only then will it be safe to assume that U.S. support for this vital partner can be maintained for the long term.
