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A+ A-
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) denied the conditional release of a Kurdish political prisoner despite the request being approved by the Yazd Central Prison after he served almost 17 years behind bars, a human rights watchdog reported on Sunday.
'Khaled Zamani - a Kurdish political prisoner, father of three daughters and one son, and a native of Khoy - remains deprived of both prison leave and conditional release, despite having served 6,151 days behind bars,' the Oslo-based Hengaw Human Rights Organization said.
Zamani, on a 30-year prison sentence, has faced the 'ongoing denial of furlough by the IRGC's Intelligence Organization,' Hengaw added, with the latest refusal coming despite his conditional release having been approved by the Yazd Central Prison and the city's prosecutor.
The denial by the IRGC comes despite 'the approval of Zamani's request by the Classification Council of Yazd Central Prison and the city's prosecutor.'
He was arrested on July 1, 2008, by Iranian intelligence forces over charges of alleged membership in the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK).
PJAK was established in 2003 and is considered the Iranian wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), but claims its links are only ideological.
After its establishment in the Qandil Mountains - an area on the Kurdistan Region's border with Iran where the PKK is also headquartered - PJAK expanded its operations into the Kurdish areas of western Iran, recruiting hundreds of young men and fighting bloody battles with the IRGC.
Zamani was sentenced by the Urmia Revolutionary Court to amputation of his left hand and right foot on charges of moharebeh, or enmity against God. Following an appeal, he was sentenced to 30 years in Yazd Central Prison, according to Hengaw.
He has been denied furlough since then.
Hengaw also reported that he has been subjected to severe physical and psychological torture during his imprisonment.
Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Iran face systemic discrimination and disproportionately high rates of death sentences and executions, often on charges related to political activities such as baghi (armed rebellion) or moharebeh (enmity against God).
Amnesty International's annual report, published in March, highlighted a sharp rise in executions in Iran in 2024, placing the country among the top three executioners globally. Iran, alongside Iraq and Saudi Arabia, accounted for 91 percent of all known executions worldwide.
The report also censured Iranian authorities over their continued weaponization of the death penalty against dissidents, including those who participated in the Jin Jiyan Azadi (Women Life Freedom) protests and especially the minorities.
In mid-September 2022, 22-year-old Kurdish woman Mahsa (Zhina) Amini died in police custody after being arrested for allegedly violating Iran's compulsory hijab law. Her death sparked nationwide protests in Iran, the longest protest movement the country had seen in four decades.
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Rudaw Net
4 hours ago
- Rudaw Net
Dialogue with Damascus advancing, not yet ‘formal negotiations': Rojava official
Also in Interview Washington should help SDF reach deal with Damascus: Former US diplomat EU MP urges Turkey to embrace peace talks with PKK Germany is shifting gears with stricter migration, stronger defense: German MP DEM Party plans overhaul as PKK disarms A+ A- QAMISHLI - Talks between the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) and the interim government in Damascus are progressing but have not yet reached the stage of formal negotiations, a senior Rojava official told Rudaw. Elham Ahmad, foreign relations co-chair of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), told Rudaw's Dilbixwin Dara in an interview from Qamishli, that discussions with Damascus remain in their early phases and that 'one cannot call them outright negotiations. 'They are a form of dialogue' which 'falls within the framework of how we can address the Syrian issue,' Ahmad said. In recent months, the Rojava administration has been engaging in talks with Syria's interim government over integration into federal institutions - including the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - based on a March 10 agreement between interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi. A core issue, according to Ahmad, is differing interpretations of what "integration" means. 'Our understanding of integration is that it should involve mutual recognition - Damascus must recognize us, just as we recognize them,' she explained. However, a key sticking point is that 'each side interprets this agreement differently,' Ahmad noted, elaborating, 'Our understanding of integration is that it should involve mutual recognition - Damascus must recognize us, just as we recognize them.' Following his appointment as Syria's interim president, Sharaa in late January pledged to form an 'inclusive transitional government that would reflect Syria's diversity.' However, he has faced criticism from both domestic and international observers for allegedly sidelining minority communities in the governance process. In the interview aired by Rudaw on Sunday, Ahmad argued that centralized rule in Syria has long caused suffering, and decentralization would lighten the central government's burden by giving regions responsibility for services, culture, language, internal security among other things. Kurdish leaders have long advocated for a decentralized system within Syria. Ahmed argued in the interview aired on Sunday that centralized rule in Syria has long caused suffering, and decentralization would lighten the central government's burden by giving regions responsibility for services, culture, language, and internal security. On the regional front, Ahmad confirmed that there are ongoing discussions with Turkey through an 'open channel,' calling the engagement 'positive and constructive.' She emphasized the need for dialogue to prevent further escalation and to explore peaceful solutions. She also voiced strong support for the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), describing it as a historic opportunity 'not only for Kurds but for the entire Middle East.' The senior Rojava official further extended her appreciation to Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, citing his 'genuinely positive role' during what she described as 'sensitive and challenging times' for the people of northeast Syria. Below is the full transcript of the interview with Elham Ahmad. Rudaw: Dear viewers, good time to you all from Qamishli. We are in Western Kurdistan (Rojava) and I am presenting a very important interview here with a distinguished guest - a diplomat and official of Western Kurdistan, the foreign relations co-chair of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), Elham Ahmad. Ms. Elham, welcome. Elham Ahmad: Welcome, thank you. Welcome. It is interesting that neither of us is from Qamishli. Although you are from Afrin and I am from Kobane, we are closer together. Thank you very much for accepting this interview. Ms. Elham, you are very active, very vibrant in your work. You have a massive responsibility you're shouldering, isn't it? It's a national responsibility, a revolution that has reached a level where we must now see results from it and fulfill our duty. I want to start by asking about the negotiations and exchanges between you and the interim leadership in Damascus. What are they about? These meetings that are happening in Damascus - are they negotiations, dialogue? What is exactly happening in Damascus? Yes, actually, what is happening in Damascus is at its beginning, but one cannot call them out right negotiations. They are a form of dialogue - meaning, they fall within the framework of how we can address the Syrian problem. When the [Bashar al-Assad] regime was in charge, that regime represented one side, it was clear, and that regime was the Baath regime. The other side facing that regime was the opposition. Much effort was exerted to truly save Syria from that crisis. Those engagements [with the toppled Assad regime] cannot be called negotiations either. They were also a form of dialogue about how we could exit the crisis, but those engagements did not work. Now, the new administration in place, the interim administration [led by Ahmed al-Sharaa], wants to bring [the different] Syrian parties under its umbrella, understand all the diverse components and communities within [the Syrian] society, include them [in governance] and accordingly establish a new Syria together. Through these engagements, we wish to reach partnership in this country. We believe we are Syrian. We are Kurdish and Syrian, we are Arab and Syrian, we are Syriac and Syrian. Our common identity that brings us all together is being Syrian. Within this framework, we are asking how can we build a new Syria together? For this, [I can say], the engagements [between Rojava and Damascus delegations] can be described as dialogue. Through this dialogue, we can find the path to resolution. Syria has yet to exit this fundamental crisis and has yet to save itself from this [thorny] situation. We ask: how can we save Syria from this crisis, bring it to a stable situation and an agreed-upon situation? At this stage, the talks [between the delegations] are taking place within that framework. Is there someone supervising or monitoring these negotiations? Indeed, there are mediators. [The latest meeting] marked the first time an American representative participated, a French representative also participated, and Britain was also involved indirectly. But the parties that sat down - including our representatives and the interim administration's - we sat together following [agreement] on several main points that are required to reach a resolution, and held discussions about what measures can be agreed on following the March 10 agreement signed in Damascus [between Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces chief Mazloum Abdi], to implement the items of that agreement. How can we implement [that accord]? By adopting which approach? Our discussions centered on that. Are you satisfied with the role of US Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack? What is his role in these negotiations? What does he do? It was the first time that both of us - [DAANES and Damascus representatives] - saw Mr. Barrack in the meeting. It was the first time he participated in the meeting in person. In my opinion, as he mentioned in the meeting, to be able to play a positive and good role, knowing the parties is very important. I think there was hope that some decisions would come out of the meeting. We also said one or two decisions must come out of this meeting, but they didn't. Why wasn't that possible? Because of the [difference in the two sides'] understanding of "integration." In the March 10 deal, we agreed on integration in the form of participation. However, each side interprets this term, integration, differently. Our definition of integration is that it must entail mutual recognition. That means that the Damascus government also recognizes us as we accept them. What kind of acceptance might you say? Now they represent an interim administration. They assumed rule and became the interim administration. However, elections were not held, the entirety of the Syrian people and society did not agree to [their assumption of power], but they came, ousted Assad and became the interim administration. For example, they declared an interim constitution which they drafted [on their own]. They also formed an interim government and now preparations are underway to announce a people's assembly. These were all unilateral measures they implemented. So they did not hold consultations with you when doing these things? There were no consultations, neither with us nor with other Syrian components or parties. These steps are all taken unilaterally. There is one party that has declared itself as the interim administration, and we are in dialogue with this side to properly and truly implement the March 10 agreement. Does the new leadership in Damascus want the SDF to join the Syrian army? How do you view this matter? Are you against the SDF becoming part of the Syrian army? Tom Barrack wants this from you, doesn't he? To join the Syrian army and for the SDF to cease to exist. There is such a decision in the March 10 agreement. It says integration, meaning the SDF must also become part of the army. There is such a decision, there's an agreement. Under its own name? [As the SDF?] This matter is up for discussion. When discussions start, what form we will agree on will be taken as a basis. It is not like they can just come and say "surrender your weapons" or "bring all these fighters you have, transfer them and goodbye, it's over for you." The issue isn't like that. The integration we are talking about is different. We say the interim government must recognize the will of the people here [in Rojava]. In terms of security, how do these people protect themselves? Or how do they want to reach a way with Damascus to bear the responsibility together? Damascus must see all the people as Syrians. What emerged in the meeting is, [we noted] that the people here are under an administration - today this administration is called DAANES, tomorrow it might be something else - but there is [an administration] with institutions serving this community and serving the people. [The integration the Damascus leadership has in mind] is that when this integration in institutions [takes place], the people in those institutions are not accepted as employees of state institutions by the interim administration in Damascus. They're perception is that there are people here, they'll come and replace them, they'll take charge. That's it, the other side will have no role anymore. And you don't accept this? You don't accept that the Syrian interim government comes and administers this region? No, that's not it. Now there's the issue of integration, however, [prior to that], Kurds are still lacking an identity. They have not been officially accepted as a national component within Syrian society with a history. This issue is not outlined in the constitution and they do not have self-administration rights. For thirteen years, the people of northern and eastern Syria have been in a system where they've both protected themselves and managed themselves. They've presented massive sacrifices, martyrs. They have suffered greatly and have been displaced. As they say, "We suffered under the [Baath] regime," the people here [in Rojava] have also suffered under that regime, made sacrifices, and fought against the Islamic state (ISIS), Daesh. This is why, in Syria's general national issues, no one can say, "I've done more and I deserve to take charge of everything." The issue isn't like that. They are also tired, they have also made sacrifices, everyone has made sacrifices, so they must sit together and figure out how do we rebuild this country, how do we manage it? A common thinking must be created. You have no intention of dividing Syria? I am asking this because many parties accuse you of wanting to divide Syria through maintaining the DAANES? Division or fragmentation must have a reason [to call for it]. Why division? There must be reasons for that and those reasons become the basis for a society to think about separation and the main reasons [usually] come from the center. If the center truly recognizes the rights of this community, holds their hands, treats them as equals and respects their will, then why would they seek separation? For years, it has always been said about this community, about the Kurds, that "they are dividing Syria." Today, the same is being said about [the Druze community in the southern province of] Suwayda. Mind you, under Assad's Baath regime, the people who sidelined themselves the most and did not participate in [the Syrian civil] war and did not kill anyone and remained peaceful were Syria's Druze. But what are those people being exposed to today? They are facing extermination, accused of being 'infidels who must be exterminated" and of wanting to 'divide Syria." Suwayda is a city - if it were to be divided from there one day, where would it go? If Syria is divided, where would it go? So the people of Suwayda don't want to separate, do they? No, our relations with the Druze are very good. Until now, we haven't heard from any of them saying, 'We want to divide Syria.' There's no such thing. These are scenarios and propaganda made deliberately that they keep repeating. Yesterday, Hakan Fidan, Turkey's Foreign Minister, again said, "We won't allow division." He says if Syria is divided, it means Turkey will be divided. Why are such statements made when a people want to live in peace and want to reach an agreement with the current government? Look and see - the idea of Kurdish separation hasn't come from anyone's mouth until now, it's not in anyone's intention, but if, when rights are demanded and this is called "separation," this means the intention of the person speaking this way is bad. What kind of Syria do you want? Do you want a federal Syria? Do you want a Syria where you're autonomous? Do you want a decentralized Syria? What kind of Syria do you want? We've always openly stated in our projects or goals: the centralized state has brought nothing but pain and suffering to this society for decades. We, the people living in northern and eastern Syria, along with other components, with the advancement of democracy, with the advancement of different systems that express democracy, this shows that a decentralized system that shares state powers, meaning the duties of the central state, with regions, fundamentally lightens its own burden. So you insist on a decentralized system? Yes, a decentralized system that lightens Damascus's central burden. Give responsibility to the regions. If problems arise tomorrow, say, "We left it to you." Whatever there is, you solve your own problems. Education, health, internal security, and economy. All these must be decentralized, give duties to regions, cities, and provinces. For example, give it to them so they can manage themselves and the people there bear responsibility. If there's always a centralized system like before, someone says, 'according to the decision I make, and it's imposed on everyone,' this deepens the crisis. The previous system caused the crisis. If they do the same, problems will deepen again. You won't surrender your military forces, meaning the SDF, you won't hand over the DAANES, you won't hand over your institutions to Damascus, you won't give your borders to Damascus, you won't give the airports to Damascus. What will you give to Damascus? Have you and Damascus reached some common points between yourselves? Yes, there are [mutual points]. The things we see as right. But when we say decentralized, it doesn't mean nothing is centralized. We know some things are centralized: country borders, for example, let's say border crossing, airports, passports, identification cards - these are all tied to the center in all federal countries. We are not saying "everything must be decentralized." No, but the services aspect, cultural aspect, and language aspect - all these must be decentralized. For example, today there are many Kurds here, the Kurdish language can be primary here, but in another city, another place, it doesn't have to be Kurdish. So you're saying the Kurdish language should be first in Western Kurdistan? Yes, let it be first alongside Arabic, let the Kurdish language be first. There are Syriacs, let there be Syriac language, but the cultures here might not exist in Idlib. In Idlib, Arabic is enough, in coastal areas, Arabic is enough, but in Afrin, Kurdish is primary. When there are decentralized systems, they fundamentally make the situation much easier, eliminate internal problems, cause people to truly feel they have rights, have character and will, and participate in this state by their own will, meaning they're within this state, not always by force, like "no, you must be Arab!" But I'm not Arab. No, if I speak Arabic, I might not be able to express myself well. Society should not be administered by force. Damascus and those states which have influence in Damascus must understand this. We have not said we won't surrender, but the issue of "surrender" is itself problematic. We want to have "participation" be the basis; voluntary participation, the SDF participates in the army. For example, which army exists in Damascus now? We can establish it together. Let's establish it together. Are we creating an internal security system? The same way our hearts are set on Qamishli, at the same time let them be on Hama and Homs and Latakia too, see their security like your own security. For that, the internal security system - we voluntarily participate in it, create it together, and create regional councils together. This isn't difficult. The idea that "only I exist, I am the state, I am everything" - this idea must change. I mentioned the airport, Qamishli airport - its name is also written in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, and English. Previously, it was only Arabic and English. Will you manage the airport in the future? We are not fixated on that. We know the airports issue is a sovereignty matter. meaning they're connected to the central government and managed by it. But here, which province it's in, there's a kind of guarantee or let's say a way of how this airport can best serve society? This needs discussion. We talked about decentralization. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani has also spoken about it with Sharaa and with Tom Barrack. He said there must be a decentralized Syria. You made a visit to Erbil, and I saw you met with President Barzani. I wanted to know his role - how do you see his role? His role is truly appreciated. It's a positive role, especially given the problems Rojava - or northeastern Syria - is facing today. His personal relationships with international leaders and his dialogue with the temporary administration in Damascus are significant. From what we've seen and through our direct contact, we can say his role has been genuinely positive and deserves thanks. We also hope his involvement grows even further - so that, in these sensitive and challenging times, we can support each other more and work more closely to help resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria. Recently, I heard you say, "We have direct contact with Turkey." Have you visited Turkey? There are discussions, there's an open channel. There are direct discussions and dialogue, and there's a need for these dialogues, and we see them as important too. Especially when there was war between us, and hell was breaking loose. Very intense attacks were made, and great resistance was made. Now at the negotiation level, at least, instead of using weapons directly, there's talk. There's negotiation - what's the problem, how can this be solved, how do we understand each other? This exists. There are ongoing discussions and an open channel [of communication]. We are engaged in direct talks and we believe these dialogues are important. Especially during times when war was raging between us - when attacks were severe and resistance was intense. It is better now to talk than to fight. Instead of exchanging fire, we talk: what's the problem, how do we solve it, how can we understand each other? But I want a clear answer - did you go to Turkey? According to my information, you met with the deputy head of Turkish intelligence (MIT). Is this true? Let's not overshare - there are negotiations, and we see them as positive and constructive. We are focused on removing the obstacles [hindering development] in the region, and our discussions are ongoing. So, will these discussions continue? Yes, we fundamentally want the dialogue to improve further. Rather than relying on threats, we must sit down, understand each other, and talk about what the actual issues are - what do they want? Their talks with Damascus are truly very deep. We know this. To some extent, sometimes it even feels like they speak more on Damascus's behalf than Damascus does itself. We understand this too. But today we are thinking about all of Syria, and they say they are too. Northeastern Syria is part of Syria, so relations must improve on that level. Have you had any negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)? We receive news and direct information, especially when he managed to come forward with a brave and significant initiative during a very sensitive time. In my opinion, this [peace] initiative isn't just for Kurds, it's for the entire Middle East. The peace process [between the PKK and the Turkish state] is like no other in history. At a time when everyone was saying, "It's over, it's finished," and while resistance and defense were also very strong, he said: "The era of armed conflict is over. The war has played its role, and now change is necessary." Presenting such an initiative, that message was very important to us. Have your negotiations with Ocalan taken place directly? Has he called and spoken with you? Maybe they have, maybe they haven't. What I can confirm is that there has been dialogue, and we do receive information. What is most important is that the initiative he proposed has had a major impact and brought very important results for western, northern, and eastern Syria. For solution projects across all four parts of [Greater] Kurdistan, his vision is fundamental. Ocalan has called on the PKK to lay down arms. Has he asked you to do the same? Laying down arms is not on our agenda - is it not at all an option. Syria's situation is still dangerous. In full view of the world, people are still being killed and massacred. Asking the SDF to disarm under these conditions is like telling them to walk into death. It is very dangerous. However, within the broader discussions on Syria's future - how Kurds, the DAANES and the SDF fit in rebuilding Syria - these questions will eventually be addressed. Ocalan recently said he wants to meet with Kurdish leaders, including you. Are there plans for you to visit him? This is truly very important for Kurds. I would truly like to meet him. If it happens, it would be very positive, but we haven't received an official invitation yet. Personally, I see it as a necessity. If it happens, I believe it will have a very positive impact. You saw Ocalan's video message from Imrali prison. What was your reaction to it, how did it seem? It was very different. His ideas, the spirit and morale he conveys - even at his age - with such determination and clarity on peace, democracy, and justice, are incredible. His proposals are inclusive, not just for Kurds, but for all communities whose rights have been denied. He speaks of a new democratic system that reorganizes states and re-establishes republics. It is visionary. The Kurdish Unity Conference in Qamishli formed a delegation to visit Damascus, but it didn't go. Was the delegation not ready, or did Damascus refuse to receive them? The delegation is ready. The paper [of the topics on their agenda] is also ready. But Damascus has not yet prepared itself to receive them. Work is being done on that. We anticipate that in the future a time must be set for a meeting to take place. If Damascus also prepares itself, until now, there's no problem with the delegation. Your visits to Damascus won't block the Kurdish delegation's visit? Some think you're going alone without them. No, I don't believe that. The current delegation that is holding talks with Damascus represents the general framework of the DAANES. The Kurdish delegation, on the other hand, is focused on Kurdish rights - constitutional recognition, the Kurds' role in the new Syria. When we go to Damascus, we also discuss Kurdish rights, the general decentralized system and the SDF forces, meaning what Syria's administrative system will be. We have those discussions. We also discuss the role the SDF will have in the new Syria. It's about those. Is there any fear that war may again reach the DAANES or are you hopeful that it won't happen? We truly hope not. Syria has suffered enough. Still, there are forces trying to stir conflict. There are parties that want to ignite a war by any means. For example, the 'tribal mobilization" - the call made to the tribes prompting them to go to Suwayda [to fight the Druze]. They went from this area too, that mentality. They gather themselves with an idea, with an idea and move. That is a very dangerous situation. We can say that in our region this hasn't happened much, neither has a response to those calls and in this idea been recorded. It hasn't happened much. But there are those who went [to Suwayda] and returned as bodies. This danger truly exists. Here I want to urge our brothers, especially our Arab brothers, to be careful about this matter. This region is stable; people look after their lives, even if things are difficult, they manage themselves by their own will. Why should they leave their areas and go to Suwayda to get themselves killed? Why disrupt the situation here? There are those capitalizing on this, within the interim administration, there are people pulling these strings. In neighboring countries, too, there are those who are pulling strings too. This will not end well so I stress that not falling into this trap is very important. If there's an attack on Rojava like what happened in Suwayda or with the Alawites - massacres [in the coastal regions] - who will protect you? We've always protected ourselves - with support from the forces of [the US-led Global] Coalition to Defeat ISIS and most importantly, from our own people, we have Kurdish backing. We have strong societal support, international relations, and Kurdish relations as well. In such a scenario, I think general support within the Kurdish community, especially the Syrian people, is needed. I think that the spirit of Kurdish identity and responsibility exists. So you see such an attack on Western Kurdistan as unlikely? It should not happen, it must not happen. Which country do you see as closest to you? In Europe and the West? If I name them, it might not be very objective. Until now, for example, our relations with France are strong. Our talks are good, with some other countries, for example, Germany. We've also had good dialogue with Germany and other countries. In tough times, some of them reach out to us themselves, asking how they can help. That's important. If something urgent arises, do you have high-level contacts in those countries? Yes, with many countries. For example, in the US, we have contacts at the White House and the Pentagon - at many different and high levels. I want to ask about Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad). What do you see as their future? Regarding Afrin, Sare Kani and Gire Spi, discussions are ongoing. We agreed to establish a committee. It was also included in the [Abdi-Sharaa] March 10 agreement. There was a special item regarding the return of displaced persons to their homes. We formed a committee for Afrin, but after that, Damascus did not follow through. A meeting was required to officially discuss the return of the displaced persons. We've also said people from Deir ez-Zor who are now living in Afrin should return to their homes, and we guarantee nothing will happen to them. In return, our people in camps - living in dire conditions - must be allowed to return to Afrin, Serekaniye, and Gire Spi. We're discussing this with both Ankara and Damascus. The Turkish side says 'we handed it over' [to Damascus], but violations continue to take place and armed groups tied to Turkey are still there. The future of these areas must also be discussed so that people can return home. When will we see you in Afrin? I hope very soon. We're putting all our weight to resolve this situation as soon as possible. So you believe Afrin's people will return and the demographic changes won't be permanent? Yes, they will return. Afrin's people will return. There's no alternative. True, the destruction is massive, but we believe our people will rebuild it again. You've traveled across many parts of Kurdistan, especially Western Kurdistan. Which city did you love the most? Afrin is beautiful - its people, its nature. All our cities are good, but Afrin is very special, both geographically and personally for me. I've also visited cities in South, North, and parts of Eastern Kurdistan. There are very nice cities. Is there a city that holds a special place in your heart? Of course, it's Afrin. One must love their own city - it holds history and memories for me. But truly, every place in Kurdistan is beautiful. So you want to visit Afrin soon? Is it possible for you to go now? It's difficult. The security situation is problematic, and there's no official permission from the other side that would allow such a visit for now. You've traveled a lot - to cities in Kurdistan, Europe, and America. But I asked earlier whether you've been to Turkey recently, and you didn't give a clear answer. I've been before. But I'm asking about recently - in the past few days. Is there any danger to your life during these travels? Yes, there is danger. But we also take security precautions to protect ourselves. I was truly happy to interview you. Thank you for giving us time. It was very nice to do this interview here in Qamishli. I've always seen you on TV, but this is the first time meeting you face-to-face. Kurds praise you a lot and have even given you affectionate nicknames - some call you 'our diplomat.' That kind of recognition also places a heavy burden of responsibility on your shoulders. That's absolutely true - it's a very heavy responsibility that's been placed on us. Is your diplomatic team strong? Yes, but it still needs to improve - and it's getting stronger. As women, we say: whatever strength we have, we put it in service of our people. Whatever resources, whatever capacity we have, we dedicate it to serving our people. We see ourselves as servants of the people - that's how we define our role. We understand that we're living in historic times, and we carry a historic responsibility. We must see it through to the end. The accountability for this is heavy - we know this well. And because of that, we approach everything with a spirit of responsibility and a hope that we can rise to the level of our people's expectations.
Rudaw Net
4 hours ago
- Rudaw Net
Washington should help SDF reach deal with Damascus: Former US diplomat
Also in Interview Dialogue with Damascus advancing, not yet 'formal negotiations': Rojava official EU MP urges Turkey to embrace peace talks with PKK Germany is shifting gears with stricter migration, stronger defense: German MP DEM Party plans overhaul as PKK disarms A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Washington should use its 'leverage' to help the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) strike a compromise with Damascus that is in the interest of both sides, a former US diplomat said on Friday, with talks appearing to have hit an impasse. 'So it is important that the SDF, while the US is there, it's important that the SDF find the right balance, the right compromise to make with the national government in Damascus that respects the SDF's interests while also respecting the needs of the national government,' William Roebuck, former advisor to the US special envoy for Syria engagement and a one-time assistant to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS), told Rudaw. He stressed that the presence of US forces in northeast Syria (Rojava) provides Washington 'leverage' to help the SDF reach a deal with Damascus, saying that the US should utilize that influence for a deal that 'respects the interests' of both sides. A March 10 deal between the SDF and Damascus outlined the future of the Kurdish-led force and the region it controls in Rojava. While parts of the agreement have been implemented, key provisions - such as integrating the US-backed force into Syrian state forces - remain contested. According to Roebuck, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack has made it clear that Washington will eventually withdraw from Syria, though no specific timeline has been announced. Roebuck highlighted that future arrangements in Syria are likely to involve a 'more centralized command and control' structure on the military side, while local governance may allow for greater decentralization. 'This is just the way a military works,' he noted, adding that the specifics of integrating the SDF's leadership and command structure will need to be negotiated between the Syrian government and the SDF. The SDF is the de facto army of Rojava and fought the lion's share of the battle that resulted in the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria in 2019. Syria's interim government is working to establish a unified army, bringing under state control and centralized command the multiple armed groups that had fought against the former regime. On Wednesday, SDF media head Farhad Shami told Syria's Alyaum TV that the SDF wants to join the army as 'a bloc,' adding that 'handing over weapons is a red line. It is not possible to hand over weapons.' There have been at least two meetings between SDF chief Mazloum Abdi and Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa since Bashar al-Assad's regime was ousted in December. Recent massacres of Alawites and Druze by forces affiliated with or supported by Damascus have concerned Kurds and made them reluctant to give up their weapons. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot spoke with Abdi on Friday to confirm that Paris will host the next round of talks between the SDF and Damascus. Barrot also reiterated France's support for Syrian Kurds, according to the French foreign ministry. 'It's very difficult to have a decentralized military command and control structure. Now, what the specifics of that is and how the SDF and its leadership command structure would be integrated…I think those details will need to be worked out between the Sharaa government and the SDF,' Roebuck said. The US and France have been engaged in talks with the SDF and Damascus to accelerate the implementation of the March 10 agreement, which is endorsed by Turkey. Roebuck, who is also the executive vice president of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, said Gulf states recognize the SDF as a key force in the fight against ISIS but are currently more focused on reconstruction efforts in Damascus. Sharaa has pledged to form an 'inclusive transitional government that would reflect Syria's diversity,' but he faces criticism from both domestic and international actors who say he has marginalized minority communities. Kurdish leaders have repeatedly expressed concern over the centralization of power and the prominence of Islamic law in the transitional constitution adopted by the interim government. They have denied accusations of desiring to separate and instead call for federalism. The following is the transcript of the interview with William Roebuck. Rudaw: Dear William Roebuck, thank you very much for being a guest on Rudaw. The events in Sweden have once again brought forth the ethnic and sectarian complexities of Syria. Does the model of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) strengthen the common life of the communities? William Roebuck: It's a good question. Obviously, there are significant tensions in Syria, not only in the northeast, but in other parts of the country. I think a certain degree of decentralization makes sense. And obviously with decentralization, you need local government, something similar to what you have with the autonomous administration. However, ultimately these issues will have to be resolved with the national government in Damascus. This is what the United States is insisting on. And so this has to be done through negotiation. And I don't know exactly what the national government, the Ahmed al-Sharaa government, will accept in terms of an autonomous administration remaining behind. It'll have to be a part of the discussion of integrating the SDF into the national government. The violence against Alawites during Ahmed al-Sharaa's rule has reached the level of genocide. Is this not a major source of concern for Syria's future? It's a good question. Obviously, the violence that occurred in April with the attacks on Alawites and the more recent attacks, the violence in Suwayda province between the Druze and the Sunni Bedouins and some involvement from government forces to try to control this, these are very serious incidents. They have to be investigated. Clearly the national government and the national military in Damascus has a lot of work ahead of it to become a more effective security force. I think the United States, I think other friends of Syria in the region will work with the Sharaa government to try to improve its performance in providing security and in avoiding these incidents of violence and in investigating these incidents of violence after they have occurred. But yes, I agree, these are serious incidents and they are worrisome. And the friends of Syria outside the United States and others will need to work with the Sharaa government to ensure that this type of violence does not happen again, and if it does, that it's minimized, controlled, and investigated. Is it true that the US supports the centralization of Syria and opposes the demands of Kurds, Alawites, and Druze for a decentralized system? I think what Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Thomas Barrack has indicated in his public remarks is that the United States wants to see an agreement, and they're now putting some time limit on the negotiations to ensure that this happens. They understand that, for example, in the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces and their civilian counterparts, they have their demands. And the national government, the Sharaa government, they have their requirements, their demands. So it's a negotiation. But I do think the US government is making it clear that the integration of forces in the northeast should occur… I think they've clearly made it clear that they want this to happen. It's a priority. So I don't think they necessarily are against some level of decentralization, but what they are saying is that it has to be something that the national government will also agree to. So there has to be a meeting of the two sides in a negotiation and in a compromise. You have visited northeast Syria (Rojava). The political parties of northeast Syria met in Qamishli, and federalism became the common demand of the Kurds, but Damascus is not ready to negotiate on this issue. Is America's support for this policy of Damascus true? I think the political leadership in northeastern Syria is going to have to make some compromises, to be honest. I don't think it's realistic to continue to maintain the same positions that were held, for example, two years ago or three years ago. And some of these new decisions, they're going to be difficult and they're going to involve some changes in position, I think, if the SDF is going to succeed in integrating their forces and making a kind of joint effort with the national government. I think it will be difficult and it's going to involve some hard choices and I think some of these positions that you have mentioned about the political parties in northeastern Syria, frankly I think some of these positions that insist on absolute decentralization and absolute local autonomy will be difficult to maintain in the face of a necessary compromise between the two sides. If autonomy is difficult according to the current situation in Syria, what basic rights can the Damascus government give to northeast Syria? That's an interesting question. Obviously, northeastern Syria, the forces, the leadership, they have their position, they have their priorities. And in a negotiation, of course, they will want to insist on their priorities. And I think they can certainly negotiate for as much autonomy, as much decentralization as possible. I think this is what they should try to do. All I'm saying is that it will be a compromise. And the other side, the national government, has their position. Hopefully, the United States and France, I think, who's also involved a little bit in this, but certainly the United States is a key player, that they will help the two sides reach a compromise that is fair and that strengthens stability in Syria for all of its people, its majority population, but also its minority populations. Is Tom Barrack's support for the centralization of Syria the official view of the US government? I think that US Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Barrack speaks with great authority for the views of the United States government right now. He's a very close associate of President Trump who has a lot of confidence in him. So I think if you hear him say what the position of the United States is on these issues, you should accept that what he says represents a very authoritative expression of those views. So we understand from your statements and Barrack's remarks that Syria is heading towards centralization? I think it's going to vary a little bit. I think on the military side, I think it will look more like a central type system on the governance set. At the local level, local governments, like in various cities and towns, there might be more decentralized authority. That remains to be seen. I think the focus of the negotiations so far have been heavily on the military side. And I suspect on that aspect, there is likely to be more centralized command and control. This is just the way a military works. It's very difficult to have a decentralized military command and control structure. Now, what the specifics of that is and how the SDF and its leadership command structure would be integrated, I don't know the details of that. I think those details will need to be worked out between the Sharaa government and the SDF. Dear William, I want to get your opinion. You were the US special representative in the international coalition against ISIS. You were also the deputy US representative for Syrian affairs. At this stage, when ISIS is still a threat, how necessary is the existence of the SDF? Obviously, the fight against ISIS is very important. It's one of the reasons for the existence of the Syrian Democratic Forces. And I should say that as someone who was on the ground in northeast Syria for several years, I know how effective the SDF was as a partner with the US in the fight against ISIS. Very, very effective. No question about that. For the future, you know, it's difficult. I think ultimately there's going to need to be a significant level of integration of the SDF into a Syrian national military. And I think that is going to be a challenge for the SDF, but it's a challenge that they will need to find ways to cope with. And circumstances in Syria and in northeast Syria are changing. And this is what a good leadership does. It meets those challenges head on and finds a way forward that retains something of the previous, the traditional ways that things were organized, and also accepts the new terrain, the new territory, the new way of doing things. And this is what the SDF is going to have to do. The question is also this: do the pressures for the SDF's integration into the Syrian army increase the risk of ISIS's return? Yes, I think it's very possible that there will be a further resurgence of ISIS. This is a big risk and a big danger, and this is why the SDF and its presence in the northeast is so important, its cooperation with the United States. And I hope that this cooperation will continue. It's been a very valuable partnership. Overall, the capabilities of ISIS are increasing, I think. They're still somewhat limited compared to the height of their power and influence back in 2016 and '17. But I do think that they are trying to strengthen their activities and trying to strengthen their leadership cadres. And it's very important that the SDF and the US together stay focused on this threat that ISIS poses. What should the US government do to protect the structure of the SDF? We'll have to see how this plays out. I mean, right now, US forces remain in northeastern Syria. So they have some, in English we call it leverage, some ability to shape the situation and I think the US should use that leverage to help the SDF negotiate an agreement that is, that respects their interests to the degree that the United States is able to do that. Ultimately, Ambassador Barrack has made clear in his public remarks that the US will eventually leave. It will withdraw from Syria. It just, it hasn't made clear the timeline for that withdrawal. I think it's not in the short term, but beyond that, in the intermediate, the longer term, eventually the US is going to withdraw. So it is important that the SDF, while the US is there, it's important that the SDF find the right balance, the right compromise to make with the national government in Damascus that respects the SDF's interests while also respecting the needs of the national government. Dear William Roebuck, you are now the deputy president of the Arab Gulf States Institute. How do the Gulf countries view the role of the SDF and the future of northeast Syria? I think they understand that the Syrian Democratic Forces have been a very important force in the fight against ISIS. They understand the SDF was absolutely instrumental in the defeat of ISIS in the SDF and in the northeast and in the region around the northeast. So the Gulf countries do understand this and I think they appreciate this. I think right now, to be honest, the Gulf countries are more focused on what is going on in Damascus and what needs to be done for the reconstruction and rebuilding of Syria. Where are the right investments to make? How can they assist with humanitarian or broader assistance, those types of things in helping the Syrian government exert authority and stability over the country? These are the types of things. I noticed today, for example, the Saudis have a very large trade delegation in Damascus. This is their focus that they've signed a $6 billion memorandum of understanding for investment. And this is the second visit like that in the last six weeks for the Saudis. Obviously other countries are involved, the Emiratis have been involved in signing an $800 million port deal to help renovate the port of Tartus. So there's a lot of Gulf interest in investing and helping the Syrian government in reconstruction. Dear William, if you were now the US representative for Syrian affairs, what advice would you give to the US government? I would advise them on understanding the SDF position, to appreciate the many sacrifices and achievements that the SDF accomplished with the United States and with the special forces, American special forces that worked very closely with them in the northeast over the last number of years, since they started this partnership back in 2015-16 timeframe. It's been almost a decade. It's amazing. And I think so far, what Ambassador Barrack has indicated in his remarks, that he does understand this, he does understand. But I think it's very important, if I were advising them, as you ask, this is what I would emphasize. Help them make a good deal. Work fairly with both sides, but also appreciate the sacrifices that the SDF made over the last decade to pursue US interests in Syria against ISIS.
Shafaq News
6 hours ago
- Shafaq News
Peshmerga units begin joint drills ahead of merger
Shafaq News – Erbil Kurdistan's Ministry of Peshmerga has launched joint military training exercises for Units 70 and 80 to unify and restructure the Region's security forces. The drills, which began on Sunday in Erbil, mark a key step in merging the two historically separate forces into a centralized structure under the Ministry's command. The ministry aims to reorganize the Peshmerga into two military zones and 11 infantry divisions. This restructuring effort, part of a broader reform initiative supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, seeks to modernize and institutionalize the Kurdish forces. A spokesperson from Unit 80 told Shafaq News that the first integrated military command will be established following the merger. The reform process stems from a 35-point roadmap proposed by Western allies in 2018, which was later approved by the Kurdistan Parliament.
