Russia denies involvement in arson attacks on houses, car linked to British PM
The Kremlin on Monday rejected claims of Russian involvement in arson attacks on houses and a car linked to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and said that London repeatedly saw the hand of Moscow behind anything bad that happened in Britain.Earlier this month, police were called to fires at a house in north London owned by Starmer, another at a property nearby where he used to live and to a blaze involving a car that also used to belong to him.advertisementThree men - two of them Ukrainians and one Romanian national - have been charged in connection with the fires. None of the suspects have been charged under terrorism laws or the new National Security Act which aims to target hostile state activity.
The Financial Times and the Mail on Sunday reported that British security officials were investigating if Russia was involved in the arson attacks.Asked about the reports, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed the idea that Russia was behind the arson attacks."You know, London is inclined to suspect Russia of involvement in all the bad things that happen in Britain," Peskov said. "As a rule, all these suspicions are false, unsubstantiated and often ridiculous."The British police, which has not mentioned Russia in any of their statements related to the attacks, declined to comment on recent reports. The British government did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment. Must Watch
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Time of India
36 minutes ago
- Time of India
Regime on edge: If Khamenei is slain, who will rule Iran? Behind the scenes of Supreme Leader succession battle
As Israeli bombs hit Tehran and top Iranian commanders are killed, 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is more isolated than ever. This has led to growing questions about who could replace him if he dies. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now Khamenei has lost several of his closest military and intelligence advisers in recent Israeli airstrikes. Among the dead are Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of its ballistic missile programme, and spy chief Mohammad Kazemi. These men were not just senior officials but central figures in Khamenei's advisory circle. The loss of top leaders has raised doubts about how strong Iran's leadership is and what might happen to the regime next. For now, Khamenei remains in power. He retains the final say on all major decisions in Iran, from war to judicial appointments. Those familiar with his leadership describe him as "extremely stubborn but also extremely cautious", a mindset credited with keeping him at the top since 1989. As US President Donald Trump warned that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is 'an easy target' and admitted the US knows exactly where he is, speculation is growing over who might take over if Khamenei is eliminated. Though Trump said there are 'no current plans' to kill him, he added, 'Our patience is wearing thin,' raising fears of a possible strike. With Khamenei increasingly isolated and Iran under attack, here are the top contenders who could succeed him if the unthinkable happens. Mojtaba Khamenei Mojtaba, the Supreme Leader's 55-year-old son, is a mid-ranking cleric who has remained largely out of public view. He is believed to play a key behind-the-scenes role in coordinating security and political affairs and is particularly close to the Revolutionary Guards. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now Many observers believe Khamenei has been quietly grooming him for succession. However, a dynastic transfer of power may face resistance even within Iran's conservative establishment. Ali Asghar Hejazi As the deputy for political-security affairs in the Supreme Leader's office, Hejazi wields enormous influence behind the curtain. Reuters has described him as the most powerful intelligence official in the country, with direct oversight of security operations and close ties to both the Guards and clerical elites. He is not a cleric, but his proximity to Khamenei gives him considerable weight. Mohammad Golpayegani Mohammad Golpayegani is the long-time chief of staff in Khamenei's office and one of his most trusted aides. He is known for being loyal and keeping a low profile. While not well-known to the public, his deep knowledge of how the system works and his central role behind the scenes make him a possible surprise candidate or key player in choosing the next leader. Ali Akbar Velayati Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister and senior adviser to Khamenei on foreign affairs, blends religious knowledge with years of government experience. He sits on the Expediency Council and strongly supports Iran's regional alliances. Though he's respected and trusted, his old age and poor health could work against him. Kamal Kharazi Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister, now leads Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations. He sounds more moderate than hardliners but has always stayed within the regime's limits. Fluent in English and experienced at the UN, he helped shape Iran's diplomacy after the nuclear deal. Some in the government see him as a skilled, technocratic option. Ali Larijani Ali Larijani, former parliament speaker and ex-head of Iran's state broadcaster, comes from a well-known clerical family in Qom. A conservative with a practical approach, he is close to Khamenei and the security forces but also seen as somewhat independent. His experience and loyalty to the regime make him a possible compromise candidate. The Assembly of Experts Iran's constitution gives the power of succession to the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of senior clerics elected every eight years. This group is expected to deliberate in secret and could even appoint a leadership council rather than a single Supreme Leader. Many believe Mojtaba's chances will depend on whether the assembly members are united, divided, or coerced.
Time of India
39 minutes ago
- Time of India
'I don't care': US intel said Iran wasn't building nuclear weapon; Trump said no
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The Print
40 minutes ago
- The Print
Distracted Russia is losing central Asia to China
Once viewed as Russia's backyard, Central Asia is now steadily tilting towards China, a point echoed in most Chinese commentary on the summit. According to scholars and internet users alike, the war in Ukraine has been a critical accelerant. In 2023, China overtook Russia as the region's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $94.8 billion last year. Chinese discourse conveys quiet confidence that Beijing is outpacing Moscow economically, diplomatically, and ideologically in Central Asia. The very creation of the summit two years ago, as Russia became entangled in Ukraine, reflects China's calculated timing and strategic opportunism. Chinese media coverage of President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Kazakhstan for the second China–Central Asia Summit reveals a carefully constructed narrative that underscores Beijing's ambitions in the region. Far from being a routine diplomatic event, the summit and its portrayal in state media reflect a broader effort to position China as the new centre of gravity in Central Asia , displacing Russia's long-standing dominance. The war in Ukraine, which has drained Moscow's attention and resources, has accelerated this shift, creating a vacuum that Beijing is eager to fill. A Baidu commentator described the region's transformation as a 'silent metamorphosis' driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to this analysis, infrastructure projects like the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and Turkmenistan's gas pipeline to Shanghai highlight China's growing economic footprint and position it as the architect of connectivity and shared prosperity. In contrast, Russian anxiety is likened to 'a fire in its own backyard,' underscoring the asymmetry of influence. The commentator notes that in response to China, Moscow announced large-scale military exercises with Central Asian states and is promoting a new regional security treaty—potentially including 'military exclusion zones', in a bid to reassert control. Chinese commentaries highlight developments, long delayed under Russian pressure, such as the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and a $1 billion mining deal between China and Kazakhstan, as signs of a quiet pivot toward Beijing. Russia's isolation has weakened its ability to obstruct such projects. While the railway's mismatched gauges and outdated infrastructure suggest compromise, its deeper significance lies in the diminishing weight of Moscow's veto. Central Asian countries, once cautious, are now guided by economic pragmatism and a growing desire to reduce reliance on an enfeebled Russia. Wang Minzhao, assistant professor at Tsinghua University, argues that the railway project could halve transport times and allow China to dominate Eurasian logistics. Wang cited an old Chinese proverb, 'The arm cannot wrestle the thigh' to project that Putin did not concede due to economic pressure but rather saw strategic value in leveraging Beijing to unlock new trade routes. Headlines such as 'China and Central Asia have started building big projects, and Russia, which once blocked them, is now jealous' and 'The five Central Asian countries are striving to shake off the shadow of Russia; cultural confidence inspires national awakening' reflect this changing dynamic. Also read: Apple's India pivot is making China insecure. Baidu users call it a 'reluctant migration' De-Russification Chinese discourse frames the shift in Central Asia as both inevitable and advantageous. Li Lifan, Associate Researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, noted that Central Asia is seeking both political change and economic recovery. He described an emerging shift toward 'independent regional integrationism,' with Central Asian states embracing the C5+X model—engaging with powers like China, the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea—while distancing themselves from traditional Russian-led structures. Since the invasion and tightening of Western sanctions, Central Asian states are portrayed as reassessing ties with Moscow, prompting a quiet but steady push for 'de-Russification.' Families are prioritising native languages, and increasingly Chinese, over Russian in education. Cultural life is moving away from Soviet legacies, and even Turkmenistan is stressing 'neutrality' to signal distance from Russia's security orbit. The BRI is cast as a natural and superior alternative. Kazakhstan is a key transit hub to Europe via the China–Europe rail corridor, while Uzbekistan is drawing major Chinese investment in textiles and energy. In markets, Chinese goods are steadily replacing Russian imports. One Baidu analyst cited China's rejection of Russia's proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline route through Kazakhstan as a sign of shifting energy strategy. China now prefers a direct route, citing costs and outdated logic. This is part of a broader shift: reducing reliance on Russian gas, expanding non-fossil fuels, diversifying supply chains, and boosting RMB-based trade. With investment in digital infrastructure and financial innovation, Beijing is increasingly presented not just as a key player, but a rule-setter. One Weibo post summarised this emerging attitude: 'Russia's efforts won't keep the US out, it's better to let China manage Central Asia.' Also read: Beijing is calling for Ukraine de-escalation and also benefiting from a weakened Russia Beijing's Central Asian playbook Beijing's narrative is steeped in familiar foreign policy tropes: 'win-win cooperation,' a 'community with a shared future,' and 'harmonious development.' These themes are not incidental; they are calculated tools to legitimise China's expanding influence. At the same time, the discourse subtly communicates that while the China–Russia relationship remains cooperative, it is neither permanent nor equal. China has no intention of rescuing Russia; it aims to outpace it. Xi's visit to Astana, outside the broader Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework, is telling. With Russia distracted and losing sway, China is positioning itself as Central Asia's reliable partner—one that offers long-term engagement, economic development, and relative stability. By crafting this carefully curated discourse, China presents itself not as a rival occupier but as a natural and constructive stakeholder in the region's future. Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
