A chance to rebuild the trust, restore faith in air travel

The Hindu

12 hours ago

The fatal crash of Air India flight AI171 at Ahmedabad on June 12, 2025, has thrown open the floodgates for TRP-seeking media channels to cause fear among air travellers. 'Experts' on YouTube channels are going overboard with theories about what caused the accident, that are in turn being lapped up by viewers. The media has also been reporting events days after the accident that have involved Boeing 787 Dreamliners, such as flights of various airlines returning to airports for various reasons, adding to the general anxiety.
The Digital Flight Data Recorder and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (DFDR and CVR) of AI171 have been recovered intact from the wreckage. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom are a part of the investigation and we should wait for accurate data soon. Boeing has a heavy stake in the matter and the rumours that are flooding WhatsApp groups are something the company needs to address swiftly, keeping in mind the reliability of the Dreamliner.
Some clues
The only survivor on board the flight had mentioned to some channels that he had heard a loud thud a few seconds after lift off and of lights on board flickering. The deployment of the RAT or ram air turbine on the aircraft, which has been highlighted on some YouTube channel posts based on amateur video footage of the flight, has initiated discussion on dual engine failure due to power malfunctions on the aircraft.
As mentioned earlier, the incidents involving other international airlines flying the Boeing 787s have become a weapon for many to condemn the aircraft. Fortunately for us, while waiting for the DFDR and CVR data to be released to the public — which will be a few years in India due to the bureaucratic stonewalling in removing any adverse indication against government agencies — CCTV footage released by the airport operator (Ahmedabad) — and widely distributed on YouTube — gives us a fairly good idea of what could have happened in those few seconds. The statement issued by officials that the aircraft took up the entire length of the runway for take off is another useful item to use to analyse the accident.
Runway 23 at Ahmedabad is of a length of 3,505 metres (11,499 ft) long. This length is based on the outside temperature being 15° C. On the day of the accident, the temperature reported was 37° C (on a hot day the heated runway surface could be more than 40° C) and the pressure reported was 1000 hPa. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc.9157 prescribes corrections for temperatures, and the corrected length in this case would be only 9,068 ft (2,764m) of runway. Engine performance is based on temperature and atmospheric pressure. When data is entered in the aircraft's flight management computer, it will give the crew the correct speed and thrust to be used. All take-offs weights are based on an aircraft losing one engine and climbing out safely, clearing all obstacles in its take-off path. The landing gear has to be retracted as soon as an aircraft takes off and and before reaching 35ft, indicated by an increase in altimeter reading in the cockpit primary flight display. In this case, the landing gear was not retracted and must have created tremendous drag. With a loss of thrust in even one engine, the climb gradient will be severely affected.
In the CCTV footage released by the airport operator, the take off acceleration appears normal in the first 18 seconds of the video. As the nose is raised for the take off, one can see the nose swinging to the right, indicating engine failure. If the statement of an official, that the aircraft took off right at the end of the runway, can be correlated with the swing of the plane to the right, it indicates engine failure. Only the DFDR can confirm whether it was normal engine failure or due to a bird hit or debris ingestion. The thud that the surviving passenger mentions could be due to these possibilities. The video frame shows the aircraft inside a cloud of dust. Did it pick up debris from just beyond the end of the runway? ADS-B data indicate a lift off almost at the end of the runway. One can see the exhaust from the left engine causing a dust cloud for another couple of seconds before even that stops. The second engine may have failed due to debris ingestion or bird ingestion — the video clearly shows birds flying in the vicinity. An official's statement that no bird remains were found on the runway is due to the fact that the aircraft may have ingested birds beyond the runway in the overrun area. The frames after that show the aircraft sinking slowly due to a stall and impacting the building before exploding in flames.
A similar incident
On September 29, 1986, there was a similar incident to flight IC571, an Indian Airlines Airbus A300 aircraft with 185 passengers and 11 crew on a flight from Chennai to Mumbai. A report on that accident said: 'The copilot rotated the aircraft and when the aircraft attained 5° to 8° nose up attitude, a loud noise was heard from the right side followed by severe vibration. The commander took over the controls from the copilot at this stage and initiated action to abort the takeoff. Reverse thrust and wheel brakes were applied but the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway and rolled over to kutcha ground. There was no fire but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All 196 occupants were evacuated; among them 14 were slightly injured. Probable cause: Wrong decision of the commander to reject the take-off after the aircraft had been rotated for a lift-off, following a loud sound and severe vibrations from right engine due to bird hit.'
The similarities are interesting as a flight safety study. The take-off safety speed is where an engine failure makes a pilot take a decision to continue or reject the take off and stop within the end of the runway. The Indian Airlines pilots were crucified for taking their own decisions which saved the lives of all on board because the decision to reject was after commencing rotation and beyond the take-off safety speed.
In this case, the captain of AI 171, was reaching almost the end of the runway before lifting off. He has been lost along with the rest of his crew, passengers and many others on ground. It is a Hobson's choice where a pilot has to make a decision in a split second.
The long take off run could have been due to overloading. This writer has been told that several passengers have more than the permitted seven kilograms of hand baggage. If one adds the weight of what they buy in duty free and carry with them on board, it would result in additional weight — of at least 10 kg a passenger. When you add two tons of excess weight on a very hot day, that could explain the very long take-off run of the aircraft.
Why did the pilots not recognise the slow acceleration? Why did they forget to retract the landing gear on take off? The runway marking, of the last 2,000 ft, if recognised by the pilots, could have saved lives had take-off been rejected. The DFDR and CVR should provide the answers.
Rebuild the trust
Meanwhile, passengers should know that air travel is one of the safest modes of transport and travel and the Boeing 787 Dreamliner has had a wonderful safety record for 14 years, which is something one can trust. Boeing soiled its hands with the Boeing 737MAX fiasco and the Federal Aviation Administration and the NTSB remained passive. We hope they will all rise to the occasion and rebuild the trust.
Captain A. (Mohan) Ranganathan is a former airline instructor pilot and aviation safety adviser. He is also a former member of the Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC), India