Baltic state's president rejects bill targeting country's largest Christian church
The bill that was initially passed by lawmakers back in April is aimed at barring religious organizations from having ties with foreign bodies deemed a security threat.
It would prohibit local churches from having ties or economic relations with such bodies enshrined in foundational documents or charters. Legislation seeking to bar religious entities from being governed by foreign bodies or leaders deemed a threat was dropped after Karis opposed the bill in April. He maintains, however, that the changes were not sufficient enough.
The bill 'disproportionally limits the freedom of congregations and religion,' Karis said on Thursday, criticizing the definition of a 'threat' in the legislation as extremely 'vague.'
Tallinn has 'other effective means' to combat what he called foreign influence and such 'extensive interference' into people's religious life is not needed. Lawmakers have openly admitted that they sought to exert control 'over the church teachings and religious rituals,' he claimed.
The president's decision drew criticism from Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro, who claimed the bill was aimed at protecting the country's 'security' and would not lead to 'a ban on Orthodox Christianity or any other religion.'
The ECOC has repeatedly expressed its concerns over the legislation. In June, it warned that the bill interfered 'disproportionately' with the internal life of religious associations even after its initial version was amended.
The church had previously been required to revise its charter and remove any mention of the Moscow Patriarchate, despite maintaining historic and canonical ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.
The ROC has previously condemned the draft law as discriminatory against Estonia's 250,000 Orthodox believers, stressing that the ECOC has never engaged in politics or jeopardized public safety. Around 16% of Estonians identify as Orthodox Christians and 8% as Lutherans, according to government data.
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