Taliban making steady gains toward global legitimacy
At the time, Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship was on a 'positive trajectory' and that the move was a positive step towards 'enhanced engagement' in the areas of trade, security and counterterrorism.
This is a big win for the Taliban, particularly after its relationship with Islamabad broke down over terror attacks on Pakistani soil by the Taliban-affiliated militant group Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The situation had reached crisis levels when Pakistan carried out airstrikes on alleged terror camps in Afghanistan last year, killing 46 people and sparking border skirmishes between Taliban and Pakistani soldiers.
Pakistan's recognition is the latest in a series of diplomatic victories for the Taliban. China was the first country to seek closer ties, sending its ambassador to Kabul in 2023 before accepting the credentials of a Taliban envoy in Beijing. At the time, Chinese officials said the Taliban should not be excluded from the international community.
Today, China is the Taliban's closest partner. China recently hosted a trilateral meeting with Taliban and Pakistani officials in Beijing that successfully cooled tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan.
Beijing also announced it would extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan, representing a potential Belt and Road Initiative-fuelled trade boon for the Taliban.
Taliban envoys occupy embassies in every Central Asian country barring Tajikistan, and the United Arab Emirates has also sent an ambassador to Afghanistan.
More recently, the Taliban has welcomed Indonesia's chargé d'affaires in Kabul and Iran has accepted the appointment of the Taliban's new Consul General in Mashad. Russia also plans to send an ambassador after removing the Taliban from a list of designated terror organizations.
Further afield, Japan hosted a high-level Taliban delegation in February, the first visit to the country by any Afghan government. For a regime accustomed to international isolation, engaging with the likes of Japan and Indonesia is seen as a key route towards international legitimacy.
India, too, is bidding to engage with the Taliban. There are reports that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will soon accept a Taliban ambassador in New Delhi. That comes after Indian and Taliban foreign ministers met in Dubai in January. India clearly thinks this is the time to recognize the Taliban before the country is dominated by rivals Pakistan and China.
Even the United States, which battled Taliban insurgents for nearly two decades in the name of the War on Terror, has shown signs of softening on the regime.
For example, Washington removed millions of dollars worth of bounties for senior Taliban leaders in March, including for Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, to secure the release of George Glezmann, an American tourist detained by the Taliban in December 2022.
Despite this, the Taliban still faces stubborn obstacles to achieving full legitimacy. Most significantly, the regime continues to be denied Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations; it has been barred from taking the seat four times since 2021.
Many countries still refuse to recognize the regime due to its abysmal treatment of women – called 'gender apartheid' by the UN experts – and its close links to internationally designated terrorist groups.
History shows winning legitimacy is rarely a linear process and is often a game of diplomatic patience. The People's Republic of China spent years in isolation before it was recognized by the West as the legitimate government of China, taking its place on the UN Security Council in 1971 and recognized by Washington only in 1979.
This was a decision based on pragmatism – an acknowledgment the PRC was not going anywhere and that engaging with Beijing was then aligned with Western strategic interests.
Similarly, while China, India and the US have at one time or another all demanded the Taliban respect women's rights and root out terrorism, these unmet demands have not stopped them and others engaging with the regime by opening embassies, exchanging envoys and making deals.
There is a pragmatic view emerging that the Taliban is probably here to stay and that it is better to engage with the regime rather than further isolate Afghanistan.
The West seems to believe it can negotiate with so-called Taliban 'reformers' to improve the situation for women and girls, while China, Russia and Iran see the regime as a key ally against the deadly Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK), which has carried out attacks in Russia and Iran and threatened Chinese interests in the region.
But the Taliban's words and actions show this approach is not working. The Taliban continues to roll out punitive edicts oppressing women and made it clear its position is fused with its harsh interpretation of Islam and is thus non-negotiable.
And the West's decision to engage is no doubt seen by the regime as a sign of weakness, validating its stance and emboldening it to take further hardline positions and policies.
Indeed, with reports supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzad has strengthened his power base and marginalized Taliban moderates, reforms look increasingly unlikely.
The Taliban has also wholly failed to defeat ISK, seen by the group's brazen assassination of Taliban powerbroker Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani last year, terror attacks on civilians in Russia, Iran and Turkey, and threats to do the same against India.
There is also certain evidence ISK has successfully infiltrated the regime's intelligence agencies and attracted disillusioned Taliban soldiers to its ranks. At the same time, The Taliban is believed to be backing Al Qaeda and TTP, likewise failing on its vow to keep Afghanistan terror-free.
The regime's inability to divest from terrorism makes the region less safe, a reality experienced by China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and India since the Taliban returned to power.
Legitimizing and emboldening the Taliban, therefore, comes with significant security risks that may ultimately outweigh the potential diplomatic benefits of engagement.
Nonetheless, the Taliban is winning the battle of legitimacy despite these failings, helped by Afghanistan's strategic position between Central and South Asia and China's willingness to fill the vacuum left by the US after its fateful 2021 withdrawal.
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