China's Wang Yi holds trilateral talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan after India visit
In a statement on X, the Afghan foreign ministry said, "Today, the sixth meeting of the dialogue of the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan was held in Kabul. In this meeting, alongside reviewing the decisions of previous meetings, emphasis was placed on strengthening relations between the three countries in the political, economic, and transit sectors."
BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND CHINAEarlier on Wednesday, Muttaqi held a bilateral meeting with Wang Yi to discuss expanding cooperation between Afghanistan and China in multiple areas.The Afghan foreign minister described the bilateral relationship as "progressing" and called China a "good trading partner for Afghanistan," noting that annual trade between the two countries has reached $1 billion."The trade volume between the two countries has risen to a significant level," the Afghan foreign ministry wrote on X. "Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi presented his practical proposals regarding the expansion of economic cooperation between Afghanistan and China, particularly in the areas of transportation cooperation, banking relations, and balancing trade, and made a request."Wang Yi said that the relevant institutions of both countries are actively working to further increase Afghanistan's exports to China.CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HEADS TO PAKISTANAfter two days of high-level discussions in New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in Kabul on Wednesday, marking his first visit to Afghanistan in over three years.Following his trip to Kabul, Wang landed in Islamabad for a three-day visit, where he is scheduled to meet his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar. According to Islamabad's Foreign Ministry, Wang and Dar will co-chair the sixth round of the China-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, furthering cooperation between the two countries.Earlier in May, Wang met Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Afghan acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Beijing. During the meeting, he extended a formal invitation for Afghanistan to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).Following Wang's engagement, Pakistan appointed its first ambassador to Kabul since the Taliban's return to power in 2021.- EndsWith inputs from ANITune InMust Watch
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Why Xi Jinping made a rare visit to Tibet amid tension over Dalai Lama succession
Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Lhasa on Wednesday on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The development comes amid tensions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government about his potential successor. This is Xi's second-ever visit to the region as president Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a rare visit to Tibet. Xi arrived in Lhasa on Wednesday on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region. He is the first Chinese president to attend this ceremony. The development comes amid tensions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government about his potential successor. The Tibetan spiritual leader, who turned 90 in July, had announced just months ago that he would choose his own successor. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD But what do we know about Xi's trip? What does his rare visit to Tibet mean? What we know about Xi's strip Xi arrived in Lhasa, the regional capital of Tibet, around noon on Wednesday. Photos in state media showed him being greeted by large crowds and dancers. Xi's high-profile entourage comprised, among others, China's top political adviser Wang Huning, his chief of staff Cai Qi, Vice-Premier He Lifeng and Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong. Xi met several officials from the region including public security officers. He also met the Chinese-backed Panchen Lama. More from Explainers 'China is very patient': Trump says Xi Jinping told him Beijing will not invade Taiwan during his presidency In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with representatives of military personnel stationed in Lhasa. AP Xi praised local authorities for 'engaging in a thorough struggle against separatism'. He said they had been told to focus on four key areas – stability, development, environmental protection and border defence. 'To govern and to develop Tibet, the first thing to do is to ensure political and social stability, as well as ethnic unity and that religious people are in harmony with society,' Xi said. He also urged the CPC members to encourage the use of Mandarin. He said economic, cultural and personnel exchanges between Tibet and China must increase. He said authorities must 'guide' Tibetan Buddhism and bring it in line with socialist society. He said a special district must be established to highlight improvements in ethnic unity. Xi further told CPC members to encourage agriculture, environmental protection and tourism in Tibet. Significantly, Xi made no mention of the Dalai Lama. What his rare visit to Tibet means China has played an outsized role in Tibet's affairs since communist forces invaded the region in 1951. China claims Tibet has been part of its territory for centuries, but many Tibetans say they were essentially independent for most of that time under their Buddhist theocracy. The Tibetan Autonomous Region was established by Mao Zedong in 1965. China over the decades has tightened its grip on Tibet by demolishing monasteries and imprisoning monks who refused to toe the party line. However, it has faced sporadic resistance from monasteries and communities. This, most notably occurred in 2008, when Lhasa witnessed an outpouring of rage against Chinese traders and residents, which quickly spread to other areas. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Recent years have seen the large-scale migration of majority Han Chinese to the high-altitude region, the virtual closure of Tibet to journalists and foreigners, the removal of Tibetan children from their families to boarding schools where they are taught in Mandarin, and the repression of all forms of political or cultural expression outside Communist Party control. These efforts intensified after XI came to power in 2012. The trip makes sense in the backdrop of Xi's seemingly newfound determination to tighten his grip on the Chinese state yet again. The development comes amid tensions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government about his potential successor. AP The Dalai Lama fled Tibet and sought refuge in India in 1959 after a failed uprising against the Chinese. He has been in India ever since – a thorn in the side of the Chinese authorities. China and the Dalai Lama have been at odds over the question of his successor. While the Dalai Lama has made it clear that the atheistic Chinese state would have no say over the tradition, China seems ready and willing to do so. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In fact, China has already appointed its own Panchen Lama – who many Tibetans deride as a stooge of the CPC. The Chinese state also disappeared Gendün Chökyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama had appointed as the Panchen Lama – the second highest ranked official in the Tibetan religion – in 1995. The then six-year-old boy and his family have not been seen in public since. China's contested border with India runs along Tibet's southern edge, where China has been building roads and other infrastructure for possible military use. Beijing has recently unveiled a mega hydropower project in the Tibetan Plateau – which has caused discomfort in New Delhi. Xi' visit to Tibet also comes in the backdrop of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi undertaking a trip to India. India and China have taken steps to repair their relations which hit a nadir during the Galvan Valley clash in 2020. This in the backdrop of US President Donald Trump imposing tariffs on trading partners including India. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD What do experts say? Experts says Xi's visit reinforces the desire of the Chinese state to exert control over the region – particularly as the question of the succession of the Dalai Lama looms large. Xi's trip makes him the only Chinese visit leader to visit Tibet twice. Robert Barnett, a scholar of Tibet at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, told The New York Times,'The succession of the Dalai Lama is a symbolic battleground and symbolic opportunity for the party' to claim Tibet, Barnett said. 'I am really struck by the decision for Xi himself to go,' he added. He said the move shows the 'remaining existential anxiety in the party about religion and nationality despite years of control.' Gyaltsen Norbu, China's 11th Panchen Lama at the opening ceremony of CPPCC with other delegates at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Tibetans often call him a stooge of the Chinese Communist Party. File image/Reuters They also say it reinforces the limits of Chinese power over the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people. 'The Chinese have found themselves on the back foot,' Tseten Samdup Chhoekyapa, an official of the Dalai Lama's office in northern India, told The New York Times. Chhoekyapa said the trip must be viewed through the prism of the Dalai Lama's statement about his succession and that Beijing is trying to once again 'legitimise its occupation of Tibet. 'For Tibetans, the anniversary of the People's Republic of China's creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region is no cause of celebration, but a painful reminder of China's colonial occupation,' Dorjee Tseten, the Asia Program Manager at the Tibet Action Institute and a member of Tibet's exiled Parliament, added. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 'Tibet remains one of China's greatest challenges, and Tibetans will never accept Beijing's imposed succession plan for the Dalai Lama.' With inputs from agencies
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Beyond the blocs: India's strategic opportunity in a reinvigorated RIC
The international landscape is no longer defined by clear battlelines and conventional military might alone. The 21st century has introduced a new, insidious form of conflict: hybrid threats. This multi-pronged strategy—encompassing state-sponsored terrorism, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, maritime aggression, and a new frontier of cognitive warfare—aims to destabilise nations from within, blurring the distinction between peace and war. For the Global South, which often lacks the institutional resilience and technological safeguards of the West, these threats pose an existential challenge. In this volatile environment, the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral, long seen as dormant or fraught with internal tensions, is now being revisited as a potential vehicle for a new collective security framework. However, for such a framework to be truly effective and not just a geopolitical gambit, India's unique position and leadership will be critical. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The recent push by Moscow and Beijing to revive the RIC dialogue is a clear signal of their intent to counter what they perceive as a Western-led security architecture. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko, in a recent statement, emphasised Russia's 'genuine interest' in restarting the trilateral mechanism, an interest echoed by China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, who called it vital for 'regional and global stability.' While this overture is driven by their own geopolitical priorities, it presents India with a strategic opportunity to shape the agenda in a manner that advances the Global South's larger objectives. India's approach to security has long been rooted in a multidimensional strategy, a stark contrast to the purely kinetic responses often favoured by the West. New Delhi's 'whole-of-government' approach to hybrid threats, as outlined in its national security strategies, recognises that a cyber-attack on a power grid (like the alleged Chinese malware attack on Mumbai's grid in 2020) is as much a national security threat as a terrorist incursion. India's defence modernisation and the creation of specialised bodies like the Defence AI Council (DAIC) are a testament to its recognition of this new reality. This is precisely the kind of expertise and experience India can bring to the RIC table, shifting the conversation from a mere anti-Western bloc to a substantive forum for technical cooperation. The focus must be on tangible, threat-specific collaboration. While RIC has a history of discussing counterterrorism, the focus must move beyond general condemnations to actionable intelligence sharing and capacity building. For the Global South, the threat of radicalised non-state actors exploiting weak governance is a constant menace. India, with its extensive experience in counterinsurgency and counter-radicalization, can lead the charge in establishing a joint RIC counterterrorism doctrine. This framework could include shared threat assessments, joint training exercises, and a mechanism to block the financing and propaganda of terrorist groups across digital platforms—a domain where cognitive warfare and terrorism now intersect. The RIC countries are important participants in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which serves as the world economy's circulatory system. China's growing presence in the IOR, its debt-heavy 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), and its aggressive posturing in the South China Sea remain points of contention. This is where India's role as a 'first responder' and net security provider in the IOR, underpinned by its initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the more recent MAHASAGAR, is crucial. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD For an RIC maritime security framework to be credible, it must be based on a commitment to international law and the freedom of navigation. India should leverage its position to ensure that any trilateral cooperation on piracy, illegal fishing, and maritime terrorism does not legitimise aggressive unilateral claims but instead upholds a rules-based order that benefits all coastal states of the Global South. Arguably the most critical and complex frontier, both Russia and China have been accused of employing sophisticated cyber and cognitive warfare tactics, from electoral interference to disinformation campaigns aimed at sowing internal discord. India, which has also been a victim of such campaigns, is developing its own cyber resilience and is uniquely positioned to understand the dual-use nature of these technologies. Instead of a framework to weaponise these capabilities, India must champion a code of conduct that promotes a secure, open, and resilient cyberspace. This involves pushing for shared protocols for reporting cyber-attacks, developing a common defence against state-sponsored disinformation, and creating a joint technical working group to protect the digital infrastructure of developing nations. This would not only enhance regional security but also provide a valuable resource for other Global South countries struggling with these threats. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD It goes without saying that the deep mistrust between India and China, especially in the wake of the military standoff in eastern Ladakh, is the elephant in the room. The success of a revived RIC hinges on a credible de-escalation of border tensions and a genuine commitment to dialogue. Without this, any talk of a collective security framework will be dismissed as hollow rhetoric, a mere façade for Great Power competition. India's role is not to be a junior partner in a Russo-Chinese-led bloc but to act as a crucial hinge—a bridge between competing powers and a champion for the Global South. By pushing for a security framework that is multilateral, rules-based, and focused on specific, non-traditional threats, New Delhi can ensure that the RIC serves a constructive purpose. It can transform this grouping from a tool of geopolitical realignment into a meaningful platform for collective action, safeguarding the interests and stability of the very nations that are most vulnerable in this age of hybrid threats. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Subhalakshmi Brahma is Researcher at JK Policy Institute, Specialising in geopolitics and strategic domains. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
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Why Nepal has a problem with India-China trade through Lipulekh Pass
New Delhi has strongly reacted after Nepal took objection to the resumption of border trade between India and China through Lipulekh Pass, on the border between Uttarakhand and Tibet. Kathmandu claims Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura and Kalapani as part of its territory. But why is there a dispute over these areas controlled by India? The border dispute between India and Nepal has flared up again. File Photo/PTI The boundary issue has once again flared up between India and Nepal. New Delhi has strongly reacted to Kathmandu's objection to the resumption of border trade between India and China through Lipulekh Pass. India dubbed Nepal's territorial claims to the Lipulekh Pass as 'unjustified and untenable.' Nepal earlier expressed displeasure with India over its decision to reopen trade with China through the Himalayan pass, a route that covers Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let's take a closer look. What did Nepal say? India and China have decided to reopen border trade through three designated trading points — Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand, Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh, and Nathu La Pass in Sikkim. The development came during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India earlier in the week. After the announcement, Nepal objected to the resumption of border trade between the two countries through Lipulekh Pass, which it claims is its territory. 'The Nepalese government is clear that the official map of Nepal has been included in the constitution of Nepal and that the map shows Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani east of the Mahakali River as integral parts of Nepal,' the Nepal foreign ministry said on Wednesday (August 20). 'It is a well-known fact that the Nepal government has been requesting the government of India not to construct or expand roads and indulge in any kind of activity such as border trade in the territory,' the statement by the spokesperson of the foreign ministry, Lok Bahadur Chhetri, read. 'It is also well known that the Nepal government has already informed the government of China that the area lies in Nepalese territory,' it added. 'The Nepal government is committed to resolving the border issue between the two countries through diplomatic channels on the basis of historical treaty - agreement, facts, map and other evidence complying with the spirit of cordial and friendly relations existing between Nepal and India,' read the statement. Nepal's objection came even as Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited the country between August 17-18 and invited Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to visit India in September. Moreover, India and Nepal on Wednesday jointly inaugurated two bridges constructed with grant assistance from New Delhi in Koshi province. 'India has promised to provide 10 prefabricated steel bridges to Nepal under grant assistance for rebuilding critical road infrastructure disrupted by rains and for bolstering connectivity following the September 2024 floods,' the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu said in a press release. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD How India reacted India hit back at Nepal's territorial claims, saying they were not based on 'historical facts'. 'Our position in this regard has been consistent and clear. Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh Pass had commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades. This trade had been disrupted in recent years due to COVID and other developments, and both sides have now agreed to resume it,' said Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal. 'As regards territorial claims, our position remains that such claims are neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence. Any unilateral artificial enlargement of territorial claims is untenable,' he said. In response to media queries regarding comments made by Nepal on border issue, Official Spokesperson Shri Randhir Jaiswal says "We have noted the comments of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal related to resumption of border trade between India and China through the Lipulekh… — ANI (@ANI) August 20, 2025 STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 'India remains open to constructive interaction with Nepal on resolving agreed outstanding boundary issues through dialogue and diplomacy,' Jaiswal added. Even in 2015, Nepal had objected to an agreement between India and China to include the Lipulekh Pass as a bilateral trade route. India-Nepal border dispute India and Nepal share a 1,800 km open border. Kathmandu claims Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura and Kalapani near the trijunction of India, Nepal, and China. Nepal disputes the areas, which are under India's control, based on the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, which established the Kali River as the demarcation line for the boundary with India. The Kali River has two tributaries — one beginning at Lipulekh and the other at Limpiyadhura. Kathmandu claims the river originating in Limpiyadhura as the western border, while New Delhi asserts the boundary begins from Lipulekh. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Lok Raj Baral, a former Nepali diplomat, told Al Jazeera that the disputed land lies between the two rivers. He said that the boundary issue stems from a lack of maps published by Nepal. 'Nepal did not have the capacity to produce maps, so it depended on maps published by the British India. The first boundary claim by Nepal was made in 1962,' he said. Last year, Nepal announced a new currency note featuring a map showing Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura. India had rejected the map, saying the 'unilateral actions' would not change the ground reality. This was not the first time that Kathmandu displayed the areas within its territory. On June 18, 2020, Nepal revised its new political map with these three strategic regions. The move was dismissed by India as 'untenable'. That year, Nepal also protested India's inauguration of a new 80-kilometre road leading to the Lipulekh Pass. This link serves as the shortest route between New Delhi and Kailash-Mansarovar. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In 2019, New Delhi published a new map exhibiting Kalapani within its borders, a move criticised by Kathmandu. With inputs from agencies
