Panasonics battery unit profit grows 47% y/y in Q1 on AI boom
Profit for the key unit, which makes batteries for Tesla and other EV makers, rose 47% year-on-year to 31.9 billion yen ($215.6 million).
"Concerns remain over a further slowdown in EV demand due to U.S. tariff policies and termination of IRA 30D tax credit", Panasonic said in a presentation slide, but noted demand for data centre-bound energy storage systems is "growing more than anticipated".
For the full-year that ends in March 2026, the company kept its operating profit forecast for the energy unit at 167 billion yen.
Panasonic Holdings said in May it would cut 10,000 staff and expected to book restructuring costs of 130 billion yen as part of a push to improve group profitability.
The electronics manufacturer said at the time it did not expect to book any restructuring costs in its energy business.
Last week, Panasonic Energy's major customer Tesla warned of fallout from the U.S. government's legislation to cut a $7,500 tax credit for EV buyers.
Panasonic Energy operates a plant in the U.S. state of Nevada that provides batteries to Tesla and earlier this month started production at its second U.S. plant, in Kansas.
It also makes energy storage systems for data centres in its consumer business, which in the April-June quarter saw a rapid rise in demand owing to massive AI-related investments, the company said.
But both auto batteries and consumer energy storage systems would see certain impact from U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs, it added, without providing the impact forecast in numerical terms.
Panasonic Energy is investing in new battery technologies as it competes with Chinese and South Korean rivals such as CATL and LG Energy Solution (LGES) in the global EV supply chain.
Last week, LGES warned of slowing demand by early next year due to U.S. tariffs and policy uncertainties after it reported a profit jump for the April-June period.
(Reporting by Kantaro Komiya; Writing by Daniel Leussink; Editing by Christopher Cushing and David Holmes)
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In Trump's eyes, the end goal was always the same: advance US interests without compromise. India, for its part, must read this as a case study in future-proofing its foreign policy. The US will remain a critical partner, but partnership does not mean protection from pressure. National interest, not sentiment, must be India's guiding principle. In the great game of global power, emotional narratives are short-lived. Strategy endures. Trump understood that well. India must, too. (The writer is the Chief Spokesperson of BJP, Chairman for Nation Building Foundation, and a Harvard Business School certified Strategist)
