
A 'Terror' For Erdoğan
On March 19, 2025, the Turkish government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrested Ekrem Imamoğlu, who has been mayor of Istanbul since 2019, on charges of "establishing and managing a criminal organization," "helping a terror organization,"[1] "taking bribes," "extortion," "unlawfully recording personal data," and "rigging a tender."[2] The Interior Ministry announced that he was also suspended from his post as mayor as a temporary measure.[3] On March 28, even Imamoğlu's lawyer was arrested and later released on the condition that he be kept under "judicial control."[4]
Imamoğlu, who is now being held in Istanbul's Silivri prison, notorious for its housing of political prisoners, is a leading figure in the main opposition party in Turkey, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), which was the party of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey. Imamoğlu has long been viewed as the likely presidential candidate in presidential elections that, by Turkish law, need to be scheduled before May 7, 2028. Another popular figure is Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara. On March 24, several days after his arrest, Imamoğlu won a CHP party vote and was declared the party's presidential candidate,[5] a decision formalized by the party on March 27.[6]
The CHP had made significant gains in the 2019 local elections,[7] but it was the 2024 local elections that were a major upset: For the first time in 22 years of the rule of Erdoğan's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the CHP received more votes than the AKP – 37.8 percent of Turks voted for the CHP over 35.5 percent voting for the AKP.[8] The CHP also won the mayorships of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, and Antalya – together constituting the country's capital and five largest cities.
It is therefore not surprising that the country erupted in demonstrations following Imamoğlu's arrest, with hundreds of thousands taking to the streets in dozens of cities. Media have reported significant protests ongoing in Adana,[9] Ankara,[10] Antalya,[11] Aydın,[12] Balıkesir,[13] Adıyaman,[14] Afyonkarahisar,[15] Amasya,[16] Ardahan,[17] Artvin,[18] Bartın,[19] Bilecik,[20] Bolu,[21] Burdur,[22] Bursa,[23] Çanakkale,[24] Denizli,[25] Edirne,[26] Eskişehir,[27] Giresun,[28] İstanbul,[29] İzmir,[30] Kastamonu,[31] Kırıkkale,[32] Kırşehir,[33] Kütahya,[34] Manisa,[35] Mersin,[36] Muğla,[37] Sinop,[38] Tekirdağ,[39] Uşak,[40] Yalova[41] and Zonguldak.[42] CHP leader Özgür Özel said that 2,200,000 people protested the arrest at Istanbul's Maltepe district on March 29,[43] though media reports put the number at hundreds of thousands.[44] This list is not exhaustive.
Attendants protest the arrest of leading opposition figure Ekrem Imamoğlu at a massive rally in Maltepe on March 29.
Erdoğan's government has responded as it has historically in such situations: with "rubber bullets" as reported by the media,[45] which Turkish analysts take to mean projectiles from the FN 303 riot gun used by Turkish police;[46] TOMA vehicles, which are the Turkish-made armored water cannons designed for riot control that became famous during their widespread deployment in crushing the 2013 Gezi Park protests;[47] tear gas, for nearly half a million units of which Turkish police recently placed orders to refill their warehouses;[48] 1,876 people detained and 260 arrested as of March 27,[49] including 37 arrests for social media posts;[50] the banning from broadcasting for 10 days of the TV channel of the leading opposition outlet Sözcü;[51] the arrest of Turkish journalists covering the protests, including Yasin Akgül, Zeynep Kuray, Hayri Dinç, Kurtuluş Arı, Ali Onur Tosun, Bülent Kılıç, Gökhan Kam, Elif Bayburt, and Nisa Suda Demirel;[52] the arrest of Swedish journalist Joakim Medin when he arrived at the airport on March 27 to cover the protests;[53] the deportation of BBC Turkey journalist Mark Lowen on the grounds that he was "a threat to public order";[54] the banning public gatherings and protests through March 26 by the Istanbul Governor's Office;[55] the restriction of access to YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, and Telegram in Turkey;[56] the restriction by March 27, of a CHP website calling for a boycott of government-aligned businesses in Turkey;[57] and court orders to X, formerly Twitter, to close "over 700 accounts of news organizations, journalists, political figures, students, and others,"[58] with which X has said that it will not comply, though there are reports that some X accounts reporting on the protests have been shut down.[59]
Perhaps Erdoğan would have provoked less of a reaction with such a move – which he timed carefully during Ramadan, when most Turks are fasting and therefore less likely to go into the streets to protest, and also ahead of Eid celebrations – if the arrest were not so transparently political. If Erdoğan were looking to uncover those helping terrorist organizations in his government, he need only look in the mirror. Was it under Imamoğlu that those from around the world seeking to join ISIS poured for years through Turkey into Syria to slaughter civilians and build their caliphate, or was that under Erdoğan? Is it Imamoğlu who apparently continues to permit ISIS leaders to meet in the capital city of Turkey to coordinate their activity in Syria?[60] As for corruption – was it Imamoğlu who, in hushed tones told his son in a December 2013 phone call, "They are doing a big corruption raid... whatever you have in your house, remove it," admonishing him, after he spoke casually of removing amounts of 10, 25, and 30 million Euro, "don't speak openly"? Was it Imamoğlu on that phone call, or was it the reis himself?[61] Is it under Imamoğlu that tens of millions of lira have disappeared from the country's Religious Affairs Ministry, which hosts events at five-star hotels, appoints the family members of senior leadership to positions for which they are not not qualified, and maintains a growing portfolio of property?[62] Did Imamoğlu build extravagant palaces in Ankara and on Lake Van[63] while cases of povery-related suicide were reportedly increasing in the country, or was that Erdoğan?[64] Would that it were otherwise, but unfortunately this list, too, is far from exhaustive.
To summarize: Erdoğan likely orders the arrest of the leading opposition figure – such a move would be unlikely to be taken without at least his explicit approval. He does so on corruption and terrorism charges, which are laughable in Erdoğan's Turkey. Then he arrests the lawyer who represents that figure. Then he arrests the protesters who stand up in a natural democratic revolt against such a consolidation of power. Viewing this picture together, it seems clear that the "terrorist organization" that Imamoğlu is accused of helping is simply the formidable opposition party in Turkey that is closing in on ending Erdoğan's reign – this is a terror for him indeed.
* Yigal Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI.

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