Trump wants to command bosses like Xi does. He is failing
One side of the debate wants to flood China's market. By permitting Nvidia to resume exports of its dumbed-down H20s to China, the argument is that it will reduce the incentive for China's own chipmakers, such as Huawei, to develop substitutes. That will keep Chinese developers of generative AI hooked on American hardware, and make China less likely to invade Taiwan, where the bulk of the world's cutting-edge chips are made. The other side takes a tougher approach. Its advocates, including this newspaper, contend that choking off access to the H20s, which are hot stuff in China even if sub-par by American standards, would slow the development of Chinese technology just enough for the US to secure an insurmountable lead in the AI race.
Mr Trump alluded to neither of these arguments when he confirmed on August 11th that Nvidia would resume selling H20s to China (AMD, a rival, will sell some of its AI chips, too). Instead he boasted of the haggling that took place between himself and Mr Huang to determine how big a cut America should get in return for the favour (and floated a similar approach for Nvidia's 'super-duper-advanced' Blackwell chips). Contrast that with the quieter way China has used one of its most sought-after resources—rare earths—as a bargaining chip. When it comes to meddling with markets, America's nickel-and-dimer-in-chief has much to learn from Xi Jinping.
A lot about the way Mr Trump has handled chip exports to China pales besides the way America's rival has used rare earths for leverage. The American president's strategy is capricious and confusing. In the space of three months, H20 sales have been banned and unbanned. His export levy probably violates Article 1 of the constitution, so it may face a legal challenge. By contrast, China's approach is becoming more sophisticated. In recent months it has established a system of export controls that tries to track the end customer of commodities and spans hundreds of products, from sensors to manufacturing equipment.
So far Mr Trump's approach appears neither to help America nor to hurt China. He has surrendered an important part of America's national-security strategy for a pittance. Assuming H20 sales generate $20bn of revenues to Nvidia, the 15% surcharge would net $3bn—less than the cost of a new nuclear-powered submarine. He has also given away one of America's biggest sources of leverage before a proper deal is reached with China. Meanwhile Mr Xi still has the rare-earths cudgel in hand, even if in the long run its use will spur efforts around the world to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies.
Mr Trump's H20 gambit, moreover, is muddle-headed. If his intent is to undercut Huawei and make China dependent on American chips, it would make more sense to dump cheap Nvidia products there rather than raising their price through an export tax. That is the approach China has taken with great effect in its exports of solar panels, electric vehicles and drones (as well as, on occasion, rare earths). It knows the implications. Perhaps that is why it is pressing Chinese firms to shun the H20 chips.
Mr Trump's ham-fisted approach to chips is not the only way in which he is proving to be a poor student of Mr Xi. Consider the pair's efforts to assert themselves over their countries' chief executives. When Jack Ma, co-founder of Alibaba, a Chinese e-commerce giant, became too big for his boots in 2020, Mr Xi's government did not just reprimand him. He was purged from public life for five years. Such was Mr Xi's paranoia about the balance of power shifting from China's Communist Party to its internet billionaires. Mr Trump is similarly determined to keep America's bosses under his thumb. In the past week he has called directly or indirectly for the resignations of Lip-Bu Tan, the new boss of Intel, a chipmaker, and David Solomon, chief executive of Goldman Sachs, an investment bank. But he is more easily won over than Mr Xi. After Intel's boss visited the White House on August 11th, Mr Trump hailed his career as an 'amazing story'.
Mr Xi has likewise been more effective at whipping up patriotic fervour among companies in order to get them to do his bidding. China installs party cells to ensure they adhere to the government's objectives. Mr Trump has used the threat of tariffs to encourage companies like Apple to reshore manufacturing to America. Yet America's president receives mostly lip service. When Apple's boss, Tim Cook, unveiled a $600bn, four-year investment pledge into America this month, it was more of an update than a change of plan. Not for nothing did he embellish it with a 24-carat gold gift to Mr Trump.
No big dealmaker
It is perhaps unsurprising that Mr Trump, who lacks Mr Xi's authoritarian power, has been less effective at making his country's businesses subservient to his political goals. It is also a relief. China's approach of state capitalism may seem attractive to politicians in countries held back by democratic processes that make it difficult to effect change. But its model is creaking. Growth in China has slowed and venture-backed entrepreneurial activity has waned in recent years. Businesses are mired in a brutal price war.
Thankfully, Mr Trump only dabbles in state capitalism. Even so, his approach is damaging. These days businesses in China can at least rely on a degree of coherence and consistency in policymaking. America Inc will not thrive amid chaos.
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Economic Times
10 minutes ago
- Economic Times
Trump is aiming for Pakistan-style compliance from India, but his plan is not working
Synopsis Amidst rising tensions, the US-India trade relationship faces turbulence as Trump's administration imposes tariffs, allegedly to pressure India on geopolitical issues like Russian oil imports. India views these actions as an infringement on its sovereignty, resisting demands to compromise on agriculture, patent laws and military sourcing. India's refusal to play a compliant role, unlike Pakistan, frustrates Trump. "Trump wants a vessel like Pakistan. India refuses to behave like one." That blunt assessment from Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI), captures the essence of the US-India trade saga: it's less about economics than geopolitics. While headlines focus on tariffs and trade deficits, the underlying story is about power, leverage and sovereignty. Speaking to Economic Times, Srivastava explains, "Washington expects compliance, and India is not yielding." Trump, who is set to meet Russian leader Vladimir Putin on Friday at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, has long framed tariffs as a tool to 'fix trade deficits,' but India's case suggests a different motive. On August 7, the US announced it would raise tariffs on Indian goods from 25% to 50%, citing Delhi's purchase of Russian oil. India called the move 'unfair' and 'unjustified,' with the new rate set to take effect on August 27. The White House framed the tariffs as a way to cut Russia's energy revenues and pressure Vladimir Putin toward a ceasefire. With this increase, India becomes the most heavily taxed US trading partner in Asia, joining Brazil which faces similar steep tariffs amid tense bilateral relations. The economic stakes for India are high. In 2024, India exported $87 billion worth of goods to the US. According to US Census Bureau data for May 2025, imports from India stood at $9.43 billion, while US exports to India were $3.82 billion, resulting in a US goods trade deficit, or an Indian surplus, of roughly $5.6 billion. If the 50% tariffs remain in place, nearly all of India's annual exports to the US could become commercially unviable. Meanwhile, the US continues to run a $45.7 billion goods trade deficit with India, yet these tariffs disproportionately affect Indian exports compared with goods from other Srivastava, the message is clear: 'Trade deficit is just for the namesake. It's about forcing countries to fall in line with a geopolitical agenda.' India imports roughly 20% of its GDP in goods, spanning petroleum, machinery and electronics, yet Washington appears less concerned with trade imbalances than with pressuring India to compromise on and dairy have emerged as key sticking points in India-US trade talks, which collapsed earlier this month. On August 7, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, 'India will never compromise on the well-being of its farmers, dairy producers and fishermen.' New Delhi has consistently resisted US pressure to open these sectors, arguing that doing so would threaten millions of small farmers. Historically, India has kept agriculture largely off the table in trade agreements to safeguard domestic to Srivastava, US demands extend far beyond tariffs: opening government procurement, diluting patent laws that could make medicines costlier, limiting future digital taxes, and shifting military sourcing to the US. 'Even if we open agri and dairy, no trade deal will happen with this. Not a trade issue. They want you to open your government procurement, dilute patent laws, commit to never charge digital tax in future, buy military from the US, the list is endless,' he adds, 'Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Brazil partly over politics and partly because Brazil asked Twitter to remove anti-Brazil content. Records show India generates even more such requests, so he could use that as an excuse too. He can conjure unlimited reasons to impose tariffs if he's unhappy. My sense is he doesn't want a partner in India, he wants a vassal. India refuses to play that role; it insists on an equal partnership. That's the basic problem.'The US approach to Russian oil imports is uneven. China, Russia's largest crude buyer, faces no comparable tariff threats, while India is under heavy pressure. 'Even if the US demanded zero imports from Russia, India's imports would fall anyway due to economic circumstances,' notes Srivastava. European and US bans on petroleum products derived from Russian crude are already reducing India's imports, independent of Washington's selective approach reflects a broader pattern in US trade policy. Brazil, for example, faced a 50% tariff despite running a surplus with the US, largely over political disagreements including its stance on Venezuela and former President Bolsonaro. Venezuela itself is under secondary sanctions for buyers of its oil, though some firms, like Chevron, have received exemptions. These cases suggest that political alignment often outweighs economic between Russia and the US has dropped roughly 90% since the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though last year the US still imported $3 billion worth of Russian goods, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Census Bureau. Meanwhile, the European Union, a partner in sanctions against Russia, imported $41.9 billion (36 billion euros) of Russian goods in 2024, Eurostat data the US pressures India to cut Russian oil imports, market forces and global regulations are already reshaping trade flows. Europe and US bans on petroleum products ensure India's imports will decline regardless of Washington's actions. Srivastava cautions, however, that the US may find new reasons for tariffs, keeping India under continuous has built a buffer against such pressures. Exports constitute roughly 20% of GDP, compared with 90% for Vietnam, a country far more vulnerable to US-imposed shocks. 'Vietnam will suffer more. We will suffer, but we will absorb it properly. Country will bounce back. All we need to do is not to surrender,' Srivastava US consumers will also feel the impact of tariffs. About 90% of prescriptions in the US rely on generics imported from India. While the total trade value may be under $10 billion, disruption affects the majority of prescriptions, potentially raising prices significantly. Companies may eventually source alternatives over three to four months, but the immediate effect is inflationary.'Indian exports will suffer, but we need to consider whether it's better to endure this and use it to push delayed reforms, like diversifying exports, rather than falling into a bad deal. This isn't really about trade; it's about surrendering sovereignty,' Srivastava Srivastava, Trump's broader strategy is political theatre. 'Basically, he wanted to hit China. He couldn't, so he has to show his domestic voters that he is a big man, that a bully can show strength by hitting someone. He couldn't hit China, so let's hit India, that's the only thing.'With China, Trump launched a trade war over the large trade deficit, but Beijing hit back by restricting supplies of critical materials, he noted. 'India hasn't used those levers, which is why Washington expected Delhi to yield immediately.'India's refusal to play a compliant role, unlike Pakistan, frustrates Trump. At the same time, India maintains strategic autonomy, engaging with Russia on defence, limiting deep Chinese investment to marketing and distribution, and managing relations with the US on equal footing. 'We are a big country, big economy, and so we have to have workable, good relations with everyone, without being in anybody's camp,' Srivastava pre-Galwan, Chinese investment has been superficial. 'China doesn't invest in deep manufacturing. They will not supply any technology. They will invest in marketing of cars, garments, two, $5 billion here and there, but we don't want that. So we have to evaluate very carefully,' he says.'We can have targeted strategic relationships, like with Russia for defence, but moving closer to China is complicated. There's the border dispute and a $100 billion trade deficit,' he export-oriented economy, diversified supply chains and robust domestic market allow it to absorb short-term shocks while resisting long-term concessions. 'All we need to do is not enter into any relationship that costs us the medium or long term,' Srivastava takeaway is clear: Trump's tariffs are less about trade and more about leverage. Every tweet, every tariff threat, every demand is a political signal designed to demonstrate strength to domestic voters. 'Every day he abuses us on Twitter. That shows India has entered his mind,' Srivastava response emphasises sovereignty, resilience and strategic foresight. "Trade deal is not a trade deal. It's about bargaining for your sovereignty. And India is not bargaining."


Economic Times
10 minutes ago
- Economic Times
Modi heads to China — a delicate step in the dragon-elephant tango
Synopsis Amidst fragile relations and border tensions, Prime Minister Modi's upcoming visit to China signals a calculated step in geopolitics. Facilitated by a pact at the BRICS summit, the visit, tied to the SCO summit, aims to foster regional stability and address trade imbalances. India navigates complex relationships, balancing engagement with China and continued collaboration with the US. Just a year ago, the idea of Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting China would have seemed far-fetched. Relations between the two nations were fragile. The border in eastern Ladakh was quiet but tense, with troop disengagement at key friction points still incomplete. Fast forward to 2025, and Modi's upcoming trip to Tianjin feels less like a gamble and more like a calculated step in a complex geopolitical dance. 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Yet India continues to pursue defence, technology, and energy collaboration with the China visit asserts India's position against unilateralism while keeping the door open with America. A potential resolution in Ukraine could also ease some tariff will closely monitor three issues: The US's continued commitment to the Indo-Pacific amid potential trade concessions with China, particularly as India hosts the upcoming Quad summit in November. Counterterrorism cooperation, which may be affected by the US recalibrating its Pakistan policy. The proposed H-1B visa overhaul, which could impact Indian professionals in IT and healthcare, potentially straining people-to-people and economic ties. These challenges will test India's diplomatic finesse and its ability to balance competing global priorities. With inputs from TOI


Hans India
10 minutes ago
- Hans India
Temper rhetoric, any misadventure will have painful consequences: India warns Pakistan
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