China is entering a golden age of innovation Asia Times
This article is the second part of a commentary published by Guancha.cn. Hao Ping, which means 'good commentary', is the Guancha column's title. Asia Times editorial elucidation notes are in brackets. It is republished with permission.
In early 2025, China saw a wave of technological innovation achievements—from movies and video games to artificial intelligence and futuristic fighter jets—making many realize that a long-term transformation was already underway.
This sudden change results from China's strategic resolve, market dynamism and societal collaboration. Although this transformation has been ongoing, it is finally visible to the world. Its ultimate result may exceed what people can imagine. It will continue to evolve and become a new paradigm of industrial civilization.
Liang Wenfeng, founder of DeepSeek, once offered a compelling summary of this rapid transformation.
'I grew up in the 1980s in a remote town in Guangdong. My father was a primary school teacher. In the 1990s, people had many opportunities to make money in Guangdong. Many parents came to our house and said that education was pointless. But now, those attitudes have completely changed. Because making money has become harder—even jobs like taxi drivers are scarce. In just one generation, everything has changed.
'Going forward, hardcore innovation will become increasingly important. This might not be widely understood right now because society wants tangible results. When those who achieve hardcore innovation become successful and recognized, society's collective attitudes will change. We need more successful cases and some more time.'
In the summer of 1959, the American National Exhibition in Moscow's Sokolniki Park welcomed two special visitors: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and US Vice President Richard Nixon.
In front of a model home filled with modern appliances and furniture, the two engaged in the historic 'Kitchen Debate.'
Nixon argued that most American blue-collar workers could easily afford such a home and its appliances, with homes typically replaced every 20 years as consumers upgraded to better ones. 'The American system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques,' he said.
However, Khrushchev sidestepped Nixon's point and focused his critique on distribution issues [economic benefits]. [Several] decades later, the outcome of the Cold War [the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991] offered a phased resolution to this debate.
From McDonald's to Coca-Cola, Hollywood to Nike, American companies' innovations in consumer goods proved more effective than [the Soviet Union's] rockets or atomic bombs in shaping the global imagination and fostering a widespread desire for a particular way of life.
Andy Warhol, the father of pop art, once observed: 'What's great about this country is that America started the tradition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same things as the poorest.
'You can be watching TV and see Coca-Cola, and you know the president drinks Coke, Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke too. A Coke is a Coke, and no amount of money can get you a better Coke than the one the bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the same, and all the Cokes are good.'
America's ultimate victory in the battle for hearts and minds was rooted in the innovative society Nixon had proudly championed.
Today, Chinese products, from TikTok, Shein, BYD and DJI to the global contributions of AI models like Qwen and DeepSeek — are irresistible due to their better quality and lower prices.
If a new 'Kitchen Debate' were to occur today, China could confidently declare: 'The Chinese system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques.' Facing this claim, some Americans—or those who support America's ideology—might be provoked.
They might say something like 'innovation and creativity cannot be planned,' followed by obscure theories of Ronald Coase [A British economist (1910-2013) whose theories focused on the nature and efficiency of companies], creating an 'amusement atmosphere.'
[In a short story by Chinese writer Lu Xun in 1919, people enjoyed an 'amusement atmosphere' by making fun of unemployed scholar Kong Yiji, who likes to use old Confucius words.]
Why was the market's 'invisible hand' [suggested by Scottish economist Adam Smith in 1759] defeated by the 'visible hand' [which refers to the Chinese government's significant role and direct intervention in the economy] in driving innovation?
The transformation of Made in China is making the answer increasingly clear. While corporate profits disproportionately direct America's top talent into a handful of industries, China's industrial policy has evolved far beyond outdated stereotypes.
By fully leveraging market forces and empowering private enterprises, the government is focused on addressing market failures and sharing innovation costs with individual firms. Besides, US capitalism has been shifting its attention away from the manufacturing sector for a long time.
Comparing R&D investments between China and the US vividly illustrates the value of China's industrial policy.
According to the US National Science Foundation, American companies invested $692.7 billion in R&D in 2022, while China invested 2.39 trillion yuan ($354 billion). The gap was significant even if the figures were adjusted for purchasing power parity.
However, a closer look reveals the uneven distribution of the United States' investment in innovation: only slightly more than half of its corporate R&D spending went to manufacturing, and within that, about one-third was invested in the pharmaceutical sector.
In contrast, over 80% of China's corporate R&D investment flowed into manufacturing, with the information and communication technology (ICT) sector accounting for 20% of the investment, the largest among all other manufacturing sectors.
The investment strategy that 'concentrates on a particular industry and diversifies on companies' not only ensures a healthier distribution of talent and financial resources but also creates an environment where Chinese companies can leverage relative advantages, much like the ancient strategy of 'Tian Ji's horse racing.'
[In ancient times, Chinese strategist Sun Bin suggested his friend Tian Ji, a general of the Qi state, rearrange the deployment of his horses so that Tian's strongest horse could win King Wei of Qi's average horse while Tian's average horse could win the King's weakest horse. Although the King's strongest horse still beat Tian's weakest horse, the King lost the overall race. The King later appointed Sun as chief military adviser.]
What is more important is that the collaboration between traditional and emerging industrial sectors can create synergy and lead to powerful innovation.
A good example is how China's ICT and machinery manufacturing sectors have prompted the rise of the country's new energy vehicle industry.
Today, China is entering a golden age of innovation. Millions of STEM graduates from its universities and trillions of yuan in annual R&D investments—both domestic and international—are fueling a diverse corporate ecosystem.
The ecosystem includes dozens of supergiants, hundreds of unicorns and gazelle companies, and nearly 15,000 specialized and innovative 'little giants.' The depth and resilience of 'Made in China' or 'Created in China' are growing.
This multidimensional innovation network avoids the rigidity of Soviet-style central planning and the negative effects of America's laissez-faire approach. It naturally gives rise to a new paradigm of modernization. The Kitchen Debate [in 1959] seemed to be an accurate prophecy.
When Chinese new-energy vehicles shine at the Munich Auto Show, DJI's drones fly over the Amazon rainforest and TikTok fosters a sense of belonging among young people across ideological and linguistic divides, the world is witnessing a quiet but profound paradigm shift.
This is not a Cold War-style ideological confrontation nor a simple race for technological supremacy. Rather, it is humanity's reimagination of innovation and inclusive progress in the digital age.
Herein is the lesson of 'Made in China 2025': when technological innovation becomes affordable and accessible, and industrial upgrading creates new opportunities, a development miracle can happen.
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Asia Times
15 hours ago
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Asia Times
20 hours ago
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The Israeli logic of assassinating Iran's nuclear scientists
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Targeting nuclear scientists began during World War II when Allied and Soviet forces raced to capture Nazi scientists, degrade Adolf Hitler's ability to build a nuclear bomb and use their expertise to advance the U.S. and Soviet nuclear programs. In our data set, we classified 'targeting' as cases in which scientists were captured, threatened, injured or killed as nations tried to prevent adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Over time, at least four countries have targeted scientists working on nine national nuclear programs. The United States and Israel have allegedly carried out the most attacks on nuclear scientists. But the United Kingdom and Soviet Union have also been behind such attacks. Meanwhile, scientists working for the Egyptian, Iranian and Iraqi nuclear programs have been the most frequent targets since 1950. Since 2007 and prior to the current Israeli operation, 10 scientists involved in the Iranian nuclear program were killed in attacks. Other countries' nationals have also been targeted: In 1980, Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, allegedly bombed Italian engineer Mario Fiorelli's home and his firm, SNIA Techint, as a warning to Europeans involved in the Iraqi nuclear project. Given this history, the fact that Israel attacked Iran's nuclear program is not itself surprising. Indeed, it has been a strategic goal of successive Israeli prime ministers to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and experts had been warning of the increased likelihood of an Israeli military operation since mid-2024, due to regional dynamics and Iranian nuclear development. The wrecked cars in which four of Iran's nuclear scientists were assassinated in recent years are displayed on the grounds of a museum in Tehran in 2014. Photo: Scott Peterson / Getty Images via The Conversation By then, the balance of power in the Middle East had changed dramatically. 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During Donald Trump's first term, the president withdrew the US from a multilateral nonproliferation agreement aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear program. After being reelected, Trump appeared to change tack by pursuing new diplomacy with Iran, but those talks have so far failed to deliver an agreement and may be put on hold for the foreseeable future amid the war. Most recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors declared Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. In response, Iran announced it was further expanding its enrichment capacity by adding advanced centrifuge technology and a third enrichment site. Even if the international community anticipated the broader attack on Iran, characteristics of the targeting itself are surprising. Historically, states have covertly targeted individual scientists. But the recent multiple-scientist attack occurred openly, with Israel taking responsibility, publicly indicating the attacks' purpose. Further, while it is not new for a country to use multiple counter-proliferation tools against an adversary over time, that Israel is using both preventive military force against infrastructure and targeting scientists at once is atypical. Additionally, such attacks against scientists are historically lower tech and low cost, with death or injury stemming from gunmen, car bombs or accidents. In fact, Abbasi – who was killed in the most recent attacks – survived a 2010 car bombing in Tehran. There are outliers, however, including the Fakhrizadeh assassination, which featured a remotely operated machine gun smuggled into Iranian territory. Why target nuclear scientists? In foreign policy, there are numerous tools available if one state aims to prevent another state from acquiring nuclear weapons. Alongside targeting scientists, there are sanctions, diplomacy, cyberattacks and military force. Targeting scientists may remove critical scientific expertise and impose costs that increase the difficulty of building nuclear weapons. Proponents argue that targeting these experts may undermine a state's efforts, deter it from continuing nuclear developments and signal to others the perils of supporting nuclear proliferation. Countries that target scientists, therefore, believe that doing so is an effective way to degrade an adversary's nuclear program. Indeed, the Israel Defense Forces described the most recent attacks as 'a significant blow to the regime's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction.' Posters featuring images of Iranian nuclear scientists are displayed in Tehran, Iran, on June 14, 2025. Photo: Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images / The Conversation Despite Israel's focus on scientists as sources of critical knowledge, there may be thousands more working inside Iran, calling into question the efficacy of targeting them. Further, there are legal, ethical and moral concerns over targeting scientists. Moreover, it is a risky option that may fail to disrupt an enemy nuclear program while sparking public outrage and calls for retaliation. This is especially the case if scientists, often regarded as civilians, are elevated as martyrs. Targeting campaigns may, as a result, reinforce domestic support for a government, which could then redouble efforts toward nuclear development. Regardless of whether targeting scientists is an effective counter-proliferation tool, it has been around since the start of the nuclear age – and will likely persist as part of the foreign policy toolkit for states aiming to prevent proliferation. In the case of the current Israeli conflict with Iran and its targeting of nuclear scientists, we expect the tactic to continue for the duration of the war and beyond. Jenna Jordan is associate professor of international affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology and Rachel Whitlark is associate professor of international affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Both Israel and the US should ponder air power's limits in Iran
As the war between Israel and Iran escalates, Israel is increasing its calls on the United States to become involved in the conflict. Former Israeli officials are appearing on US news outlets, exhorting the American public to support Israel's actions. President Donald Trump has signaled a willingness for the US to become involved in the conflict. He's gone so far, in fact, to suggest in social media posts that he could kill Iran's supreme leader if he wanted to. The American military could certainly make an impact in any air campaign against Iran. The problem from a military standpoint, however, is that the US, based on its forces' deployment, will almost certainly seek to keep its involvement limited to its air force to avoid another Iraq-like quagmire. While doing so could almost certainly disrupt Iran's nuclear program, it will likely fall short of Israel's goal of regime change. In fact, it could reinforce the Iranian government and draw the U.S. into a costly ground war. The initial stated reason for Israel's bombing campaign — Iran's nuclear capabilities — appears specious at best. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued several times in the past, without evidence, that Iran is close to achieving a nuclear weapon. US intelligence, however, has assessed that Iran is three years away from deploying a nuclear weapon. Regardless of the veracity of the claims, Israel initiated the offensive and now requires American support. Israel's need for US assistance rests on two circumstances: While Israel succeeded in eliminating key figures from the Iranian military in its initial strikes, Iran's response appears to have exceeded Israel's expectations with their Arrow missile interceptors nearing depletion. Israel's air strikes can only achieve so much in disrupting Iran's nuclear ambitions. Most analysts note that Israel's bombings are only likely to delay the Iranian nuclear program by a few months. This is due to the fact that Israeli missiles are incapable of penetrating the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which estimates place close to 300 feet underground. The United States, however, possesses munitions that could damage, or even destroy, the Fordow facility. Most notably, the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (more commonly known as a bunker buster) has a penetration capability of 200 feet. Multiple strikes by said munition would render Fordow inoperable, if not outright destroyed. The efficacy of air power has been vastly overrated by the popular media and various air forces of the world. Air power is great at disrupting an opponent, but has significant limitations in influencing the outcome of a war. Specifically, air power is likely to prove an inadequate tool for one of the supposed Israeli and American objectives in the war: regime change. For air power to be effective at bringing about regime change, it needs to demoralize the Iranian people to the point that they're willing to oppose their own government. Early air enthusiasts believed that a population's demoralization would be an inevitable consequence of aerial bombardment. Italian general Giulio Douhet, a prominent air power theorist, argued that air power was so mighty that it could destroy cities and demoralize an opponent into surrendering. Douhet was correct on the first point. He was wrong on the second. Recent history provides evidence. While considerable ink has been spilled to demonstrate the efficacy of air power during the Second World War, close examination of the facts demonstrates that it had a minimal impact. In fact, Allied bombing of German cities in several instances created the opposite effect. More recent bombing campaigns replicated this failure. The US bombing of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War did not significantly damage North Vietnamese morale or war effort. NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999, likewise, rallied support for the unpopular Slobodan Milosevic due to its perceived injustice — and continues to evoke strong emotions to this day. Iran's political regime may be unpopular with many Iranians, but Israeli and potentially American bombing may shore up support for the Iranian government. Nationalism is a potent force, particularly when people are under attack. Israel's bombing of Iran will rally segments of the population to the government that would otherwise oppose it. The limitations of air power to fuel significant political change in Iran should give Trump pause about intervening in the conflict. Some American support, such as providing weapons, is a given due to the close relationship between the US and Israel. But any realization of American and Israeli aspirations of a non-nuclear Iran and a new government will likely require ground forces. Recent American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show such a ground forces operation won't lead to the swift victory that Trump desires, but could potentially stretch on for decades. James Horncastle is an assistant professor and the Edward and Emily McWhinney professor in international relations at Simon Fraser University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
