How Andhra led the war against Maoists from the front

India Today

21-04-2025

Two decades after Left Wing Extremism (LWE) groups across states forged unity as the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and the government declared the entity as the single-biggest challenge to India's internal security, the insurgency appears to be on the brink of collapse across the board. This has been enabled by concerted counterinsurgency measures as well as the depletion of Maoist ranks, both in terms of cadre and leadership.The geographical spread of LWE violence has contracted substantially with the fall of LWE-affected districts from 126 across 10 states in 2013 to only 38 in nine states last year. The number of police stations reporting LWE-related violence has significantly reduced from 465 in 2010 to 171 in 2023 while the decline in incidents in the same period is by a significant 73 per cent. Deaths, of security forces and civilians, dropped sharply from 1,005 in 2010 to 138 in 2023. What's more, since early 2024, security forces have pushed the LWE from the defensive to a virtual retreat.advertisementConcerted interstate initiatives to tackle LWE evolved in the early 2000s after the dreaded People's War Group (PWG), then active in Andhra Pradesh, merged with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) present in pockets in several northern and eastern states. Post-merger, the CPI (Maoist) grew along a 'Red Corridor'—mineral-rich areas running through forest and backward tracts of several states, beginning from Andhra Pradesh in the South.It is in the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh that the PWG gained considerable currency after the first stirrings in Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967, and then spread as the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) through distinct geographical areas over the next 40 years. The Maoists expanded steadily into Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkand and West Bengal.
However, containing their growth and area domination became possible through a multi-pronged strategy, which evolved from the experiences in undivided Andhra Pradesh. Many learnings in counterinsurgency and best practices of weaning youth away from the path of violence have emerged and been adopted from what Andhra Pradesh did since the 1980s. At first, Andhra set up an exclusive intelligence-gathering mechanism to collate information on 'underground' militants and front organisations and their activists propagating Maoist ideology.advertisementAlongside, the state police raised an elite commando force, the Greyhounds, in 1989 and trained them in guerrilla warfare to take on Maoists in the forests. The Maoists would retreat to the forests after daring attacks, which included gunning down public representatives, police personnel and those suspected to be police informers. Ironically, in 2023, K.S. Vyas, the IPS officer credited with founding and development of the Greyhounds force, was shot dead while out for an evening jog in Hyderabad.The Greyhounds, trained in guerrilla and jungle warfare, were often deployed in small groups to prevent identification or becoming easy targets. The special force soon became instrumental in containing Maoist activity in Andhra. To ensure that Greyhounds troopers remained battle-effective, those turning 35 years were posted out to routine policing jobs until retirement. As its track-record showed impressive results, other states followed the Andhra model to raise similar anti-Maoist forces.Dependence on the Andhra experience has continued as its exclusive intelligence-gathering network garnered information more effectively given that the Maoist leadership was dominated by those originally from the state. This has continued even after the state's reorganisation and the creation of Telangana in 2014. In this, LWE cadre who have surrendered are also being tapped for intelligence gathering and to issue alerts when ageing Maoist members come for medical treatment to towns and, at times, to Hyderabad.advertisementAndhra Pradesh also focused on the need to boost development initiatives in backward regions to prevent Maoists and their sympathisers from using the socio-economic inequities to build a covert groundswell of support. Maoists, across states, have managed to draw the support of local people, especially tribal communities, who believe they have been exploited and left untouched by the country's economic growth.Tribal disaffection largely sprang from the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, which prohibits tribes that rely on forest resources for livelihood from even harvesting the bark of trees. Another trigger that made tribes support Maoists was the implementation of development projects, including mining, which led to significant displacement of tribal populations. Those vulnerable became susceptible to supporting the Maoists in various ways, such as providing logistics and information.Empowering the tribal cohorts and improving their education and healthcare helped stifle the growth of Maoist influence. Following the Andhra example, states affected by LWE put in place a policy that merges police action with economic development to breach Maoist strongholds.Consequently, both the surrenders and desertions from rank and file have crippled Maoists' capabilities and capacities. With recruitment down, their armed formations reduced and ammunition in short supply, the LWE cadre are thought to be at the end of a losing battle. LWE analysts also point to a lack of ideological clarity within the Maoist ranks. As one of them put it, 'The Maoists have been overwhelmed by strong action of the security forces, and what they do to sustain themselves until the forces are withdrawn will determine their future.'advertisementSubscribe to India Today MagazineTune InMust Watch