MIS for mangoes too late: YSRCP
He highlighted that since May 10, mango farmers had faced price slump without the State intervention, while neighbouring Karnataka secured a Central deal on June 21 to procure mangoes at Rs 16 per kg.
In contrast, the Andhra Pradesh's government acted only on July 21, post-season, offering a mere Rs 14.9 per kg against last year's Rs 25-29 per kg, with a meagre Rs 1.84 per kg subsidy.
He questioned the Market Intervention Scheme relevance now as most of the crop was already sold, accusing the TDP-led NDA government of political posturing.
He mentioned that only 1.62 lakh tonnes of the State's 6.5 lakh tonnes of mango produce was targeted for procurement, too late to benefit farmers. Juice factories, closed until June 10, ignored the announced Rs 12 per kg price, and the promised Rs 4 per kg subsidy remains unpaid.
Nagi Reddy termed the NDA government's actions deplorable, accusing it of distorting facts for propaganda, and betraying farmers.
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