Pilot's chilling final words before largest loss of life on British airliner

Daily Mirror

29-04-2025

Last words heard from the cockpit voice recording demonstrated the true terror from inside the British aircraft just before Manchester plane slammed into Tenerife mountain killing
Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located at an elevation of 2,000 ft making it a particularly challenging airport to fly in and out from. The weather is often cloudy - sometimes creating poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea.
The deadliest example of how conditions can be catastrophic for pilots is the on-ground collision of two planes on March 27th, 1977, partly due to poor visibility.
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The infamous disaster still retains the title of being the worst crash in aviation histor y - costing 583 people's lives.
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But another tragedy befell the island, just three years later.
In the 1970s and 1980s British airline Dan-Air rose to become the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. On 9. 20am April 25 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport to Tenerife.
It was mostly filled with British holidaymakers looking to escape the UK for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands.
There were three experienced pilots on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth ,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. There were also five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants to 146.
For three hours, all was well until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time.
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The winds usually came from across the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12.
The controller Justo Camin, 34, could not give the go ahead to the usual descent procedure as there was an aircraft in front also heading to Runway 12 - and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air.
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Due to the non-availability of radar at the airfield, Camin managed traffic movements procedurally - instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route
Just after 1.18pm Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead could land safely on Runway 12.
But there was a problem - there was no holding pattern for that runway - so Camin improvised.
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He wanted Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and remain in this holding pattern - making turns - until the other flight was out of the way.
In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.'
After receiving the message, the captain replied,"Roger" without repeating what Camin had told them to do. If Whelan had done this, the impending catastrophe would have been surely avoided.
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When he said 'turn to the left,' he actually meant to say 'turns to the left,' describing the direction in which the crew were to fly around the holding pattern. But without the 's,' this transmission sounded to the crew ' turn to the left.'
Camin who also cleared the flight to an assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, had made a small but significant error.
Captain Whelan, confused by the latest unexpected instruction to go into a holding pattern which didn't appear on any of his charts - made only one turn to the left onto a heading of 150 degrees, believing that's what the controller told him to do.
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They were now in a mountainous area where the minimum safe height is 14,500ft.
At one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything."
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It was clear from the cockpit voice recording, the crew was getting uneasy but nobody queried the instructions with the controller.
The controller Camin, believing the plane to be out over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, had allowed the aircraft to descend another thousand feet. He had no idea the plane was in the middle of the mountains.
Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that."
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"They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!"
In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right.
Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain.
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"Lets get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process.
The Spanish investigators later said that this one manoeuvre destroyed any chance of escape.
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Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out.
Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit.
The impact obliterated most of the plane instantaneously, sending shattered debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued onward for several hundred meters before it slammed against the ground, plummeted into a ravine, and broke apart.
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Tiny fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport.
Within hours, rescuers made the trek up the mountain, but it was immediately obvious that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash.
Not one single complete human body could be found and the remains of many of the people on board were never conclusively identified.
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Although admitting the controller's error, Spanish investigators lay all the blame on the Dan Air crew.
The British investigators argued that the controller should have realised earlier that the separation between the two planes would be a problem, so that he could have utilise a published holding pattern - preventing the crew from getting confused.
British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query it or request clarification.
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They also criticized Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet.
After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain.
What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash.
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If the controller had said turns and not turn the crash would never have happened.
The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardized procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns.
It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings.
Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways.
Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner, on its 45th anniversary, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not well remembered.