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Daily Mail
01-05-2025
- General
- Daily Mail
Pilot's chilling final words on board flight from Manchester to Tenerife moments before largest loss of life in British aviation history
The final words of the pilot flying a British aircraft that crashed into the Tenerife mountains and killed 146 is haunting people 45 years on. The three pilots on board had years of experience under their belt but the rugged terrain and poor weather around the airport has made it a notoriously difficult place to land. Only three years before the Dan-Air flight 1008 crashed, the worst aviation disaster in history tragically took place at Tenerife North when two planes collided on the run way, killing 583 people - partly due to poor visibility. But in 1980, a change in wind direction forced Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and Flight Engineer Raymond Carey, 33, to alter their landing plan and come in from the opposite side. A tragic miscommunication in instructions then left the pilots asking one minute and six seconds before the crash 'b****y strange hold, isn't it?'. As they dropped below the safe height of 14,500ft for the mountains, one pilot responded 'it doesn't parallel with the runway or anything'. Having taken off from Manchester earlier that morning, the flight experienced no difficulty on the journey over the continent. With winds typically coming across the Atlantic to the west, on April 25 1980 there was a change in direction, forcing the popular airliner to come in using the opposite runway. There was not a single body that was found intact and most remains could not be identified Another aircraft was ahead of the doomed flight and controller Justo Camin, 34, could see they were dangerously close to colliding mid-air. He had to tell each flight how to fly along a predetermined route thanks to a lack of radar but improvised a holding pattern for the Dan Air flight. Flight 1008 was told to enter a left-hand holding pattern and continue to make turns until the other flight was out of the way: 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' But this is where Mr Camin's instructions proved fatal - he had meant to say 'turns' rather than 'turn' and had sent the plane onto a collision course. So Captain Wheelan only made one small turn instead of the 150 degrees required for the holding pattern, heading straight for the mountain side invisible through the fog. The recording from the cockpit shows the team begin to get uneasy and experts believe if they had asked the air controller to clarify the instructions there might have been time to veer themselves off their path to destruction. Mr Camin, thinking the plane is over the sea, tells Flight 1008 that they can continue descending another 1,000ft, expecting them to slowly come in over the runway. Captain Whelan says to his cop-pilot: 'I don't like that.' He responds: 'They want us to keep going more round, don't they?' Seconds later, the automatic ground alarm begins blaring 'pull up, pull up!' Captain Whelan quickly turns into a sharp right instead of pulling up as co-pilot Firth suggests other routes after reading the charts. Flight engineer Carey tells them 'let's get out of here' as Captain Whelan continues turning to the right as they continued to lose 300ft of altitude. This was the last chance for the plane to save itself from its tragic fate. The flight engineer begins shouting 'bank angle, bank angle!' before the CVR cuts out as the plan slams headlong into La Esperanza. Debris was scattered across the mountain range and the tail section careened onwards for several hundred metres before plummeting into a ravine. There was not a single body that was found intact and most remains could not be identified. At 5,450ft, the plane was only 92ft from the summit and it obliterated instantly. Spanish investigators tried to pin all the blame on the Dan-Air crew despite admitting fault with the controller's instructions while the Brits argued Mr Camin should have used a published holding pattern that kept flights at 7,000ft and realised earlier there was a problem with between the separation of the two planes. They did acknowledge however that the Dan-Air crew should have queried the controllers instructions or requested clarification. After the tragedy, a standardised procedure for all flight operations was established as well as the need for clear communication between pilots and air traffic controllers that is repeated. Dan-Air, which has popular during the 60s and 70s, was able to recover from the disaster before it was taken over by British Airways in 1992.
Irish Daily Mirror
30-04-2025
- Irish Daily Mirror
Pilot's eerie warning moments before Spain plane crash that killed 146 people
Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located at an elevation of 2,000 ft making it a particularly challenging airport to fly in and out from. The weather is often cloudy - sometimes creating poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea. The deadliest example of how conditions can be catastrophic for pilots is the on-ground collision of two planes on March 27, 1977, partly due to poor visibility. The infamous airport disaster still retains the title of being the worst crash in aviation history - costing 583 people's lives. But another tragedy befell the island, just three years later. In the 1970s and 1980s British airline Dan-Air rose to become the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. At 9.20am on April 25 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport for Tenerife. It was mostly filled with holidaymakers looking to escape for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands. There were three experienced pilots on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. There were also five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants on board to 146. For three hours, all was well until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds usually came from across the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. The controller Justo Camin, 34, could not give the go ahead to the usual descent procedure as there was an aircraft in front also heading to Runway 12 - and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. Due to the non-availability of radar at the airfield, Camin managed traffic movements procedurally - instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route. Just after 1.18pm Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead could land safely on Runway 12. But there was a problem - there was no holding pattern for that runway - so Camin improvised. He wanted Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and remain in this holding pattern - making turns - until the other flight was out of the way. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' After receiving the message, the captain replied, "Roger" without repeating what Camin had told them to do. If Whelan had done this, the impending catastrophe may have been avoided. When Camin told them: 'turn to the left,' he actually meant to say 'turns to the left,' describing the direction in which the crew were to fly around the holding pattern. But without the 's,' this transmission sounded to the crew 'turn to the left.' Camin who also cleared the flight to an assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, had made a small but significant error. Captain Whelan, confused by the latest unexpected instruction to go into a holding pattern which didn't appear on any of his charts - made only one turn to the left onto a heading of 150 degrees, believing that's what the controller told him to do. They were now in a mountainous area where the minimum safe height is 14,500ft. At one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." It was clear from the cockpit voice recording, the crew was getting uneasy but nobody queried the instructions with the controller. The controller Camin, believing the plane to be out over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, had allowed the aircraft to descend another thousand feet. He had no idea the plane was in the middle of the mountains. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. However the usual response to the alarm would be to "pull up" and go as high as possible to clear surrounding terrain. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Let's get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. The Spanish investigators later said that this one manoeuvre destroyed any chance of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantaneously, sending shattered debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued onward for several hundred meters before it slammed against the ground, plummeted into a ravine, and broke apart. Tiny fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport. Within hours, rescuers made the trek up the mountain, but it was immediately obvious that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash. Not one single complete human body could be found and the remains of many of the people on board could not be conclusively identified. Although admitting the controller's error, Spanish investigators lay all the blame on the Dan Air crew. The British investigators argued that the controller should have realised earlier that the separation between the two planes would be a problem, so that he could have utilised a published holding pattern - preventing the crew from getting confused. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query the controller's instructions or request clarification. They also criticided Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. Usually crew are expected to pull up and go as high as possible -as the alarm demands What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash. If the controller had said "turns" and not "turn" the crash may never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardised procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner, 45 years on, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not as well remembered as it should be - and the 146 people who lost their lives that fateful day.
Daily Record
29-04-2025
- Daily Record
Pilot's chilling mistake causing deaths of 146 Brits
Tenerife North Airport , once known as Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located 2,000 ft above sea level, making it a particularly tough airport to fly in and out from. The weather conditions often creates poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea, reports the Mirror . The most terrifying example of how deadly these conditions can be came on March 27, 1977, when two planes collided on the runway, partly due to poor visibility. The crash remains the worst in aviation history, with 583 lives lost. However, another disaster hit the island just three years later - involving a British jet. In the 1970s and 80s, Dan-Air had become the UK's largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. On 9.20am on April 25, 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport for Tenerife. On board were mostly British tourists looking to escape the UK for the sunny beaches and stunning landscapes of the Canary Islands. The flight was crewed by three experienced pilots, Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and Flight Engineer Raymond Carey, 33, plus five cabin crew, bringing the total number of occupants to 146. For most of the three-hour flight, everything went to plan, until the descent at 1pm local time. Winds normally blow in from the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. Controller Justo Camin, 34, was unable to use the normal descent procedure because another aircraft was ahead, also lining up for Runway 12 and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. With no radar to guide him, Camin had to manage traffic using set instructions, instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route. At 1.18pm, Camin decided to put the Dan-Air flight into a holding pattern to give the other plane time to land safely. However, Runway 12 had no publishing holding patten - so Camin improvised. He told the crew to enter a left-hand holding pattern and stay in it, circling, until the other aircraft had cleared. When First Officer Firth radioed in their position, Camin replied: "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan simply answered: "Roger" - without repeating the instructions back. Had he done so, the disaster might have been avoided. Camin had said "turn to the left," when he actually meant "turns to the left", a small but crucial mistake that confused the crew. The captain was now trying to follow a holding pattern that didn't exist on any chart and misread the order as a single turn to the left onto heading 150. That one turn sent them into mountainous terrain where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500ft - nearly triple their current height. At one minute and six seconds before the crash , one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." The cockpit audio shows the crew were uneasy, but no one radioed air traffic control to double check. Controller Camin, thinking the jet was safely circling out at sea, told them to descend another 1,000ft. He didn't realise they were heading straight for the hills. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Lets get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. Spanish investigators later said that one desperate turn wrecked any hope of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated the plane. Debris scattered across the slopes, and the tail section was hurled into a ravine before shattering. Small fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport . Rescuers reached the site within hours, but the scene was devastating. No one had survived. Not a single intact body was found. Some victims were never even identified. Spain admitted the controller had made a mistake - but blamed the British crew entirely. UK investigators hit back, saying Camin should've realised sooner there was a conflict and used a published holding pattern. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query the controller's instructions or request clarification. They also criticized Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash . If the controller had said "turns" and not "turn" the crash would never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardized procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner , on its 45th anniversary, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not as well remembered as it should be - and the 146 people who lost their lives that fateful day.
Daily Mirror
29-04-2025
- Daily Mirror
Pilot's chilling final words before largest loss of life on British airliner
Last words heard from the cockpit voice recording demonstrated the true terror from inside the British aircraft just before Manchester plane slammed into Tenerife mountain killing Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located at an elevation of 2,000 ft making it a particularly challenging airport to fly in and out from. The weather is often cloudy - sometimes creating poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea. The deadliest example of how conditions can be catastrophic for pilots is the on-ground collision of two planes on March 27th, 1977, partly due to poor visibility. The infamous disaster still retains the title of being the worst crash in aviation histor y - costing 583 people's lives. But another tragedy befell the island, just three years later. In the 1970s and 1980s British airline Dan-Air rose to become the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. On 9. 20am April 25 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport to Tenerife. It was mostly filled with British holidaymakers looking to escape the UK for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands. There were three experienced pilots on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth ,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. There were also five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants to 146. For three hours, all was well until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds usually came from across the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. The controller Justo Camin, 34, could not give the go ahead to the usual descent procedure as there was an aircraft in front also heading to Runway 12 - and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. Due to the non-availability of radar at the airfield, Camin managed traffic movements procedurally - instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route Just after 1.18pm Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead could land safely on Runway 12. But there was a problem - there was no holding pattern for that runway - so Camin improvised. He wanted Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and remain in this holding pattern - making turns - until the other flight was out of the way. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' After receiving the message, the captain replied,"Roger" without repeating what Camin had told them to do. If Whelan had done this, the impending catastrophe would have been surely avoided. When he said 'turn to the left,' he actually meant to say 'turns to the left,' describing the direction in which the crew were to fly around the holding pattern. But without the 's,' this transmission sounded to the crew ' turn to the left.' Camin who also cleared the flight to an assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, had made a small but significant error. Captain Whelan, confused by the latest unexpected instruction to go into a holding pattern which didn't appear on any of his charts - made only one turn to the left onto a heading of 150 degrees, believing that's what the controller told him to do. They were now in a mountainous area where the minimum safe height is 14,500ft. At one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." It was clear from the cockpit voice recording, the crew was getting uneasy but nobody queried the instructions with the controller. The controller Camin, believing the plane to be out over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, had allowed the aircraft to descend another thousand feet. He had no idea the plane was in the middle of the mountains. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Lets get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. The Spanish investigators later said that this one manoeuvre destroyed any chance of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantaneously, sending shattered debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued onward for several hundred meters before it slammed against the ground, plummeted into a ravine, and broke apart. Tiny fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport. Within hours, rescuers made the trek up the mountain, but it was immediately obvious that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash. Not one single complete human body could be found and the remains of many of the people on board were never conclusively identified. Although admitting the controller's error, Spanish investigators lay all the blame on the Dan Air crew. The British investigators argued that the controller should have realised earlier that the separation between the two planes would be a problem, so that he could have utilise a published holding pattern - preventing the crew from getting confused. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query it or request clarification. They also criticized Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash. If the controller had said turns and not turn the crash would never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardized procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner, on its 45th anniversary, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not well remembered.
