Pilot's terrifying final words on deadly flight to Tenerife from UK

Daily Record

a day ago

A British Airways flight from Heathrow was the second plane involved in the Tenerife airport disaster, but it never reached the island.
Tenerife, with its sun-soaked beaches, is a favourite holiday destination for Brits.
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However, on 22 March 1977, a horrific tragedy unfolded when a passenger flight destined for Tenerife North airport, then known as Los Rodeos Airport, crashed, claiming the lives of all 583 people on board.
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It comes as, just three years after the first Tenerife plane crash, a Delta Flight exploded shortly after take-off, killing all passengers and crew on board.
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Tenerife boasts two airports, but Tenerife North is notoriously challenging for pilots due to its altitude of 2,000ft and often cloudy weather conditions that hamper visibility.
Tragedy struck again just three years later, at 9.20am on 25 April 1980, when Dan-Air's Flight 1008 left Manchester Airport for Tenerife, carrying mainly British holidaymakers eager for the Canary Islands' sunny beaches and breathtaking landscapes.
The flight crew comprised three seasoned pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Five flight attendants were also on board, bringing the total number of passengers and crew to 146.
For three hours, the flight went smoothly until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time, according to the Mirror.
The winds were gusting from an unexpected direction, forcing air traffic to be redirected to Runway 12 rather than the standard landing strip.
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But this sparked a dilemma for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34, as another aircraft was already approaching the identical runway, creating the terrifying prospect of a mid-air collision between the two planes.
Operating without radar assistance, Camin was compelled to depend on procedural techniques to control air traffic and he directed each aircraft to stick to a pre-planned route.
At 1:18 pm, Camin recognised he needed to place the Dan Air crew into a holding pattern to enable the aircraft in front to touch down safely on Runway 12.
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Yet, there was no established holding pattern for this runway, forcing Camin to think on his feet.
He ordered Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern, circling until the other flight had cleared.
Responding to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin stated, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly."
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Captain Whelan responded with a brief "Roger", neglecting to repeat Camin's instructions back to him.
Had he done so, the looming catastrophe might have been prevented.
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Nevertheless, when Camin told them to "turn to the left," he meant to say "turns to the left," specifying the direction the crew should follow whilst executing the holding pattern.
But missing the vital 's', the crew understood this as "turn to the left."
Camin, who had also authorised the flight to ascend to 5,000 feet, made a minor but crucial error.
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Captain Whelan, puzzled by the sudden directive to enter a holding pattern not indicated on any of his charts, executed a single left turn, aligning with a heading of 150 degrees, convinced this was what the controller intended.
They were now soaring over mountainous terrain, where the minimum safe altitude was a staggering 14,500 feet.
Just one minute and six seconds before the devastating crash, one of the pilots said, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, "it doesn't parallel with the runway or anything."
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The cockpit voice recording clearly captured the crew's escalating unease, yet no one challenged the controller's instructions.
Controller Camin, under the assumption the plane was over the sea in his makeshift holding pattern, permitted the aircraft to descend another 1,000 feet, unaware it was actually amidst the mountains.
Captain Whelan voiced his concerns about Camin's instruction to his co-pilot in the cockpit, saying, "I don't like that."
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His co-pilot replied, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?" At this juncture, the automatic ground alarm blared in the cockpit, urging them to "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the looming mountainous terrain, Captain Whelan abruptly aborted his left turn for a drastic right turn. He believed this manoeuvre would enable them to circumvent the imminent obstacle.
Typically, when hearing the alarm, the correct response would be to "pull up" in a bid to gain sufficient altitude to clear any surrounding terrain.
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Co-pilot Firth, after examining the chart, recognised the captain's decision was poorly judged and suggested different courses of action.
The phrase "let's get out of here," uttered by Flight Engineer Carey, echoed through the cockpit voice recorder (CVR).
Despite the engineer's warning, Captain Whelan continued with the steep right turn, which caused a drop of 300 feet.
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Spanish investigators declared categorically in their report this precise manoeuvre eliminated any possibility of avoiding catastrophe.
Alerts from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" ring out as the final recorded words before the CVR falls silent.
Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its devastating fate as it slammed into La Esperanza at a height of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 metres) below the summit.
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The impact destroyed most of the aircraft immediately, spreading wreckage across the mountainside.
The tail portion of the plane careered several hundred metres, ultimately smashing to the ground, tumbling into a gorge, and breaking apart. Small fires broke out amidst the scattered debris, and Tenerife North Airport was shaken by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years.
Rescue teams arrived at the mountain within hours, but it was immediately apparent that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash.
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The scene was so catastrophic not a single intact human body could be found, and many victims could not be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's error, Spanish investigators placed the entirety of the blame on the Dan Air crew.
However, British investigators argued the controller should have recognised sooner the proximity between the two planes would pose a problem, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and prevent any confusion amongst the crew.
They further contended the controller should not have issued an untested and non-standard holding pattern, but conceded that the Dan Air crew did not question the controller's instructions or seek clarification.
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The decision by Camin to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet also drew criticism from the British team. They argued that if the holding pattern had been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet.
Upon receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - unable to see due to fog and cloud - opted to make a right turn, which tragically led them directly into the mountain. Typically, crews are expected to ascend as high as possible in response to such an alarm.
What remains undisputed, however, is the omission of a single letter in a word triggered the series of events that ultimately resulted in the crash.
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Had the controller used "turns" instead of "turn", the tragic crash could have been averted.
The investigation into the crash led to an increased emphasis on clear, standardised procedures across all flight operations, including holding patterns.
The incident underscored the importance of unambiguous communication between air traffic controllers and pilots, with a particular focus on pilots repeating instructions from Air Traffic Control to eliminate any potential misunderstandings.
Despite the tragedy, Dan Air managed to bounce back and continued operations until 1992 when it was acquired by British Airways.
Even though it marked the largest loss of life on a British aircraft, the memory of Dan Air Flight 1008 and the 146 lives tragically lost that day seems to have faded over the last 45 years.