Rated 5 Stars By 110,000 Reviews, This 5-Port Gigabit Ethernet Switch From TP-Link Is Nearly Free
Get this great TP-Link Ethernet Switch now and enjoy a hassle-free connectivity.
There are not a lot of brands on Amazon that approach perfect customer satisfaction, and TP-Link is definitely one of the top 4 or 5 brands consistently receiving outstanding reviews. Right now, one of their top sellers – a 5-Port Gigabit Ethernet Switch – is available at a massive discount for a limited time (while the supply lasts).
The product alone has more than 110,000 reviews at a flawless 5/5 rating which says a lot regarding its performance and reliability. Even better, it's now a record low price of only $13 down from the the original list price of $19. If you're looking to optimize your home (or business network) easily, this is our favorite device.
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Connect Multiple Devices Easily
This 5-port gigabit switch is designed to seamlessly upgrade your network size with ease with 10/100/1000Mbps RJ45 ports that auto-negotiate and auto MDI/MDIX. It integrates into your existing setup and you can easily connect multiple devices such as computers, printers and gaming consoles. With the plug-and-play feature, there is no complicated installation or configuration: just plug it in and enjoy faster and more reliable network speed immediately.
TP-Link has used advanced technology to reduce power consumption and thereby save you electricity bills and reduce the carbon footprint. The fanless metal build ensures noiseless operation so it can be mounted in quiet residential or home office environments. The metal body also ensures excellent heat dissipation which ensures that the device lasts longer and continues to function better over time.
In addition to hardware, this switch delivers sophisticated traffic optimization features: Port-based 802.1p/DSCP Quality of Service (QoS) prioritizes video and voice traffic so that streaming becomes smooth-silk and calls crystal-clear for video conferencing. IGMP Snooping enhances network performance by managing multicast traffic and reduces unwanted data transfers and delivering overall maximum speed and stability.
Its compact and go-anywhere design makes it easy to place wherever you desire, be it on a desk or on a wall mount, regardless of environment. Backed by TP-Link's award-winning 3-year warranty and unparalleled technical support available weekdays, you can invest with confidence that help is simply a call away.
With more than 10,000 units sold in the past month and a stellar 4.7-star average from over 130,000 reviews, this 5-Port Gigabit Ethernet Switch is a proven crowd favorite (and it is also our personal favorite). Thanks to the current 30% discount on Amazon, it's available for just $13 instead of the usual $19.
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Hamilton Spectator
24 minutes ago
- Hamilton Spectator
Global streamers fight CRTC's rule requiring them to fund Canadian content
OTTAWA - Some of the world's biggest streaming companies will argue in court on Monday that they shouldn't have to make CRTC-ordered financial contributions to Canadian content and news. The companies are fighting an order from the federal broadcast regulator that says they must pay five per cent of their annual Canadian revenues to funds devoted to producing Canadian content, including local TV news. The case, which consolidates several appeals by streamers, will be heard by the Federal Court of Appeal in Toronto. Apple, Amazon and Spotify are fighting the CRTC's 2024 order. Motion Picture Association-Canada, which represents such companies as Netflix and Paramount, is challenging a section of the CRTC's order requiring them to contribute to local news. In December, the court put a pause on the payments — estimated to be at least $1.25 million annually per company. Amazon, Apple and Spotify had argued that if they made the payments and then won the appeal and overturned the CRTC order, they wouldn't be able to recover the money. In court documents, the streamers put forward a long list of arguments on why they shouldn't have to pay, including technical points regarding the CRTC's powers under the Broadcasting Act. Spotify argued that the contribution requirement amounts to a tax, which the CRTC doesn't have the authority to impose. The music streamer also took issue with the CRTC requiring the payments without first deciding how it will define Canadian content. Amazon argued the federal cabinet specified the CRTC's requirements have to be 'equitable.' It said the contribution requirement is 'inequitable because it applies only to foreign online undertakings and only to such undertakings with more than $25 million in annual Canadian broadcasting revenues.' Apple also said the regulator 'acted prematurely' and argued the CRTC didn't consider whether the order was 'equitable.' It pointed out Apple is required to contribute five per cent, while radio stations must only pay 0.5 per cent — and streamers don't have the same access to the funds into which they pay. The CRTC imposes different rules on Canadian content contributions from traditional media players. It requires large English-language broadcasters to contribute 30 per cent of revenues to Canadian programming. Motion Picture Association—Canada is only challenging one aspect of the CRTC's order — the part requiring companies to contribute 1.5 per cent of revenues to a fund for local news on independent TV stations. It said in court documents that none of the streamers 'has any connection to news production' and argued the CRTC doesn't have the authority to require them to fund news. 'What the CRTC did, erroneously, is purport to justify the … contribution simply on the basis that local news is important and local news operations provided by independent television stations are short of money,' it said. 'That is a reason why news should be funded by someone, but is devoid of any analysis, legal or factual, as to why it is equitable for foreign online undertakings to fund Canadian news production.' In its response, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters said the CRTC has wide authority under the Broadcasting Act. It argued streamers have contributed to the funding crisis facing local news. 'While the industry was once dominated by traditional television and radio services, those services are now in decline, as Canadians increasingly turn to online streaming services,' the broadcasters said. 'For decades, traditional broadcasting undertakings have supported the production of Canadian content through a complex array of CRTC-directed measures … By contrast, online undertakings have not been required to provide any financial support to the Canadian broadcasting system, despite operating here for well over a decade.' A submission from the federal government in defence of the CRTC argued the regulator was within its rights to order the payments. 'The orders challenged in these proceedings … are a valid exercise of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission's regulatory powers. These orders seek to remedy the inequity that has resulted from the ascendance of online streaming giants like the Appellants,' the office of the attorney general said. 'Online undertakings have greatly profited from their access to Canadian audiences, without any corresponding obligation to make meaningful contributions supporting Canadian programming and creators — an obligation that has long been imposed on traditional domestic broadcasters.' The government said that if the streamers get their way, that would preserve 'an inequitable circumstance in which domestic broadcasters — operating in an industry under economic strain — shoulder a disproportionate regulatory burden.' 'This result would be plainly out of step with the policy aims of Parliament' and cabinet, it added. The court hearing comes as trade tensions between the U.S. and Canada have cast a shadow over the CRTC's attempts to regulate online streamers. The regulator launched a suite of proceedings and hearings as part of its implementation of the Online Streaming Act, legislation that in 2023 updated the Broadcasting Act to set up the CRTC to regulate streaming companies. In January, as U.S. President Donald Trump was inaugurated for his second term, groups representing U.S. businesses and big tech companies warned the CRTC that its efforts to modernize Canadian content rules could worsen trade relations and lead to retaliation. Then, as the CRTC launched its hearing on modernizing the definition of Canadian content in May, Netflix, Paramount and Apple cancelled their individual appearances. While the companies didn't provide a reason, the move came shortly after Trump threatened to impose a tariff of up to 100 per cent on movies made outside the United States. Foreign streamers have long pointed to their existing spending in Canada in response to calls to bring them into the regulated system. This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 8, 2025.
Yahoo
28 minutes ago
- Yahoo
Buy FuboTV Now or Wait Until the Disney Deal Is Done?
FuboTV is being merged with Disney's Hulu streaming service. FuboTV's first-quarter results weren't as strong as they may have seemed. The company's subscriber count was weak. 10 stocks we like better than fuboTV › FuboTV (NYSE: FUBO) made headlines in early 2025 when it agreed to merge with Disney's (NYSE: DIS) Hulu streaming service. This is a very big deal for FuboTV, and the stock has risen dramatically since the agreement was announced. Should interested investors buy now before the deal is done, or does it make more sense to wait and see what happens? FuboTV says it has "a global mission to aggregate the best in TV, including premium sports, news and entertainment content, through a single app." In the U.S. market, the product it sells is "a sports-first cable TV replacement product." Basically, it is competing with the major content providers with an aggregated cable replacement for so-called cord-cutters. That's not exactly a bad plan, but it is still a fairly big project to undertake since companies like Disney, among many others, have created compelling streaming products of their own. And cable providers are increasingly offering their services through the web, as well. Notably, even if a consumer uses FuboTV, they still need a connection to the internet to make it work. Cable and phone providers are still how large numbers of consumers reach the web. Disney is a media titan with massive content franchises. Hulu was an early effort to break into the streaming world, with multiple original partners. At this point, Hulu's partners have stepped back, preferring to start their own streaming services. That includes Disney. Merging FuboTV with Hulu, with Disney ending up retaining a 70% stake in the company, seems more likely to benefit Disney than Hulu or FuboTV. That's because FuboTV could end up being a mere vassal of Disney. In that scenario, Disney could sell content to FuboTV with costs so high that FuboTV barely makes a profit. Another scenario to consider is that Disney simply sells its stake in FuboTV, leaving FuboTV with a larger business, but one that is still at a strategic disadvantage as content makers push their own streaming products. The interesting thing is that FuboTV didn't have a great first quarter in 2025. For example, the company reported GAAP earnings of $0.55 per share in the first quarter. But if you remove one-time items, the company actually lost $0.02 a share. That was an improvement from an adjusted loss of $0.14 a year earlier, but FuboTV is still a money-losing venture. Worse, FuboTV's subscriber base declined year over year in the first quarter. The first-quarter showing suggests it isn't entering into the Hulu pairing on the strongest footing. Meanwhile, it is taking on a large business that it will operate separately from its FuboTV operation. Complexity will dramatically increase for FuboTV, given that Hulu is a larger streaming business. So execution will be very important, noting that it is entirely possible that FuboTV is biting off more than it can chew. That's highlighted by the company's first-quarter subscriber issues. Could Hulu combining with FuboTV be a massive win for everyone involved? Sure, that's one possible outcome, but there are negative outcomes that could transpire as well. Disney's large ownership stake could leave FuboTV beholden to Disney, placing the desires of other shareholders in a distant second place. FuboTV's not-so-great first-quarter subscriber numbers could be a harbinger of trouble to come even as it bulks up its subscriber count with Hulu. And Disney could just be attempting to offload a business that it doesn't want before the business really starts to show signs of weakness. Tiny FuboTV taking on the much larger Hulu service does sound exciting. But for most investors, it probably makes more sense to wait and see how the new FuboTV performs following the transaction before buying. After FuboTV's big stock price jump, it seems like there's a lot of good news already priced in here. Before you buy stock in fuboTV, consider this: The Motley Fool Stock Advisor analyst team just identified what they believe are the for investors to buy now… and fuboTV wasn't one of them. The 10 stocks that made the cut could produce monster returns in the coming years. Consider when Netflix made this list on December 17, 2004... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you'd have $669,517!* Or when Nvidia made this list on April 15, 2005... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you'd have $868,615!* Now, it's worth noting Stock Advisor's total average return is 792% — a market-crushing outperformance compared to 171% for the S&P 500. Don't miss out on the latest top 10 list, available when you join . See the 10 stocks » *Stock Advisor returns as of June 2, 2025 Reuben Gregg Brewer has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Walt Disney and fuboTV. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy. Buy FuboTV Now or Wait Until the Disney Deal Is Done? was originally published by The Motley Fool Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
Forbes
28 minutes ago
- Forbes
Have Reporting Burdens Led To More Firms Staying Private?
The best evidence for this hypothesis comes from micro-caps. Confounding trends and offsetting benefits of being public are often ignored by advocates for reducing reporting rules. The number of US public firms has fallen in recent times. Prof. Jay Ritter, who tracks these numbers, documents that we had 3,804 US listed firms at the end of 2024 relative to the peak of around 8000 in 1996. Remarkably we had 1,384 foreign firms listed at the end of 2024. Many blame higher costs reporting and auditing for the smaller number of US listed firms. They point to the cumulative onslaught of Sarbanes Oxley 2022, the 2003 Global Settlement that alleged made it harder for analysts to cover small firms, Dodd-Frank 2010, and the supposedly relentless pace of accounting and auditing regulation pushed by Congress, the SEC and the FASB. The question I want to address is whether there is any evidence for that claim. Trend depends on benchmark period In a research note, Vanguard points out that if we go back to 1972, the decline shrinks to a third. On top of that, 1972 was the year NASDAQ was set up and 3,000 odd new companies entered the public arena. Why the fall? Doidge, Karolyi, Shen and Stulz (2025) list two potential underlying reasons: (i) it is easier to stay private because restrictions on staying private have softened and it has become easier to raise funds for private firms, perhaps due to the low interest rate environment; and (ii) antitrust enforcement over the last decade has been relatively lax and product market competition has heated up leading to a greater number of mergers. They don't seem to devote much space to reporting cost burden. Acquisitions drive most of the decline A McKinsey piece shows that 95% of the exits from our markets are driven by acquisitions. Thus, the so-called missing companies have not left the investible universe for the US investor as the investor gets indirect exposure to the target via the acquirer's stock. Espen Eckbo makes the acquisition point more rigorously. However, the rate of entry and exit into public markets is not uniform across industries. We had more IPOs, relative to exits, in pharmaceutical and biotech industries. The number of IPOs, relative to exits, are more or less the same in retail, materials, consumer apparel and durables. Exits far exceed IPOs in banking, software, technology hardware, media and telecom. Any theory that argues reporting burdens are a first order problem needs to explain why such burden has massively increased for banking, software, tech hardware, media and telecom relative to pharma. Smaller IPOs, mostly micro-caps, gone The McKinsey piece also makes the interesting point that we have far fewer smaller IPOs now relative to the past. This suggests that more of the earlier value is captured by private investors, as private equity firms seem to take longer to exit their positions now relative to before (3 years in 2007 relative to 6 years in 2015). One could argue that the costs of reporting, auditing and compliance have become too large for smaller IPOs to even think about going public. Vanguard points out that the missing IPOs are micro-caps. Is the loss of micro-caps a policy concern? Moreover, Mauboussin, Callahan, and Majd (2017) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) note that half of what can be referred to as the 'listing gap' (exits more than IPOs) occurred before Sarbanes Oxley became law. Start-ups have declined too Somewhat intriguing, the number of start-ups appears to display mixed patterns since 1996. The Kaufmann index of startup activity falls from 1996 to its nadir in 2013, after which it picks up till 2017, when the index was last published but the 2017 number was still lower than the 1996 number. This suggests that there may be fewer businesses even available to go public. International exchanges I am in the UK as I write this and an institutional investor I know here suggested that the London stock exchange has suffered a similar decline in IPOs. In fact, there is some angst in the UK that they are losing listings to the US. The loss in listings applies to other advanced economies as well, as Espen Eckbo points out. The theory pushing for reporting burdens as the primary explanation will have to explain why UK reporting and reporting in other advanced economies has also become onerously burdensome. Burgeoning private equity (PE) A senior executive tells me,' the payouts achieved by management and their VCs by arranging acquisitions to PE firms, as well as PE to PE sales have been, in recent times, just as compelling as anything other than a truly dramatic IPO. Smaller companies, companies with significant internal ownership, companies without strong growth or high investment opportunities (that is to say not pharma or biotech who absolutely need risk capital), companies where management would like to stay involved but are not keen on public company visibility. These are all great reasons to be acquired by PE rather than either IPO or even getting acquired by a public company rapidly, with certainty, without much publicity. PE is incredibly well equipped at maximizing ongoing cashflows, and growth, while still maintaining: (i) particularly attractive incentives for management in the transaction, (ii) management that stays post transaction with significant incentive retentions and milestones -- all without pesky proxy announcements about executive compensation; and (iii) objectively great returns to those equity holders that are just selling.' The role of reporting for intangibles Rene Stulz (2018) has suggested that new firms heavily invest in intangibles and forced disclosure of intangibles by securities laws, all else constant, encourage firms to stay private. I am not sure of this argument as US public firms barely tell us anything about their intangible investments, especially home grown ones. Papers suggesting that SOX increased regulatory burdens Zhang (2007) finds negative returns of around -15% to -13% around the events surrounding the passage of SOX. I find these returns too large to be credible. Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) observed an increase in decisions to go private after SOX. But this evidence is mixed. Bartlett (2008) of the Stanford Law School re-examines this question and concludes, 'non-SOX factors were the primary impetus for the "name brand" buyouts commonly evoked as evidence that SOX has harmed the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.' Iliev (2010) is perhaps the best cited paper in the area. Using careful research designs, Iliev documents that section 404 of the SOX, which mandates that the auditor attest the internal controls of the firm for the absence of a material weakness, led to conservative reported earnings but also imposed real costs. Iliev compares audit fees and earnings quality for firms with float of $50-75 million to those just above at $75 million-$100 million. The idea is that firms in these two partitions are mostly similar except that Section 404 applies only to firms with float greater than $75 million. He concludes, 'on net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms' and increases audit fees by 167%. Atanasov and Black (2020) replicate Iliev (2010) and conclude that not controlling for firm growth led Iliev (2010) to overestimate SOX compliance costs in his analysis. However, the increase in audit fees suffered by the small firms is real, by about 80%. The dollar numbers underlying these estimates are worth reiterating. The average firm in Iliev's affected firm sample pays more than $0.7 million in greater audit fees. The mean and median earnings of sample firms is -$4.8 million and -$1.4 million respectively. Iliev uses this comparison to argue that the compliance costs of section 404 were substantial. Were they? Would these firms have survived had section 404 not been enacted? Is it obvious that investors would have wanted to invest in such firms? And, how much of the audit fee hike is temporary for a year or two. Even more noteworthy, this evidence relates to micro caps (defined as stocks with market capitalizations of between $50 million and $250 million in 2024). These numbers would be smaller if we went back in time as stock markets have gone up quite a bit in the last 20 years or so. The bigger question is how can we possibly generalize evidence reliant on a sample of microcaps to the entire corporate ecosystem? Ewens, Xiao and Xu (2024), in a new paper, move this literature forward and consider three such natural breakpoints to estimate costs of mandatory reporting: (i) firms below $25 million in float in 1992 were designated as 'small businesses' and escaped a few disclosure requirements; (ii) the $75 million float threshold that Iliev looked for section 404 of SOX; and (iii) the $700 million float threshold used in the 2012 JOBS Act. The 2012 JOBS Act is interesting because the point of that legislation was to exempt smaller firms from a few reporting requirements. So, the JOBS Act presents a bit of a counterfactual to the usual setting whereby regulation increased. Based on these events, they claim that the median firm spends 4.3% of its market capitalization on compliance costs. I find the 4.3% number somewhat big. Moreover, even with the clever econometrics used in the paper, can one really generalize estimates from SOX and JOBS Act to the universe of firms? I don't know. Interestingly, Ewens et al. themselves seem to conclude, 'heightened regulatory costs only explain a small fraction of the decline in the number of public firms over the last two decades. Our results suggest that non-regulatory factors likely played a more important role in explaining the decline in the number of U.S. public firms.' Evidence around the 2012 JOBS Act Researchers are generally good at coming up with unintended consequences of regulations that public firms are required to follow. But we don't often see studies that document the offsetting benefits of going or staying public. The 2012 JOBS Act presents a rare opportunity to consider whether relaxing reporting regulations encourages more IPOs. Dambra et al. (2015) conclude that the 2012 JOBS Act led to an increase of 21 IPOs a year, on average. Ewens et al. (2024) find a slightly higher estimate: roughly 28 additional IPOs. One must wonder whether 20 odd IPOs per year are worth the potential collateral damage to the credibility of US reporting and compliance systems, if the PCAOB were to be dismantled or SOX were to be repealed. Incidentally, many other advanced economies passed regulation, modeled on SOX, in their own countries. Did they not conduct a careful assessment of costs of such regulation on their IPO activity? Or did they recognize the need to tighten up reporting and audit rules after the tech bubble burst in 2001? IPO Tax Robert Jackson's, the ex-SEC commissioner, analysis highlights the 7% tax that middle market IPOs must pay even before they go public, to investment bankers, lawyers and the like. Surely, the IPO tax, which has little to do per se with the reporting and compliance costs of 4.3% highlighted by Ewens et al, deserves more attention. The advocates of cutting reporting burdens are somewhat silent about reducing the 7% middle market IPO tax. And I am aware of startups that are working on software that can write an S1 in minutes with AI. Shouldn't the 4.3% reporting costs, estimated by Ewens et al., fall? Benefits of staying public are often ignored Owners, VCs, and capital providers get liquidity. Public firms can potentially pay labor mostly via stock and hence attract higher quality talent. Stock can be used as a means of payment to buy another company and hence take out a rival or to buy a complementary firm. If you get acquired, the acquirer is usually expected to pay a 25% control premium over the prevailing stock price. In sum, the case for reporting burdens forcing companies to stay private is far from clear. The best evidence relates to micro-caps and generalizing from that set to other companies is not straightforward. Partisan debate about the evidence often tends to ignore the vast number of confounding factors such as low interest rates, falling number of start-ups, special time periods chosen for the analysis and large number of acquisitions of public firms and the 7% IPO tax. If anything, US reporting rules need to be strengthened, not weakened. I have pointed out, time and again, the deficiencies in our financial reporting system and how auditors could potentially do a better job. Regulators may want to proceed with caution the next time someone brings up the hypothesis that reporting burdens are a significant barrier to US firms going public.
