BRICS Agree to Joint Statement Ahead of Rio Leaders Summit
The shared statement, which a gathering of their foreign ministers failed to achieve in April, underscores the group's commitment to consensus despite its quickly expanding ranks.
The group of major emerging economies expanded last year beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
That has added diplomatic weight to the gathering, which aspires to speak for developing nations in the Global South, but also increased the complexity of reaching common terms on contentious geopolitical issues.
Negotiators preparing for the leaders summit over the past week had struggled to find shared language about the bombardment of Gaza, the Israel-Iran conflict and Africa's representative in a proposed reform of the United Nations Security Council, said two of the sources, who requested anonymity to speak openly.
To overcome differences among African nations on the continent's Security Council representative, the group agreed to endorse seats for Brazil and India, while leaving open which country should represent Africa's interests, a person familiar with the talks said.
The source said the group had agreed to sharpen its tone on conflicts in the Middle East, strengthening language beyond an April note expressing 'serious concern.'
On trade, sources said the BRICS will continue their thinly veiled criticism of U.S. tariff policy under President Donald Trump from the April ministerial meeting, where they warned against 'unjustified unilateral protectionist measures, including the indiscriminate increase of reciprocal tariffs.'
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