China's flawed narrative on India's Indus Water Treaty abeyance

AllAfrica

21-05-2025

The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, India, and military clashes that followed between India and Pakistan have reignited fears of a renewed spiral of tensions between the two neighbours. Even though the two sides have agreed to a US-mediated ceasefire for now, India has not withdrawn its decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) – a historic agreement that long survived hostile bilateral relations.
India has been mulling over the possibility of stopping the water flow of rivers flowing toward Pakistan.
It's important to note that 80% of river water in Pakistan passes through or originates from India – a strategic asset that India has not used thus far in its battle against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. International laws and conventions do allow a country to take recourse to such measures, in case the other party engages in unlawful conduct such as cross-border terrorism.
Yet, what deserves closer scrutiny is China's reaction. As an upper riparian state, China's narrative on India's Indus water decision reveals more about Beijing's geopolitical calculus than about any principled stance on transboundary water management.
Despite official proclamations of neutrality, Chinese commentators have largely cast India's suspension of the IWT in a negative light, framing it as a form of unlawful coercive diplomacy rather than a response to the Pahalgam terror attack in India from across the border. Articles published on Chinese media platforms such as Baidu – with titles such as 'Water is a Weapon – paint India's decision as a manifestation of a strategy aimed at destabilizing regional equilibrium under the guise of treaty reinterpretation.
Such a narrative framing stands in stark contrast to Beijing's own opaque and unilateral transboundary water governance practices on the Tibetan Plateau. Domestically, its expansive hydropower projects face minimal criticism, while India's actions are vilified as attempts to 'weaponize' natural resources.
Chinese analysts have described India's control over the upper Indus as a geopolitical lever, an assertion of dominance that allegedly leaves Pakistan vulnerable and beholden to New Delhi's goodwill.
Such accusations conveniently ignore India's repeated calls, especially after the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, to review the treaty as a matter of national interest, not religious or ideological motivation. The portrayal of India's treaty suspension as a strategic 'water cut-off' further reinforces Beijing's narrative-building attempts about India.
Chinese commentators have also subtly inserted China into the water-sharing conversation by emphasising that the Indus originates from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, referred to domestically as the Shiquan River. This framing positions China not just as a neutral observer but as a potential stakeholder, with a latent claim to relevance in Indus Basin geopolitics.
Scholars such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies argue that India's move aims to amplify diplomatic pressure on Pakistan while enhancing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's domestic political stature. Liu contends that the decision also reflects India's limited retaliatory options post-Pahalgam and is a calculated effort to renegotiate the treaty under duress.
While acknowledging the challenges this creates for Pakistan, some Chinese analysts point out that Pakistan is not entirely defenseless. Strategic infrastructure, such as the Tarbela and Mangla dams, provides short-term mitigation. And the legal framework of the Indus Water Treaty, under World Bank auspices, allows Islamabad to pursue remedies through international institutions. However, considering the complexity of the situation, Pakistan's options are limited.
China's professed neutrality rings hollow in light of recurring rhetorical patterns that consistently side with Pakistan. Phrases such as 'India is using water as a weapon' and 'the Indus does not solely belong to India' underscore a discernible alignment with Islamabad's position.
A Baidu commentary noted, 'The best way forward is to use a platform like CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) to promote water cooperation and stabilize South Asia. After all, water belongs to everyone, and the good fruit is not eaten alone.'
Such commentators overlook the fact that CPEC passes through a disputed territory between India and Pakistan, thus making any infrastructure development there unlawful in the eyes of international law.
The irony is unmistakable: while China appeals to the principles of shared water governance in South Asia, it remains opaque and unilateral in its practices as an upper riparian state.
China's repeated violation of international norms by unilaterally stopping and releasing waters during the summer and monsoon season of the Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo river is a telltale sign of this behavior.
China is also using the India-Pakistan water dispute as leverage to signal its broader geopolitical intentions. Lin Minwang of Fudan University suggests that India might pursue limited military action against Pakistan to satisfy domestic audiences – but such a move would be widely condemned.
He emphasizes that China's troop presence near the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir since 2020 acts as a deterrent, forcing India to weigh Chinese sensitivities in its regional security calculus. Such narratives portray China as a direct party to the India-Pakistan water dispute.
What is notably absent in Chinese discourse is empathy for the victims of terrorism in India. The narrative prioritizes geopolitical advantage and regional leverage, not human tragedy. China's emerging posture is less about impartial and professional diplomacy and more about strategic signalling – reaffirming its 'ironclad' friendship with Pakistan while reinforcing its stake in South Asia's evolving water politics.