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AllAfrica
21-05-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's flawed narrative on India's Indus Water Treaty abeyance
The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, India, and military clashes that followed between India and Pakistan have reignited fears of a renewed spiral of tensions between the two neighbours. Even though the two sides have agreed to a US-mediated ceasefire for now, India has not withdrawn its decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) – a historic agreement that long survived hostile bilateral relations. India has been mulling over the possibility of stopping the water flow of rivers flowing toward Pakistan. It's important to note that 80% of river water in Pakistan passes through or originates from India – a strategic asset that India has not used thus far in its battle against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. International laws and conventions do allow a country to take recourse to such measures, in case the other party engages in unlawful conduct such as cross-border terrorism. Yet, what deserves closer scrutiny is China's reaction. As an upper riparian state, China's narrative on India's Indus water decision reveals more about Beijing's geopolitical calculus than about any principled stance on transboundary water management. Despite official proclamations of neutrality, Chinese commentators have largely cast India's suspension of the IWT in a negative light, framing it as a form of unlawful coercive diplomacy rather than a response to the Pahalgam terror attack in India from across the border. Articles published on Chinese media platforms such as Baidu – with titles such as 'Water is a Weapon – paint India's decision as a manifestation of a strategy aimed at destabilizing regional equilibrium under the guise of treaty reinterpretation. Such a narrative framing stands in stark contrast to Beijing's own opaque and unilateral transboundary water governance practices on the Tibetan Plateau. Domestically, its expansive hydropower projects face minimal criticism, while India's actions are vilified as attempts to 'weaponize' natural resources. Chinese analysts have described India's control over the upper Indus as a geopolitical lever, an assertion of dominance that allegedly leaves Pakistan vulnerable and beholden to New Delhi's goodwill. Such accusations conveniently ignore India's repeated calls, especially after the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, to review the treaty as a matter of national interest, not religious or ideological motivation. The portrayal of India's treaty suspension as a strategic 'water cut-off' further reinforces Beijing's narrative-building attempts about India. Chinese commentators have also subtly inserted China into the water-sharing conversation by emphasising that the Indus originates from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, referred to domestically as the Shiquan River. This framing positions China not just as a neutral observer but as a potential stakeholder, with a latent claim to relevance in Indus Basin geopolitics. Scholars such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies argue that India's move aims to amplify diplomatic pressure on Pakistan while enhancing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's domestic political stature. Liu contends that the decision also reflects India's limited retaliatory options post-Pahalgam and is a calculated effort to renegotiate the treaty under duress. While acknowledging the challenges this creates for Pakistan, some Chinese analysts point out that Pakistan is not entirely defenseless. Strategic infrastructure, such as the Tarbela and Mangla dams, provides short-term mitigation. And the legal framework of the Indus Water Treaty, under World Bank auspices, allows Islamabad to pursue remedies through international institutions. However, considering the complexity of the situation, Pakistan's options are limited. China's professed neutrality rings hollow in light of recurring rhetorical patterns that consistently side with Pakistan. Phrases such as 'India is using water as a weapon' and 'the Indus does not solely belong to India' underscore a discernible alignment with Islamabad's position. A Baidu commentary noted, 'The best way forward is to use a platform like CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) to promote water cooperation and stabilize South Asia. After all, water belongs to everyone, and the good fruit is not eaten alone.' Such commentators overlook the fact that CPEC passes through a disputed territory between India and Pakistan, thus making any infrastructure development there unlawful in the eyes of international law. The irony is unmistakable: while China appeals to the principles of shared water governance in South Asia, it remains opaque and unilateral in its practices as an upper riparian state. China's repeated violation of international norms by unilaterally stopping and releasing waters during the summer and monsoon season of the Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo river is a telltale sign of this behavior. China is also using the India-Pakistan water dispute as leverage to signal its broader geopolitical intentions. Lin Minwang of Fudan University suggests that India might pursue limited military action against Pakistan to satisfy domestic audiences – but such a move would be widely condemned. He emphasizes that China's troop presence near the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir since 2020 acts as a deterrent, forcing India to weigh Chinese sensitivities in its regional security calculus. Such narratives portray China as a direct party to the India-Pakistan water dispute. What is notably absent in Chinese discourse is empathy for the victims of terrorism in India. The narrative prioritizes geopolitical advantage and regional leverage, not human tragedy. China's emerging posture is less about impartial and professional diplomacy and more about strategic signalling – reaffirming its 'ironclad' friendship with Pakistan while reinforcing its stake in South Asia's evolving water politics.
The Print
30-04-2025
- Politics
- The Print
China is watching India's response to Pahalgam. And appreciates its strategic restraint
Chinese analysis presents India's retaliation as measured, favouring diplomatic and economic tools over military escalation. Many have interpreted this approach as strategic restraint , while others take it to be a sign of underlying vulnerabilities. Chinese media and online forums have portrayed India's response as firm yet punitive, with particular focus on its alleged humanitarian fallout for Pakistan. Headlines such as 'After the shooting, India 'cut off water,' 'blocked roads,' and 'drove people away' to Pakistan' and 'Pakistan pushes back against India's water cut' frame India as exacerbating regional instability . The recent terror attack in Pahalgam has drawn widespread international attention, including from China, where online discourse has been active and revealing. While Chinese commentary remains varied, a clear tilt toward Pakistan is evident. Repeated use of the term ' India-controlled Kashmir ' instead of 'Kashmir' signals alignment with Pakistan's narrative. 'The attack stems from deep-rooted political and religious tensions in Kashmir,' wrote Liu Zongyi, a senior research fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. 'India's response is unsurprising; it has long blamed Pakistan for such incidents. This could further strain India-Pakistan ties and increase regional instability. The Narendra Modi government may also try to leverage the crisis politically.' Liu also linked the attacks to the abrogation of Article 370. 'The revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status fuelled local resentment by curtailing rights and encouraging demographic changes. This discontent, exploited by extremist groups, is evident in the targeting of male Hindus during the attack,' he added. Another commentator noted: 'Kashmir is no longer normal. The insistence on a 'return to normalcy' is perhaps the most regrettable aspect of this administration's Kashmir policy.' Also read: Striking back at Pakistan is full of risks. India must master choreography of escalation A cautious Beijing Chinese analysts broadly view the international response, especially from the United States, as favouring India. One common framing on Chinese platforms is: 'The West stands with India, and Pakistan turns to us for support'. A commentator remarked: 'The US and Israel have openly sided with India, supplying weapons and ammunition, effectively endorsing Modi and preparing India for a full-scale war. But they underestimate the preparedness of the Pakistani army.' On Baidu, a user wondered about China's role. 'With the US and Russia both backing India, and Pakistan increasingly isolated, how can China continue to support its long-standing ally without jeopardising its own interests?' he wrote. India's growing importance in the US Indo-Pacific strategy is widely seen as narrowing China's regional manoeuvrability, even as Russia signals increased openness to Pakistan, he added. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars are stressing regional stability. 'Restraint and rationality between India and Pakistan are key to South Asia's stability. The international community must encourage both sides to de-escalate,' noted a researcher at Fudan University's Institute of International Studies. Wang Shida, Executive Director and researcher at the South Asian Institute of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, called for a calm and measured response. He urged against the temptation to satisfy domestic nationalist demands at the risk of regional stability. Notably, he also wrote that in the sabre-rattling between India and Pakistan, the latter should not be perceived as showing weakness. While some Chinese voices recall past troop mobilisations along the China-India border as symbolic support for Pakistan, few expect any direct involvement now. Most anticipate that Beijing will maintain a diplomatic posture—advocating calm, protecting its interests, and avoiding direct provocation. A Baidu commentator argued that China's current caution on Kashmir is a way to maintain balance between its relations with India and Pakistan. He suggested that Beijing could take on a more active role through the Belt and Road Initiative, facilitating dialogue while strengthening its own border infrastructure. Also read: IWT suspension is lawful and morally right. India isn't weaponising water, but ending charity Support for Pakistan While commentary on platforms like Baidu and Guancha remains relatively measured, Weibo and WeChat reflect stronger pro-Pakistan sentiment. One Weibo post described Pakistan as 'irreplaceable' to China's strategic security, highlighting their 'all-weather' relationship, which is rooted in defence cooperation, nuclear partnership, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Some users even speculated that in a wartime scenario, China could provide Pakistan with intelligence and material support. A WeChat user accused India of trying to escalate tensions rather than identifying the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. He added that India has begun a 'water war' by controlling river flows, posing a grave threat to Pakistan's agriculture and economic stability. Another post took the conspiracy theory further. 'US Vice President Vance arrived in New Delhi on 22 April, a terrorist attack occurred the next day. Without any investigation, Modi immediately blamed Pakistan. Coincidence—or not?' the post read. A user warned India against escalation, implying that China could step in to support Pakistan both diplomatically and militarily. 'We aim to support Pakistan and bring India to its knees. India, blindly following the US, is sabotaging China's transport routes and trying to sever our economic lifeline. It is a vicious wolf and a hungry tiger at our doorstep—aggressive, cunning, and poised to strike. Our goal should be to cripple India permanently, leaving it a deflated power incapable of rising again,' read a particularly hostile post. Also read: Dhaka walls have Islamist Hizbut Tahrir posters. They are asking the military to take over Strategic alignment Chinese discourse has deliberately avoided holding Pakistan accountable for the Pahalgam terror attack. Rather than condemning terrorism, many Chinese voices blame India, express sympathy for Pakistan's diplomatic isolation, and call for deeper Chinese support. This is not neutrality; it is calculated alignment. Beijing continues to use Pakistan as a proxy to destabilise India and undercut its regional influence. For decades, China has enabled Pakistan's anti-India agenda through diplomatic cover, military support, and economic aid. The result is a sustained campaign of cross-border terrorism that Beijing refuses to confront as long as it serves the goal of containing India's rise. China is deliberately ignoring Pakistan's state-sponsored terrorism, even as the threat mirrors the kind of violence it claims to oppose. India is not collateral; it is the target. The irony is stark: China, too, has lost its citizens to terrorism in Pakistan. Yet, it chooses to dismiss India's security concerns, eroding the possibility of regional stability and exposing its calls for peace as hollow rhetoric. This posture may yield short-term strategic gains for Beijing, but the long-term consequences are catching up. As global support and solidarity for India deepen, China's turning a blind eye to Pakistan's state–sponsored terrorism risks becoming a lasting liability. Present Chinese discourse makes one thing clear: India is the target of state-sponsored terrorism, and Beijing remains complicit by design. Sana Hashmi is a fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
