US Sentinel missile stalls as China, Russia steam ahead
This month, Defense One reported that the US Air Force has paused work on key segments of its Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program to address escalating costs and restructure its acquisition strategy, as confirmed by service officials.
The US$141 billion program—81% over its initial budget—is intended to replace the aging 1970s-era Minuteman III ICBMs, which may have reached the end of their service lives and upgrade potential.
Northrop Grumman, the program's prime contractor, was directed to halt design, testing, and construction work for the Command and Launch Segment at various facilities, including Vandenberg Space Force Base in California and Hill Air Force Base in Utah. Work on training devices and security systems has also been suspended.
The decision follows a July 2024 announcement of restructuring efforts after costs surged and US Department of Defense (DOD) officials ruled out alternative programs. Northrop CEO Kathy Warden acknowledged the work pause in January, stating that the restructuring could take up to 24 months.
Despite the setback, Northrop has still achieved milestones under the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract.
The US Air Force is considering opening parts of its ground infrastructure to competition to reduce costs. While the timeline and scope of the restructuring remain unclear, the Sentinel program is vital for modernizing the US nuclear triad, which includes the Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and B-21 bomber.
A November 2024 report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) states that Sentinel is designed to address current and expected threats while being more cost-effective, modular, and maintaining the industrial base. The US Air Force plans to replace the Minuteman III missiles with Sentinel by 2029.
While Sentinel's modular design promises cost-effective maintenance and future upgrades, these benefits are overshadowed by soaring costs and timeline slippage, potentially reducing the readiness of the US land-based nuclear arsenal.
In stark contrast, the US DOD's 2024 China Military Power report highlights China's rapid expansion and modernization of its ICBM capabilities. The report mentions that China has approximately 400 operational missiles, including fixed and mobile launchers that can launch unitary or multiple warheads.
China's strategic missile forces include silo-launched and road-mobile ICBMs. It has recently completed three new solid-propellant ICBM fields housing at least 300 silos, with development consistent with the US and Russia's launch-on-warning (LOW) systems.
The report further notes that China is developing advanced nuclear delivery systems such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) systems, which can bypass US missile defenses.
Meanwhile, Russia is also upgrading its strategic missile forces. A March 2024 report by Hans Kristensen and others for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists notes that Russia is replacing aging Soviet-era ICBMs with advanced systems like the RS-24 Yars, which can carry four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
Kristensen and his co-authors note that Russia is phasing out the RS-20V Voevoda and introducing the RS-28 Sarmat, a missile capable of carrying up to 10 warheads with an extended range, including over the North and South Poles. New systems such as the Yars-M and Kedr, emphasizing greater mobility and stealth, are expected to replace current systems by 2030.
The delays hampering the Sentinel program may force the US to rely on the aging Minuteman III far longer than anticipated. Keeping those missiles operational presents significant challenges, especially since some critical upgrade guides and component manufacturers no longer exist.
However, Matt Korda argues in a March 2021 Federation of American Scientists (FAS) report that life-extending the Minuteman III is a more cost-effective and safer option than Sentinel, whose projected life-cycle cost of US$264 billion could severely strain the US defense budget.
He highlights that a 2000s-era Minuteman III life extension program effectively turned 450 decades-old missiles into nearly new ones—except for their steel shells—at a cost of just $7 billion.
Korda points out that many critical Minuteman III subsystems remain highly reliable, and advanced non-destructive testing methods could ensure their longevity without sacrificing operational readiness. He argues that modernizing Minuteman III would delay Sentinel development for decades, freeing resources for more immediate security priorities.
His proposal gains weight when considering the significant budget pressures of modernizing all three legs of the US nuclear triad. Caleb Larson notes in a recent 1945 article that while the B-21 bomber program is estimated to cost $203 billion for 100 aircraft, it could face harsh scrutiny given the growing US budget deficit approaching $2 trillion yearly.
Similarly, a September 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights significant cost overruns and delays in the Columbia-class SSBN program. The report projects that the lead submarine may be delivered 12 to 16 months late—between October 2028 and February 2029—jeopardizing planned operational readiness in 2030.
Persistent issues such as late materials, incomplete design products, and inexperienced staff undermine construction performance. The GAO estimates cost overruns in the hundreds of millions of dollars, far exceeding optimistic US Navy and shipbuilder estimates. Additionally, the report criticizes the US Navy for inadequate cost and schedule analysis, limiting effective risk management and corrective actions.
These challenges are critical when the US faces renewed great power competition and potential nuclear brinksmanship. The US 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns that by the 2030s, the US will encounter two major nuclear powers—China and Russia—as strategic competitors and potential adversaries for the first time in history.
In light of that growing challenge, Philip Sheers and others argue in a May 2024 article for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that while the US cannot stop China and Russia from joining it as top nuclear powers, it can take specific steps to mitigate the consequences.
They emphasize the importance of continuing to modernize the US nuclear arsenal while adopting new approaches to deterrence in a more complex, multipolar world. By doing so, the US can maintain its strategic edge and adapt to the evolving security environment.
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