Ukrainian Media Outlet RBC-Ukraine: 'The Chinese Factor – Why Beijing Is Saving Russia's Economy And What The U.S. And Europe Are Going To Do About It'

Memri

16 hours ago

On August 12, 2025, ahead of the meeting between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, Ukrainian media outlet RBC-Ukraine published an article titled "The Chinese Factor – Why Beijing Is Saving Russia's Economy And What The U.S. And Europe Are Going To Do About It." The article assessed that the United States and the European Union "perceive the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war as just one element of a broader settlement of their relations with China."
(Source: China Daily)
Below is a translation of the RBC-Ukraine article:[1]
"Real Measures To Limit China's Role In The War [In Ukraine] Are Rarely Taken"
"'Hopefully, China can help us stop the war with, in particular, Russia... they have a great deal of power over that situation, and we'll work with them,' Donald Trump made this statement on January 23, back in the first days of his presidency.
"These words were expected. Ukraine has long been trying to convey to its partners the thesis that it's because of China that Russia is still able to continue the war. As statements by European and American politicians demonstrate, Brussels and Washington understand the destructive role of the Tianxia [the PRC],[2] but there are nuances. Thus, real measures to limit China's role in the war are rarely taken.
"Be that as it may, over the past few months, contacts between the U.S. and China, as well as between China and the European Union, have intensified. This offers at least a faint prospect of a slight change in the Middle Kingdom's stance.
"Officially, Beijing claims neutral position and advocates for 'negotiations, ceasefire, and peace.' But as RBC-Ukraine has reported, everything that the Russians require to continue waging war comes almost openly from China. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service, as of early 2025, 80 percent of critical electronics for Russian drones were of Chinese origin.
"Ultimately, China is indirectly financing Russian aggression by purchasing oil and gas from the Kremlin for its own benefit. Moscow has offered Beijing a discount – according to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, by 2027, the cost of Russian gas for China will be 28 percent lower than prices for Europe and Turkey.
"Exactly how much profit Russia gets from exports to China is unknown. The final price of oil is a commercial secret. However, even the minimum amount of income plays into the hands of Russians, as it allows them to maintain [the oil] wells in operating condition, rather than engage in their expensive and complex conservation. '[First,] provided such a ban on Russian oil exports were to happen, Russia would certainly face the problem of what to do with its oil. Second, there would be the problem of reduced revenue from oil sales. And third, there would be the problem of what to do with the [oil] production,' Mikhail Gonchar, president of the 'Strategy XXI' Analytics Center, told to RBC-Ukraine.
"However, there are other trends. For instance, Russian coal exports to China have dropped sharply since the end of last year. Combined with the closure of the European market to Russia, this has already led to mass work stoppages in mines in Russia's coal-producing regions and local economic crises. As noted by The Moscow Times, 51 of Russia's 179 coal enterprises are at risk of closure. In addition, China has stopped purchasing winter wheat and barley from Russia, which delivered a tangible blow to Russian farmers."
"China's Goals in the Russo-Ukraine War"
"Such a policy, when China, on the one hand, provides limited help to Russia, and on the other, weakens it – has a clear logic from Beijing's perspective. 'The fundamental issue for China, is for Russia to remain under the rule of the current regime (under Putin's rule). China does not need a pro-Western regime on its 3,200-kilometer border. Therefore, it is best to have a creeping war, in which Russia neither loses nor wins,' former Ukrainian ambassador to Japan Sergei Korsunsky told RBC-Ukraine.
"Provided Russia loses the war, several possible scenarios appear at once. The most threatening [scenario] for China is the downfall of Putin's regime and the rise to power of forces determined to restore relations with the West.
"Wherein, Russia's victory in the war will make Putin's regime even more aggressive and bold, and not only toward Europe, but also toward China itself. Despite declarations and assurances of strategic partnership, there are many contradictions between China and Russia, particularly territorial ones. At the very least, Russia will be able to 'flex its muscles' over China in terms of energy supplies.
"That is why, for example, there is no talk of direct supplies of Chinese arms to Russia. Such deliveries could have significantly strengthened the aggressor. Therefore, Russia currently receives direct military assistance only from North Korea and, to a certain extent, from Iran. But the context of relations with the United States remains central to China's strategic calculations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told the EU's top diplomat, Kaja Kallas,[3] that China 'cannot accept Russia losing the war against Ukraine, as this would allow the U.S. to focus all its attention on China.'
"Despite the fact that these words were published by Hong Kong's 'South China Morning Post' newspaper, citing unnamed sources, there are all indications that the 'leak' was controlled, that China sent a clear signal to the entire world."
"U.S.-China: An Uneasy Dialogue"
"There has been a long-standing competition for influence – from Southeast Asia to Africa and Latin America, between the two most powerful countries in the modern world – the U.S. and China. Trump personally worries about the serious trade imbalance with China. And finally, the two countries continue to struggle for world technological leadership, in particular in relation to artificial intelligence. All these factors overlap. 'China needs to have cheap energy sources because it is in a race with the U.S. regarding artificial intelligence [development]. AI requires an incredible [supply of] energy. And in order to provide it, one needs to have the corresponding sources. And Russia is the ideal supplier,' Sergei Korsunsky argued.
"In this context, Taiwan, with its very specific international status, is also important for China. Among other things, the island is known for hosting the most advanced chip manufacturing companies. Officially, China declares its desire to 'return' Taiwan [to the mainland] but has not yet taken any real steps in this direction. However, according to Korsunsky, such a prospect is quite viable. And this means the possible involvement of the U.S. in the defense of Taiwan, with the likelihood of being drawn into a full-scale war with China.
"There are now signals coming from the U.S. that should reduce tensions around Taiwan. For example, on July 29, the U.S. allowed the American company NVIDIA to supply China with advanced chips for H20 for artificial intelligence. 'This is what China lacks. It can only obtain [microchips] from Taiwan. And the fact that the U.S. has allowed NVIDIA to supply them to China is a certain compromise,' Sergey Korsunsky said.
"At the same time, the U.S.-China trade negotiations continue. Back in 2024, China exported approximately $439 billion worth of goods to the U.S., meanwhile the U.S. supplied only $144 billion worth of goods to China. As a result, the trade deficit reached $295 billion, which is approximately one percent of U.S. GDP.
"Trump's goal in the negotiations is to facilitate conditions for a gradual decrease in the trade deficit, at the same time obtaining preferences for American suppliers in China. On July 28-29 the two delegations met [to discuss] this issue in Stockholm. An agreement was not reached, although both sides agreed to continue the dialogue.
"Trump has threatened to reinstate draconian trade tariffs on all Chinese goods if no progress is made. What's more, the U.S. is increasingly talking about the introduction of secondary tariffs, in the context of China's issue. Practically, this constitutes an additional 'penalty' for purchasing Russian energy resources, which will be added on top of the basic tariff rate. Moreover, a corresponding precedent already appeared last week.
"On August 6, Trump introduced by executive order an additional 25-percent trade tariff on imports from India, which had been purchasing Russian oil. According to the decree, if it is established that any other country is directly or indirectly importing Russian oil, a proposal to impose an additional 25 percent tariff against that country will be submitted to the U.S. president for consideration.
"India and China are clearly not equivalent for the U.S. in this context. The trade volume between the U.S. and India, although quite significant in absolute figures, is not so critical compared to the scale of the entire American economy. In turn, Beijing is a key trading partner for Washington, thus even 25 percent tariffs will significantly affect the cost of Chinese goods for ordinary Americans and the U.S. economy as a whole. In some spheres, such as rare earth metals, the U.S. dependence on China is bluntly critical. And these are things that Trump is forced to consider.
"The U.S. president briefly imposed trade tariffs on China in May of this year but then suspended them for 90 days. That period expires today, August 12. However, according to CNBC, just hours before the deadline, Trump postponed the tariffs against China for another three months.
"At the same time, the state of the PRC's own economy remains the key issue. As it is, the country already has structural problems due to the growing crisis in the real estate market, the growth of local government debts, and the decline in domestic consumption. Potential losses from new U.S. tariffs could exacerbate the situation.
"Naturally, China will make its final decision on both Russia and the broader deal with the U.S. by considering all these factors and after the U.S. takes corresponding steps, if any. September 3 comes as a good occasion for this; Donald Trump is expected to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
"However, even if the agreement on Russia becomes part of the Trump-Xi deal, it will not necessarily be made public, given the Chinese mentality. 'China cannot publicly cave to this pressure. These statements about energy sovereignty, that [China] themselves be able to decide from whom and what to buy... they just could not put it any differently. They need to save face in this situation,' political scientist Igor Reiterovich noted to the RBC-Ukraine.
"The Ukrainian authorities are considering two scenarios of how events could develop: The first one is that China will decide not to escalate the situation with the U.S. yet and will gradually prompt Russia to end the war; the second one is that China will choose the option of escalation with the U.S., in which case aid to Russia will continue and even increase. However, even if a direct agreement with China is not be reached, the U.S. has the ability to curb Russia's access to a number of dual-use goods.[4] The main thing is political will. 'The semiconductor market is controlled by four American companies [NVIDIA, Intel, AMD, and Applied Materials]. Minimal steps have already been made: paragraphs in contracts banning sales to Russia, preventive measures. But the companies are not yet reacting if these measures do not work,' Pavel Shkurenko, advisor on sanctions policy at the Kyiv School of Economics Research Institute, noted in a commentary to RBC-Ukraine.
"According to him, strict regulations are requirements, not recommendations. Ideally, if a component is found in a Russian weapon, a [corresponding] company such as Intel or AMD should pay a fine, this will prompt it to control where its manufactured products end up. 'As of now, the market is only trying to avoid direct supplies [to Russian companies], but if components end up in Russia, this is not perceived as a problem for manufacturers,' Shkurenko added."
"The EU's Stance On China Is Still Superficial"
"In the context of asserting pressure on China, the U.S. is trying to join forces with the European Union, which comes as the second largest market for Chinese goods. On July 21, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent directly urged Europe to join the secondary trade tariffs that the U.S. plans to impose on Russia's trading partners.
"The chances of this happening are increasing, especially since relations between Washington and Brussels have warmed in recent months. On July 28, the U.S. and the EU signed a new trade agreement, according to which the U.S. will have tariff-free access to the European market for its goods, while most products from the EU exported to the U.S. will be subject to 15 percent tariffs.
"The agreement also provides for an increase in U.S. energy supplies to EU member-states, which could replace Russian energy resources. Furthermore, the parties agreed to expand exports of U.S. weapons and military equipment to its European allies. Brussels makes no secret of the fact that a number of concessions to Trump on the economy are aimed at maintaining the U.S. military presence in Europe and assisting Ukraine.
"However, the EU's stance on China is still superficial. For instance, there are sanctions against Chinese companies, but their volumes are miniscule. 'All decisions on sanctions are passed unanimously by EU member-states in the EU Council. A number of Chinese companies have been already subjected to increased export controls,' the European Commission responded to a question from RBC-Ukraine.
"According to the European Commission's response, companies found to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex or circumventing EU sanctions can be added to this list. This means that the EU prohibits exporting dual-use goods, technologies, and advanced technological products to these companies, unless very specific exceptions apply. In total, there are 25 [of such] companies from China and Hong Kong [on the list]. 'It should be noted that this does not mean that we hold the jurisdiction (third country) in which they [listed companies] operate responsible for their actions,' stated in the European Commission.
"In addition, the restrictions in the latest sanctions package covered two Chinese banks – Heihe Rural Commercial Bank and Heilongjiang Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank, reads the EU Council statement. According to the EU's intel, they were engaged in cryptocurrency transactions that undermined the effectiveness of the sanctions. 'Politico' reports that more sanctions are being prepared against Chinese companies. Wherein, parts from European manufacturers are still being supplied to Russia via China and a number of other countries.
"Furthermore, the EU has not yet taken a stance on possibility to join secondary tariffs, which the U.S. is threatening to impose on buyers of Russian energy resources. 'We will not speculate on any measures that have not yet been adopted,' the response of the European Commission assessed."
"The U.S. And The EU Do Have Leverage Over China"
"As in the case of the U.S., the EU is carefully considering the consequences of putting pressure on China, not only for Europe as a whole, but also for individual member-states. Currently, the question of trade tariffs on electric vehicles from the PRC, whose supplies are undermining the position of European car manufacturers, remains one of the most problematic issues. In June of last year, the EU introduced anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles of up to 38 percent.
"In its turn, China also has leverage over the EU, controlling 90 percent of all rare earth element supplies. In April of this year, Beijing imposed restrictions on the export of these raw elements, which delivered a blow to the automotive and aerospace industries, as well as microchip manufacturers.
"Attempts to reach an agreement have been unsuccessful so far. At the EU-China summit held on July 24, a statement on combating climate change was the only document signed. And the Chinese shortened the summit itself to one day instead of the planned two. Not least because of the Russian context.
"During the summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa called on Chinese leader Xi Jinping to assert pressure on Russia and refrain from providing any material support to the Russian military-industrial complex.
"Xi Jinping responded to von der Leyen and Costa that the challenges facing Europe do not originate from China and urged the EU to 'properly deal with differences and frictions.' 'It is hoped that the European side will keep the market open for trade and investment and refrain from using restrictive economic and trade instruments,' Xi Jinping stressed.
"By the results of the talks, a European official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told 'AFP' agency that the EU was not demanding that China sever ties with Russia, but was calling for increased oversight to limit material support for Moscow.
"The bottom line is that the U.S. and the EU do have leverage over China. However, they have not yet seriously deployed it. Both Washington and Brussels perceive the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war as just one element of a broader settlement of their relations with China.
"All this automatically means the absence of any decisive actions in relation China. The emphasis will be on diplomacy. However, so far, all the behavior of American and European officials indicate that they will make final decisions based on the results of the negotiations in Alaska. But it remains unclear whether this is just another reason to postpone unpleasant decisions on Beijing."