London Chinese restaurant chain Ping Pong has shut all its branches with immediate effect
The Chinese restaurant group – which once had 12 locations across London – opened in 2005. The company announced news of its closure over instagram, writing: 'It's a wrap. After 20 unforgettable years, all Ping Pong locations are now permanently closed. We're incredibly proud of what we built, an independent hospitality brand full of creativity, flavour, and soul.'
Ping Pong fans were aghast at the closure, expressing their deep sorrow at the post. 'Noooooo. You were the best dim sum. Where am I going to get the veggie buns and sticky rice from?!', wrote one. 'This is incredibly sad news! Wish we'd have known. Would've loved to visit it one last time,' said another.
The restaurant's founder Kurt Zdesar, who left the group in 2007 and went on to launch the Chotto Matte chain, commented: 'The UK has become increasingly difficult to survive this current economical environment. Very sad news.'
At the time of its closure, there were four London branches of Ping Pong left; in Soho, Southbank, Bow Bells House and St Christopher's Place.
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