Israeli Likud party ministers urge Netanyahu to annex West Bank
They issued a petition ahead of Netanyahu's meeting next week with U.S. President Donald Trump, where discussions are expected to centre on a potential 60-day Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal with Hamas.
The petition was signed by 15 cabinet ministers and Amir Ohana, speaker of the Knesset, Israel's parliament.
There was no immediate response from the prime minister's office. Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, long a confidant of Netanyahu, did not sign the petition. He has been in Washington since Monday for talks on Iran and Gaza.
"We ministers and members of Knesset call for applying Israeli sovereignty and law immediately on Judea and Samaria," they wrote, using the biblical names for the West Bank captured by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war.
Their petition cited Israel's recent achievements against both Iran and Iran's allies and the opportunity afforded by the strategic partnership with the U.S. and support of Trump.
It said the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel demonstrated that the concept of Jewish settlement blocs alongside the establishment of a Palestinian state poses an existential threat to Israel.
'The task must be completed, the existential threat removed from within, and another massacre in the heart of the country must be prevented,' the petition stated.
Most countries regard Jewish settlements in the West Bank, many of which cut off Palestinian communities from one another, as a violation of international law.
With each advance of Israeli settlements and roads, the West Bank becomes more fractured, further undermining prospects for a contiguous land on which Palestinians could build a sovereign state long envisaged in Middle East peacemaking.
Israel's pro-settler politicians have been emboldened by the return to the White House of Trump, who has proposed Palestinians leave Gaza, a suggestion widely condemned across the Middle East and beyond.
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Mint
21 minutes ago
- Mint
Wall Street worries as crisis-level deficits become the government's default mode
U.S. budget deficits were already approaching $2 trillion when Republican lawmakers set out to extend and expand tax cuts this year. Interest rates were high and the bond market was jumpy, producing worrying spikes in borrowing costs. Republicans forged ahead anyway, defying warnings from Wall Street to Washington that they were pushing the country further down a dangerous fiscal path. On Thursday, the House voted in favor of the sprawling tax-and-spending bill that was passed on Tuesday by the Senate. The resulting legislation headed for President Trump's desk adds $3.4 trillion to federal deficits through 2034 compared with a scenario in which Congress did nothing, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The extent of the projected shortfall increased as the measure worked its way across Capitol Hill, as the Senate made some business tax breaks permanent. Economists, investors and politicians have often warned that the U.S.'s growing debt burden would punish future generations. The market has been willing to tolerate spikes in borrowing during crises such as a war or Covid, seeing it as a logical, and temporary, response to a sharp growth slowdown. What stands out now to those sounding the alarm the loudest is that America is bingeing on debt when there's no such emergency requiring it. The deficit as a share of the economy is already around the levels reached in the era of the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic. Many investors are concluding that financial profligacy isn't a bug, but rather a feature of U.S. policymaking. 'The government is like a teenager with a credit card that has no limits until it has to be paid," said Bill Gross, founder of Pimco. ''Payment due' comes not with default but with a weak dollar and higher interest rates." Trump and his GOP backers in Congress dismiss those bleak projections and, armed with their own budget math, paint a very different fiscal reality. They say tax cuts will accelerate growth and, along with new tariffs and heavy cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, will actually put the nation on sounder financial footing. The long-term verdict might be rendered in U.S. bond markets. The U.S. borrows money by issuing Treasurys, and an oversupply of those bonds would drive up yields, which rise when prices fall. Because interest rates on other debt are linked to Treasury yields, that would also lift costs on mortgages, car loans and corporate bonds. The market has been calm lately. But it has sent warning flares about the fiscal trajectory, most recently in May when yields on 30-year bonds climbed close to a two-decade high. Some investors, meanwhile, are concerned that massive debt projections are weighing on the dollar, which just posted its biggest first-half decline since 1973. The deficit, or annual gap between government revenue and spending, was $1.8 trillion, or around 6% of gross domestic product, last fiscal year. Moody's estimates it will reach nearly 9% of GDP by 2035, pushing publicly held federal debt—or the sum of all the annual shortfalls—from a little under 100% of GDP now to more than 130%. That compares to the previous record of 106% in 1946. Ken Rogoff, a Harvard University professor and former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund, said the U.S. is leaving itself little room to go on a borrowing binge when it really needs to. 'We typically look to borrow 20% or 30% of GDP in these big crises," he said. 'It's not clear markets will tolerate that." Even if Congress wasn't adding new tax cuts this year, federal debt would grow from around $29 trillion to $50 trillion in 2034, according to the CBO. The bill's advance, though hardly unexpected on Wall Street, has dimmed budget hawks' already modest hopes that lawmakers would make deficit reduction more of a priority. Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, warns that staying on the current path will ultimately lead to some mix of a bond-market slide, a severe economic contraction or an inflation-fueling intervention by the Federal Reserve. The GOP bill 'reflects a political system that favors indulging voters over prudence," he said. Trump says skyrocketing growth will avert any downsides. 'For all cost cutting Republicans, of which I am one, REMEMBER, you still have to get reelected," he wrote in a social-media post shortly before senators began voting on the bill earlier this week. 'Don't go too crazy! We will make it all up, times 10, with GROWTH, more than ever before." Members of Congress during the House vote on Thursday. The U.S. government borrows money to pay for the shortfall between what it collects in taxes and what it spends on programs, such as defense and Social Security, by issuing Treasury securities that mature over varying periods of time. Buyers of this debt range from foreign banks to hedge funds to everyday investors. In principle, Treasurys are subject to the forces of supply and demand, like any other item. If the government issues more Treasurys than investors want or need, it will need to win them over with higher interest rates. If investors are worried about that happening in the future, they will likely sell bonds now, causing an immediate jump in yields. Treasurys, though, have long been viewed as the ultimate safe investment, especially in rocky economic times, because they are backed by the world's richest country and are effectively guaranteed to be repaid at maturity. That has historically kept America's borrowing rates in check, even as the volume of debt grew. Yet deficit worries still go back a long way, in government and on Wall Street. Peter Peterson, the late co-founder of the Blackstone Group who also served as President Richard Nixon's secretary of commerce, became concerned when planning for a talk on President Ronald Reagan's budget in 1981. Its big increase in defense spending and substantial tax cuts didn't make sense to him, and he was especially worried about the looming costs of Social Security and other entitlement programs. 'To put the matter bluntly, Social Security is heading for a crash," he wrote in a 1982 essay so long that the New York Review of Books split it into two parts. That same year, Salomon Brothers chief economist Henry Kaufman, known as Dr. Doom for his pessimistic forecasts, warned that proposed tax cuts and the resulting deficits would effectively block recovery from an ongoing recession. Worries about the deficit flared up regularly in the decades that followed—taking a break in the 1990s when the Clinton administration briefly engineered a surplus. But the concerns were little more than minor impediments to a long bull market in bonds that dragged Treasury yields steadily lower. Rogoff, the Harvard professor, who with Carmen Reinhart wrote the 2009 book 'This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," has long argued that high levels of debt can weigh on growth. A 2012 paper he wrote with Reinhart and her husband, Vincent Reinhart, found that for advanced economies since 1800, debt levels above 90% of GDP corresponded to significantly lower levels of growth. The U.S. shot past that 90% threshold when the government spent massively in its efforts to bolster the economy during the pandemic. The overall level of America's GDP is significantly higher than what forecasters on the eve of the pandemic expected it would be in 2025, but Rogoff still thinks that at some level deficits matter. 'The appetite for U.S. debt may be very large, but it's clearly not infinite," he said. The Department of Treasury building in Washington. Nearly a third of publicly held U.S. debt is owned by foreigners, including foreign central banks. If they start worrying more about America's large debt load, they could become less willing holders. A wholesale dumping of U.S. debt by foreigners—a doomsday scenario—is extremely unlikely, according to Jeremy Stein, a Harvard economist who was a Fed governor from 2012 to 2014. 'But I wouldn't be surprised if, over the next couple of years, as their portfolios roll off and they have to reinvest, they start shifting that reinvestment more towards, say, Europe or German bonds," he said. Stein also worries that as the supply of Treasurys increases, hedge funds will become even bigger players in the market for U.S. debt. That could raise the odds of market disruptions, because fast-money traders occasionally run into problems that force them to sell. A mix of factors has created the current fiscal imbalance, including recessions, an aging population and rising federal assistance to households. Those spending policies were largely championed by Democrats. Republicans, meanwhile, have led the charge in cutting taxes. This year's budget negotiations revealed fissures among Republicans, with some expressing more concern about deficits than others. With the 2017 tax cuts set to expire at the end of the year, many in the party argued that an extension shouldn't count as a deficit increase because it was merely a continuation of current policy. Others, though, opposed that approach, citing concerns about national debt. House conservatives, led by Reps. Jodey Arrington (R., Texas) and Lloyd Smucker (R., Pa.), along with others such as Rep. Chip Roy (R., Texas), forced the House's budget framework to link tax cuts and spending cuts, with no more than a $2.5 trillion gap between them. By that approach, if the House could find $2 trillion in spending cuts, it could have $4.5 trillion in tax cuts. If it could only find $1.5 trillion, the tax cuts would have to shrink, too. 'We can't continue to have quote, a free lunch, by just saying that every single tax cut pays for itself," Roy said in an April interview. The House, on May 22, passed a version of the tax bill that adhered to those demands. CBO estimated that it would cost $2.4 trillion over a decade. In June, 38 Republicans led by Smucker signed a letter saying they wouldn't support legislation coming back from the Senate that violated their framework. Doing so, they wrote, 'would invite higher borrowing costs and undermine the economic growth that Americans need." 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If demand is stronger for shorter-term bonds, it makes sense to 'just give the investors what they want," said Blake Gwinn, head of U.S. rates strategy at RBC Capital Markets. Write to Sam Goldfarb at and Justin Lahart at
Indian Express
34 minutes ago
- Indian Express
Nuclear Iran is best bet for peace
The proliferation of nuclear arms is a net loss for global peace and security. It raises the risks of accidental war, empowers authoritarian regimes and undermines decades of nonproliferation efforts. From both a moral and strategic standpoint, it is better for Iran not to get the bomb. But what if it does? This is not a prediction nor a policy endorsement. It is a hypothesis grounded in the counterintuitive logic of deterrence theory and shaped by the failures of decades-long Western policy that have prioritised sanctions, limited engagement, covert sabotage and containment over comprehensive security guarantees to the Islamic Republic. In entertaining this possibility, I want to raise the uncomfortable but necessary question: Might Iran's acquisition of a nuclear deterrent actually lead to more stability in the Middle East? At the heart of this question lies a paradox as old as the nuclear age. Scholars and strategists alike — from Kenneth Waltz to Bernard Brodie — have pointed out that the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons creates powerful incentives for restraint. States that possess nuclear weapons are often more cautious, not less. Deterrence, for all its risks, has worked. The Cold War did not turn hot, despite multiple crises. India and Pakistan, bitter adversaries with a history of war, have avoided full-scale conflict since both became nuclear powers. And North Korea, for all its volatility, has managed to deter external intervention while pursuing strategic bargains with the outside world. Iran today is boxed in strategically — militarily inferior to Israel, diplomatically isolated from the West, and economically devastated by a combination of chronic internal mismanagement and severe international sanctions. Its regional ambitions are checked not only by rival Sunni states like Saudi Arabia (as in Yemen) but also by an emboldened Israel (since October 7, 2023) that now conducts military strikes and assassination campaigns on Iranian targets with near impunity. The result is a hyper-militarised deterrence environment, but one that is asymmetrical and unstable. Israel enjoys nuclear superiority; Iran relies on proxies and grey-zone tactics to exert influence and respond to threats. This imbalance has produced endless escalation cycles — from Syria to Gaza to the Persian Gulf — where miscalculations could spiral into full-blown war. The recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel is the perfect case in point. A nuclear Iran would alter this dynamic. First, it would constrain Israel's freedom of military action. The assumption that Israeli or US strikes will go unpunished — or that Iran will absorb blows without escalating — would no longer hold. A credible Iranian deterrent would inject caution into Israeli planning, especially in moments of political recklessness or brinkmanship. It would make the cost of war explicit. And history suggests that when adversaries both possess nuclear weapons, they become more risk-averse, not less. Second, a nuclear weapon could moderate Iran's behaviour. This may sound counterintuitive, but again, history offers precedent. Once a state has secured a nuclear deterrent, its need to rely on destabilising asymmetric tactics — proxies, insurgencies, covert operations — tends to decrease. Nuclear security allows for strategic maturity. India after 1998, China after 1964, and even the Soviet Union in the late Cold War period — all became more status quo-oriented and less revisionist after going nuclear. Possession of the bomb doesn't make a state benevolent, but it does force it to act like a state: Accountable, strategic, and aware of its own vulnerability. Would Iran follow this pattern? It's impossible to say. The regime is ideologically driven and repressive. But it is also calculating. Its leaders have repeatedly shown a capacity for pragmatism when the survival of the regime is at stake, as evidenced by the ceasefire that ended the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the nuclear deal in 2015, and the most recent ceasefire with Israel. A nuclear deterrent might compel the Islamic Republic to moderate from within, as ideological paranoia gives way to pragmatic coexistence. The Middle East is already a nuclearised environment. Israel has the bomb. The US has military assets in the region capable of delivering nuclear strikes. Iran operates under constant existential threat. The question is not whether a nuclear Middle East is ideal — it is not — but whether it would be more stable if Iran, too, had the kind of deterrent that forces enemies to think twice before acting. This hypothesis is not an argument for acquiescence. The goal should still be diplomatic engagement, arms control, and regional dialogue. But if those efforts fail — and they are failing — then we should at least ask: Would a nuclear Iran be less dangerous than a cornered, insecure, and conventionally belligerent one? A nuclear Iran may well freeze the battlefield rather than ignite it, and that may be the best peace the region can hope for. The writer is associate professor of International Studies at the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Indiana University, and the author of several books on Iran's political development and US-Iran relations
Indian Express
34 minutes ago
- Indian Express
It makes the world more dangerous
In the mid-1950s, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, initiated the country's nuclear journey. Amidst stiff opposition from its principal supporter, the United States, and with discreet help from France, Tel Aviv built its nuclear programme by the end of the 1960s. Today, Israel is widely known as a non-declared nuclear weapons state. This exclusive status is often compared to Iran's nuclear programme of today, which was targeted by US President Donald Trump on June 22 as B-2 stealth bombers of the US Air Force dropped 14,000 kg bunker-buster bombs on three of the country's nuclear sites — Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Iran's nuclear programme has been the centre of delicate political brinkmanship for years. It began under the rule of the former pro-West Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and was pitched as civilian in nature, developed around former US President Dwight D Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' initiative. Tehran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, committing to not attaining nuclear weapon capabilities. All its Arab neighbours are also signatories to the NPT. Internationally, only a handful of nations, including Israel, India, and Pakistan, remain outside the agreement's ambit. In 2003, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. This, within Iranian polity, is seen as strong an indictment against nuclear weapons as possible coming straight from the ideological leadership. But today, Iran may be on the cusp of exiting the NPT. A broader nuclearisation of West Asia has been a subject of discussion for many years, and in more contemporary times, Iran has been at the centre of this. Tehran's nuclear brinkmanship could arguably be more related to protecting and sustaining the political system set up post the 1979 Islamic Revolution than the bomb itself. It used this strategy to pull in Western powers, negotiate, and mainstream the state back into the international system via the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. However, questions over its enrichment activities under the NPT have lingered for years, raising suspicion, fear, and anxiety about Iran's intent, especially in Israel. Over the years, Israel has publicly raised fears that Iran was rushing towards a nuclear weapon as it pushed back against the JCPOA. Under Trump, Israel eventually found success, as whispers about intelligence suggesting Iran had materials to build nine warheads reached Trump's ears. Trump ignored even his own intelligence apparatus, which had aired doubts. The Israel-Iran conflict is now central to the region's security debate. While speculation continues over the kind of damage the US air strikes have really caused, and how much of a setback has been dealt to potential weaponisation, the path forward could also accelerate nuclearisation instead of deterring it. The impact of nuclear weapons dictating the strategic calculus in West Asia will not be geographically limited — it will be global. Arguments around the validity of nuclear weapons and their relationship to the protection of sovereignty and power cannot be dismissed. Especially at a time when international norms put in place predominantly by the West after World War II face a potential collapse. The latter is giving rise to a strategic calculus of 'might is right' for the future. And there is no better deterrence than a nuclear weapon. Recently, North Korea has proved this. Whether Iran remains adamant on gaining nuclear deterrence is an open-ended question after the recent strikes. Israel will do its best to preserve its newfound status as the region's primary military power. Irrespective of who holds power in Tehran — moderates, conservatives or ultra-conservatives — the probability of a unanimous view that nuclear weaponisation is the only way to prevent a repeat of June 2025 may solidify. And if this happens, a domino effect could play out where nuclear shields — one Arab, one Iranian, and a publicly acknowledged Israeli one — cannot be discounted. Former prime minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto perhaps best described a cornered state's vision of what nuclear capabilities can provide and how it can be marketed to a population. In 1977, according to various accounts, Bhutto said, 'A Jewish bomb, a Christian bomb, now a Hindu bomb. Why not an Islamic bomb?' Pakistan is the only nuclear Islamic country, and its know-how in this regard is widely accepted to be transferable to its Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia if need be. In the end, attaining nuclear weapons in today's day and age is not a technical challenge but a political decision that has long-lasting ramifications. West Asia should make such a decision cautiously and wisely. The writer is deputy director and fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation
