Military Digest: When India offered Poonch and some areas of Kashmir valley to Pakistan as J-K settlement

Indian Express

6 days ago

On July 29, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed Lok Sabha and stated that between 1962 and 1963, leaders of the then ruling party proposed the surrender of key regions in Jammu and Kashmir (J-K), including Poonch, Uri, Neelam Valley, and Kishanganga.
J-K has been the subject of three wars and a limited conflict between India and Pakistan, besides the insurgency which Pakistan has actively spawned since the late 1980s in the state. In view of PM Modi's remarks, it is worth going back in history to look at some of the forgotten aspects of the negotiations between India and Pakistan on J-K.
Proposals from 1955 meeting and India's response
Documents, text of letters and minutes of meetings held on the J-K negotiations form part of an exhaustive book on the subject titled India Pakistan Relations 1947-2007, An Exhaustive Study, edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin and published in cooperation with Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Minutes of the meetings between then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru his Pakistan counterpart Mohammad Ali and Interior Minister Iskander Mirza at New Delhi, May 15, 16 and 17, 1955, throw light on the aspect of offer of transfer of Poonch and other areas to Pakistan.
Union education minister Maulana Azad and home minister Govind Ballabh Pant were present in these meetings. In the meeting held on May 15, 1955, Iskander Mirza broached the subject of Pakistan having a common defence with India. He pointed out the dangers of the Persian Gulf being occupied by a hostile power and that the defence of the Persian Gulf depended upon Pakistan and India.
Nehru did not agree. 'I said that we would like to coordinate our defence policies as well as other policies with Pakistan, but what exactly did common defence mean. Against whom was it intended? Presumably against the Soviet Union. I could not conceive of the Soviet Union attacking Pakistan or India. There was a possibility, in case of war, of the Persian Gulf being threatened,' he said in his response.
He would continue, 'Even that was a contingency that would only arise in case of a world war when of course military and strategic conditions would be considered from a world point of view. The major theatres of war would be Europe and the far East. The Middle East might be in danger but nothing much would depend upon it. The real issue would be determined elsewhere.'
Nehru referred to some broad proposals made on behalf of the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, which proposed that a large piece of territory in Jammu, north of the Chenab, should be transferred to Pakistan and the Kashmir valley should be under the control of some kind of joint army.
'I pointed out that these proposals were completely impractical. I could not conceive of any kind of joint control of Kashmir for practical reasons. From constitutional reasons also, it had to be ruled out. As for large tracts of territory north of Chenab being transferred, this was quite out of the question. No one on our side could possibly think of this. We could never get people to agree to it, and it would create enormous problems of migration, etc. I also pointed out that this would mean cutting off a small area of Jammu left with India, from Kashmir,' said Nehru.
The Pakistani delegation said something had to be done to make the Pakistani people feel that they had gained something. Nehru was asked what the least or the most that the Indian government would accept.
'I said that was difficult for me to indicate precisely the variations in the present ceasefire line. That would depend on geographical, administrative and other factors. These would have to be considered carefully by people on both sides. I pointed out for instance that the northern ceasefire line was not a happy one. The Kishanganga was a suitable line but actually the ceasefire line was a few miles away. These considerations might apply to other places too on both sides,' said Nehru.
'Apart from these minor alterations, I said that I thought it might be possible to consider the transfer of a certain part of the Poonch area which was on the Indian side. I was asked what part. I said I could not say definitely because I was not acquainted with the exact position but, roughly speaking, the Poonch area. Even this transfer, I added, might involve the migration of about fifty thousand persons from the areas transferred. That in itself would be a grave problem,' he added.
Nehru also said one of the reasons for suggesting the Poonch area was the fact that it was a major recruiting ground for the Pakistan army and many people in its army came from that area.
In the meeting held on May 16, 1955, certain proposals made in past by the Pakistan Governor General were discussed. These proposals were that a large area of the Jammu province, including Poonch, Reasi, Udhampur, etc., should be transferred to Pakistan, that Skardu might be transferred to India, and that Kargil area should be attached to Kashmir and should be governed by future decisions about Kashmir.
The meeting also proposed that there should be some joint control by India and Pakistan, both political and military, of this Kashmir area. A kind of plebiscite of the Kashmir area, from five to 20 years hence, was envisaged.
Nehru was quoted as saying that he was much surprised to receive these proposals and could not even consider them. 'It was quite impossible for us to transfer these large areas to Pakistan. No government in India could do it, apart from this involving huge political and social upheavals in these areas which were settled and progressing satisfactorily. We were not very much interested in the Skardu area which was very sparsely populated and mountainous,' he said.
'As for joint control of Kashmir, this was unthinkable, and such a thing had not happened anywhere before with success. Kashmir was an autonomous area and we could not deal with it in this way. As for Jammu areas, I again pointed out that these large transfers were not at all feasible or desirable. It might be possible for us, as I had hinted, to consider the Poonch area in this connection,' added Nehru.
In the next meeting on May 17, Maulana Azad said the Indian government had been aiming at a final settlement of the J-K issue. Azad suggested the transfer of the area of Poonch and a bit of Mirpur, which were on the Indian side of the ceasefire line.
The minutes include a comment in brackets which quoted Nehru as saying, 'I had not mentioned Mirpur in this connection to the Pakistan Ministers previously but I had mentioned it to Maulana Sahib and Pantji. But Maulana Sahib had perhaps thought that I had mentioned this to the others also.' Nehru was also quoted as saying that India had gone as far as it could.
'This had not been previously referred to by UN (United Nations) but since Maulana Sahib had mentioned it, he would include that too with Poonch as the area which might be transferred to Pakistan. But it must be clearly understood that there could be no transfer of Poonch, etc., except on the basis of a final settlement. The map was again examined in an attempt to find out what exactly Pakistan wanted,' the minutes state.
The talks were inconclusive and a joint communication issued at the end of talks between the prime ministers on May 18, 1955, blandly mentioned, 'In the course of the joint talks, the Kashmir problem was discussed fully in all its aspects. It was decided to continue these talks at a later stage after full consideration has been given by both governments to the various points that had been discussed in the course of these meetings.'
The 1963 offer on ceding areas of Kashmir valley
This offer was made during the third round of discussions held between India and Pakistan in February 1963 in Karachi. India was represented by Railways minister Swaran Singh and Pakistan by foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The briefing given by the commonwealth secretary Y D Gundevia at the coordination meeting of the MEA in New Delhi on February 21, 1963 states, 'On the second day, the two Ministers settled down to a discussion of a possible delineation of a boundary line. Minister Swaran Singh indicated certain areas west of the Valley and north of the Valley, and our readiness to concede in favour of Pakistan the rich forest areas in the north, on both sides of the Kishenganga river.'
Bhutto, in turn, responded that, according to Pakistan's criteria, only a little more than the Kathua district on the Punjab border, in the extreme south of Kashmir, could be given to India, Pakistan being entitled to the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, right up to Ladakh in the north-east and including the Valley, as well as the southern areas, including Jammu, Udhampur, Aknur, Reasi, etc.
'The Pakistani offer was, obviously, ridiculous; but in the two but in the two last discussions Mr. Bhutto kept saying that unless we 'advanced on the map' and also agreed to discuss 'the problem of the Valley' in isolation, there could not be further talks. We said that we were content; and perhaps, the best course would be to report the results to our respective Governments and then decide whether any further talks were possible,' the document states.
Nehru made a statement in Parliament on the India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir and other related matters on August 13, 1963. He said that during the talks, India not only exercised great patience and restraint, 'but also offered generous concessions, though in vain, in the hope of winning Pakistan's friendship and opening a new chapter of fruitful cooperation between the two countries'.
He added that while India continues to cherish this hope, there is little possibility of a settlement so long as Pakistan persists in its irrational animus against India.