NIA arrests 11th key conspirator in ISIS Pune sleeper module case
Rizwan Ali alias Abu Salma alias Mola is the 11th accused to be arrested in the case and had carried a reward of Rs three lakh for information leading to his capture.
The NIA Special Court had also issued a standing Non Bailable Warrant (NBW) against Rizwan, who was actively involved in promoting the terror activities of the designated foreign terror outfit, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
As part of the anti-India conspiracy of the ISIS, which is also known by various other names, NIA said, Rizwan had played an active role in the reconnaissance and recce of various locations for use as terrorist hideouts, according to the agency.
'Rizwan was also involved in conducting firing classes and training in the fabrication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED),' said the NIA.
Along with the 10 other accused already arrested and in judicial custody, Rizwan had conspired to commit a series of terror acts to destabilise the country and spread communal disharmony, said the agency.
Besides Rizwan Ali, the other arrested sleeper cell members are identified as Mohammed Imran Khan, Mohammed Yunus Saki, Abdul Kadir Pathan, Simab Nasiruddin Kazi, Zulfikar Ali Barodawala, Shamil Nachan, Akif Nachan, Shahnawaz Alam, Abdullah Faiyaz Shaikh and Talha Khan. All the accused have been chargesheeted by NIA under various sections of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Explosive Substances Act, Arms Act and Indian Penal Code (IPC).
NIA said it is continuing with its investigation in the case as part of its efforts to scuttle the ISIS or IS conspiracy to establish Islamic rule in the country through violence and terror, by waging a war against the Government of India. (ANI)
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