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PM Modi expected to visit Japan, China in late August for SCO summit
After a gap of over seven years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to travel to China later this month to attend the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), people familiar with the matter said on Wednesday.
According to the plan, Modi will embark on a visit to Japan around August 29 and after concluding the trip, he will travel to the northern Chinese city of Tianjin for the SCO summit to be held on August 31-September 1.
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The prime minister's visit to China is being planned amid efforts by the two sides to repair their bilateral ties which came under severe strain following the deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan Valley in June 2020.
There is no official confirmation yet on Modi's two-nation visit to Japan and China. The visit is likely to take place from August 29 to September 1.
Ahead of Modi's trip to China, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is set to visit India for the next edition of the Special Representatives dialogue on the boundary question, it is learnt.
Prime Minister Modi last visited China in June, 2018 to attend the SCO summit. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India in October 2019 for the second 'informal summit'.
However, the relationship came under stress due to the eastern Ladakh border face-off.
The military standoff in eastern Ladakh began in May 2020 and the clashes at the Galwan Valley in June that year resulted in a severe strain in ties.
The face-off effectively ended following completion of the disengagement process from the last two friction points of Demchok and Depsang under an agreement finalised on October 21 last year.
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In the last few months, both sides revived the Special Representative dialogue on boundary question and other dialogue mechanisms.
The decision to revive various dialogue mechanisms was taken at a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi in Kazan (Russia) on October 23, 2024.
The Modi-Xi meeting came two days after India and China firmed up a disengagement pact for Depsang and Demchok.
The two sides also took a number of initiatives to rebuild the ties that included resumption of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and New Delhi restarting issuance of tourist visas to Chinese nationals.
Both sides are also discussing modalities to resume direct flight services between the two countries.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and NSA Ajit Doval visited China in the last two months to attend SCO meetings.
China is the current chair of the SCO.
It is not immediately clear whether PM Modi and President Xi will hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit.
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It is expected that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be among the top leaders who will participate in the SCO summit.
The SCO, comprising India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Belarus, is an influential economic and security bloc that has emerged as one of the largest transregional international organisations.
It was founded at a summit in Shanghai in 2001 by the presidents of Russia, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Pakistan became its permanent member along with India in 2017. Iran joined the grouping in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.
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