Ahmede Hussain on Bangladesh After the Monsoon Revolution
On August 5, 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee Bangladesh, taking refuge across the border in India. She was driven not only out of power but out of the country by a wave of public anger – ostensibly caused by the resurrection of a controversial quota system for government jobs, but more accurately the culmination of a decade-and-a-half of mounting repression, extrajudicial violence, and corruption.
Days after Hasina's ouster, Bangladesh had a new government, headed by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. That remains the situation today. What has changed in the year since then, and where is Bangladesh headed next?
Ahmede Hussain, a Bangladeshi writer and journalist, looks back on the past year, from the origins of the July 2024 revolution to the country's current status. He notes that Bangladesh is at an inflection point: 'If free and fair elections take place – where every citizen can vote – it could mark a new beginning for a country that's becoming an increasingly important player in the Indo-Pacific.'
The first step? 'Making sure no one is ever allowed to become another Hasina.'
Let's start a year ago: What was the initial cause of the protests in July 2024 that culminated in the fall of the Sheikh Hasina/Awami League government? Beyond the proximate cause, what was at the core of popular anger at the government?
The events of July 2024 might have surprised many, but in truth, discontent had been simmering in Bangladesh for quite some time. The immediate trigger was the reinstatement of a controversial quota system in civil service exams, which allocated a disproportionate number of government jobs to the descendants of those who fought in the Liberation War. This issue had been resolved back in 2018, following widespread protests, when the government agreed to scrap the provision.
But things took a turn after Sheikh Hasina returned to power in a widely disputed election early last year – an election so discredited that even many within her own party didn't turn out to vote. Voter turnout was abnormally low. With the opposition in disarray, she seemed emboldened and began entertaining the idea of reintroducing the quota system.
Government jobs remain highly sought-after among fresh graduates, and the quota touched a nerve. Despite the narrative of economic progress often promoted in the media, Bangladesh under Hasina's rule remained deeply corrupt. A small group of politically connected business elites were allowed to plunder the economy, while ordinary citizens faced growing repression – enforced disappearances, severe limits on free speech, and an increasingly authoritarian climate where people could be picked up for something as minor as sharing a meme deemed disrespectful to Hasina, her father, or her allies.
By mid-July, it all boiled over. Years of frustration finally erupted, and given the government's long-standing disregard for dissent, the scale of the backlash shouldn't have come as a surprise. Frankly, Hasina and her party, the Awami League, had it coming.
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The Diplomat
a day ago
- The Diplomat
Bangladesh Interim Government's Weakened Counterterrorism Approach
A year after the fall of the Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh, the interim administration led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus finds itself at a critical juncture. While the government has focused on political and economic reforms, a concerning shift has occurred in its approach to counterterrorism (CT). The proactive and zero-tolerance stance of the previous administration has been replaced by what many insiders describe as a 'too soft approach,' creating a vacuum that militants are reportedly exploiting to reorganize and re-establish their networks. Radical preaching and propaganda activities continue unabated in both online and on-the-ground spaces, something that, many observers feel, might lead to mass radicalization, especially of youth. One of the key trends observed over the past year is the merging of traditional religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh with a more hardline ideology propagated by a new generation of urban and tech-savvy extremists with mainstream academic backgrounds. These new actors leverage their educational credentials and digital expertise to portray violent ideologies as intellectually and morally sound, which resonates with a younger, urban, and educated demographic. The trend has intensified since the August 2024 regime change in Dhaka, which allowed previously isolated extremist groups to forge alliances on common platforms to organize public events in the major cities of Bangladesh. A Shift in Counterterrorism Policy The current problem stems from a major policy shift by the interim government, which has not only publicly downplayed the threat of terrorism and extremism but has also actively disempowered the very agencies meant to combat it. Although the culture of denial is not new, what is new is the crippling of the security agencies by deliberately diverting them from counterterrorism. Experienced counterterrorism professionals have been sidelined, dismissed, or transferred to insignificant posts. Others have faced intimidation through police cases. This has created an internal crisis that has severely limited these agencies' ability to proactively respond to threats. According to multiple security and intelligence sources who spoke to this writer on condition of anonymity, there are significant concerns that Bangladesh's security agencies have become 'toothless tigers,' unable to operate effectively without the government's backing — a backing that is conspicuously absent. This is described as a direct consequence of a deep-seated lack of trust between the new cabinet and the security services. Many in the interim government reportedly harbor resentment from their past harassment under the previous regime, and this 'bitter experience has shaped their perception.' The result is a breakdown in communication and coordination, with once-regular inter-agency anti-terrorism meetings having ground to a halt. Dangerous Consequences This 'too soft approach' has negative consequences. A disturbing trend has emerged of convicted Islamist militants, some sentenced to life imprisonment or even death, being released on bail, often without any public explanation for their release. Many of these bails were granted under questionable circumstances, and it is not known if due procedure was followed. Security agencies believe that several high-ranking influential figures within the interim government are deliberately facilitating the release of convicted Islamist militants or at least have taken no action to prevent this trend, which has become normalized. This is compounded by an ineffective prosecution system, where the Attorney General's office is seen as a bottleneck that does not build effective cases against the accused. According to some observers, the presence of controversial figures in the Yunus government, such as an advisor with alleged ties to the proscribed group Hizb-ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), only deepens the concern that this shift is not merely a matter of neglect but a deliberate strategy. A New Political Landscape: The Rise of Islamist Forces The political landscape is also undergoing a dramatic transformation, favoring the rise of Islamist forces. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a party with a controversial history of taking part in genocide and crimes against humanity during Bangladesh's Liberation War in 1971, is re-emerging as a significant and highly organized political force. A massive public rally in Dhaka on July 19 showcased its renewed strength. While the government says it is allowing the JI to participate in elections, some people are afraid that a potential alliance between the JI and a new student-led party, the National Citizen Party, could give these groups a lot of power in the government. Reports of a radical Bangladeshi cleric, Amir Hamza, who travelled to Singapore in August 2024 and illegally engaged with a group of Bangladeshi migrant workers there, further illustrate the potential for international networks to operate with disturbing ease. The cleric, who was on bail in Bangladesh while awaiting trial for terrorism-related activities, was given a nomination later in May 2025 by JI to contest in the upcoming general elections. A Growing Threat Besides, the international connections of high-profile Bangladeshi militants should be of concern to Dhaka. Shamin Mahfuz, former leader of the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and a key figure in the Jama'atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, who was recently arrested, is known to have ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Another radical figure, Asif Adnan, who was previously arrested for terrorist activities but released largely due to his family's connections, is now again under surveillance after being named in a case for preparing for 'Jihad by TTP.' The alleged links between Bangladeshi militants and the TTP are particularly concerning and have drawn the attention of global security agencies. While government officials indicate that the government, if willing, can take firm legal action (including cancellation of passports) against citizens traveling for militant training, the bigger question remains whether the TTP has established a foothold within Bangladesh. The Debate Over the Nature of the Threat Allegations of militant links among Bangladeshi citizens in Malaysia and Pakistan have reignited the debate over extremism in Bangladesh. The interim government's denial of the existence of militancy in the country stands in stark contrast to the AL government's robust approach, which some Islamist leaders had dismissed as a 'drama.' These leaders argue that while past violence was real, the previous government exaggerated the threat to suppress political opposition. Conversely, some analysts contend that jihadi terrorism was indeed a significant issue, pointing to attacks like the one in 2016 at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka. They suggest that the current lack of overt attacks might not signal the end of extremism, but rather its shift from violent acts to a more subtle infiltration of mainstream politics, where extremist ideologies are promoted without the need for traditional terrorist operations. A Dangerous Path A year into its term, Bangladesh's interim government has created a precarious security environment by weakening its counterterrorism apparatus. By disempowering its security agencies and publicly downplaying the threat, the government has created a vacuum that militants are reportedly exploiting. This, along with a changing political landscape that favors Islamist groups and the continued presence of dangerous militants with international ties, is cause for serious concern. The government may believe its 'soft approach' will lead to peace, but it risks creating a much bigger and longer-lasting security crisis, not just for Bangladesh but for the entire region. For some optimists, there's a ray of hope: the Bangladeshi authorities are at least engaging with key radical leaders without giving it much publicity, and claim to have 'softened' their views. But the reality is that these figures still have a big influence on many people through their hateful lectures and online content, which affects social cohesion and has critical security ramifications. Bangladesh's interim government must comprehensively review the impact of its policies, address the gaps, and recalibrate them. On July 28, Yunus met with U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Tracey Ann Jacobson and declared his government's 'zero tolerance' for terrorism, vowing to eliminate all terrorists from Bangladeshi soil. Now it is time for Yunus to walk the talk.
Nikkei Asia
a day ago
- Nikkei Asia
Thousands join Bangladesh rallies and concerts a year after Hasina's ouster
DHAKA (Reuters) -- Thousands of exultant Bangladeshis gathered in the capital of Dhaka on Tuesday for rallies, concerts, and prayer sessions to mark the first anniversary of deadly protests that ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The events will culminate in a declaration touted as a roadmap for democratic reform in the political journey from an uprising sparked by economic woes and repression to rule by an interim government led by Nobel peace laureate Muhammad Yunus. "Together, we will build a Bangladesh where tyranny will never rise again," Yunus said in a message to the nation a year after protests forced Hasina to flee to neighbouring India, as he paid tribute to those who sacrificed their lives. A peaceful, fair, and transparent election could be held early next year, Yunus said, pledging a return to full democratic rule at a time of mounting pressure for a swifter transition amid growing labour unrest. "Fallen autocrats and their self-serving allies remain active," he warned, urging unity to protect the gains of the uprising while his government holds reform talks with political parties and civil society. His interim government had launched sweeping reforms, he added, while trials for those responsible for the "July killings" were progressing swiftly. Crowds waving flags, holding placards, and chanting slogans gathered near parliament, including some who had been injured in the protests. "On this day in 2024, the tyrant Sheikh Hasina fled the country," said Ahmedul Hasan, who was accompanied by his sister. "I was here last year too. I've come again to remember that moment and join the celebrations." Others were less exuberant, however. "Even after all the bloodshed and sacrifice, a truly liberal democracy in Bangladesh still feels like a distant dream," said Sabbir Ahmed, a college student who participated in protests last year, speaking from his home district of Jamalpur. Police were on high alert throughout the capital, with armored vehicles patrolling the streets to deter any attempt by Hasina's banned Awami League to disrupt the day's events. "Let this anniversary not be a day of retrospection, but a rallying cry for a brighter tomorrow," Hasina said in an open letter to the people of Bangladesh, adding that she had never resigned from her duties as prime minister. "Bangladesh has overcome adversity before, and we will rise again, stronger, more united, and more determined to build a democracy that truly serves its people." The July Declaration, to be announced later in the day by Yunus, will formally recognize the 2024 student-led uprising and the shift away from authoritarian rule to democratic renewal. Despite some opposition, it is backed by major political groups, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by former premier Khaleda Zia. Supporters see the charter as a foundation for institutional reform, while critics have warned that its impact could be largely symbolic in the absence of a legal framework or parliamentary consensus.
The Diplomat
2 days ago
- The Diplomat
One Year After Sheikh Hasina's Fall: How Is Bangladesh Holding Up?
Chalk writing on the street proclaiming '36 July' – i.e. August 5, 2024, the day Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced out of office – as 'Victory Day Bangladesh.' On August 5, 2024, as the clock struck noon, news spread rapidly that Bangladesh Army General Waker-Uz-Zaman was set to address the nation. Across the country, people sensed the bloody mass uprising that had been raging for over a month was about to reach its climax. Many believed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's 15-year-long autocratic rule was finally coming to an end. Just moments later, Hasina resigned and fled the country, seeking refuge in India. By that time, protesters and ordinary citizens had already stormed state landmarks like the Prime Minister's Office, Ganabhaban (the prime minister's residence) and Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban (the national parliament building), engaging in widespread vandalism and destruction. Simultaneously, attacks on police stations broke out in Dhaka and across other regions. The Road to an Uprising The protests that summer originally focused on a single limited issue: reforms to the quota system in government jobs. But the brutality shown by law enforcement during the protests – allegedly under Hasina's direct orders – sparked unprecedented public outrage. According to United Nations estimates, around 1,400 people were killed, while thousands were injured during the protests. From late July through early August 2024, calls mounted for Hasina to resign. This was not Bangladesh's first mass uprising. Since its independence in 1971, the country has experienced frequent political upheavals. But this was the first time in history that a sitting prime minister was forced to flee. The last major uprising occurred in 1990, leading to the fall of military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad and a democratic transition. Within two decades, Bangladesh had made progress in consolidating democracy. However, in 2007-2008, another major disruption occurred known as the 1/11 period when an army-backed caretaker government took power. Both Hasina and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Khaleda Zia were arrested, Zia's son Tarique Rahman was exiled under a no-politics condition, and new political forces were introduced – but failed to gain traction. Hasina and her Awami League (AL) returned to power in 2008 through elections under the caretaker government, raising hopes for democratic revival. Yet, over time, Hasina's government systematically suppressed opposition, the media, civil society, and state institutions. Through legal amendments and the abolition of the caretaker government system in 2011, the AL ensured its dominance of the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections. Gradually, the country's democratic space shrank. Dissent was silenced. Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, politically motivated court cases, and corruption became normalized, often shielded by AL loyalists. While the government completed mega infrastructure projects, many came with heavy foreign debt. Simultaneously, efforts intensified to idolize Hasina's father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, one of the leading leaders of the 1971 Liberation War. Textbooks were rewritten to glorify Mujib while other historical figures were sidelined. Overall, Hasina's nearly 15-year reign was the longest and most entrenched authoritarian period Bangladesh has seen. After Hasina's fall, Bangladeshis hoped for deep reforms. On August 8, three days after Hasina fled the country, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was appointed to lead the interim government. Its mission was to implement urgent reforms and hold fair elections. Yet, one year on, these promises remain largely unfulfilled. Rising lawlessness has raised doubts over whether the promised elections will be truly free and fair. Political tensions have resurfaced, especially between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), while other Islamist groups are gaining ground. Women's safety is also becoming a serious concern. Although fear of state-sponsored oppression has eased, people still long for deep structural reforms. A Nation Freed, But Not Yet Safe Since Yunus took office, one of the biggest challenges his interim government has been facing is restoring law and order. Every passing week brings fresh headlines – murders in broad daylight, rape, robbery, mugging, and extortion. In one recent incident in Old Dhaka, a businessman was beaten and crushed to death with bricks and stones over an extortion scheme. The brutality of the killing shocked the nation and signaled that crime is once again spinning out of control. In January 2025 alone, 294 murder cases were filed, up sharply from 231 the previous January. In February, 300 murder cases were reported; in March, 316; and by June, the monthly total had reached 344. Robberies rose to 171 in January, compared to 114 a year earlier. Abduction cases have more than doubled. Dhaka is among the worst-hit. Between August and November, the capital saw 379 murders, 65 kidnappings, and muggings. Business owners are being extorted openly. People are frightened, and many avoid going out after dark. To tackle the growing unrest, the government launched Operation Devil Hunt, a joint force crackdown involving the Bangladesh Army, which is still ongoing. Over 10,000 people were arrested between February and July. However, the crime rate remains stubbornly high. So what's holding back the state? Dr. Tawohidul Haque, associate professor and crime analyst at the Institute of Social Welfare and Research at the University of Dhaka, told The Diplomat in March 2025 that the police force is now viewed with public distrust. 'They're seen more as oppressors than protectors,' Haque said, adding that this perception has made many officers reluctant to act. Internal tensions within the force have also deepened. After the fall of the AL, officers who were long sidelined for political reasons were promoted. But now they face pushback from juniors still loyal to the previous government. Local informant networks, critical for tracking criminals, have also collapsed. 'Even the criminals don't fear the police anymore,' Haque said. He believes part of the solution lies in better coordination between the police and judiciary – especially around bail decisions. 'When courts release high-profile suspects without informing the police, it weakens law enforcement efforts,' he added. Meanwhile, a disturbing rise in mob justice is creating fresh fears. The Hindu community, Bangladesh's largest religious minority, has faced scattered attacks too since August 2024. However, the scale and intensity of these incidents do not match the exaggerated portrayals often circulated by India's right-wing-leaning media. Still, the atmosphere remains tense, with concerns about whether the interim government can ensure the safety of all citizens equally. Even though the authoritarian regime has ended, Bangladeshis continue to live in deep insecurity. The post-Hasina interim government has yet to restore law and order effectively. Many are now questioning: in such a climate, is it even possible to organize a free and fair election? From United Uprising to Divided Politics Before and during the uprising, nearly all major political parties in Bangladesh – aside from the AL itself – stood united against the authoritarian rule of Hasina. But following her ouster, that unity quickly started to fracture. A year on, competing interests and power struggles have returned to the forefront, as each group now seeks to expand its own influence in the post-Hasina landscape. Although all parties currently support the interim government, they remain deeply divided over the proposed structural reforms introduced by the National Consensus Commission (NCC). These reforms – such as limiting prime ministerial terms, separating the roles of party leader and head of government, shifting to proportional representation, and forming a National Constitutional Council to oversee key appointments – have sparked contentious debates across the political spectrum. The BNP, now the largest political force in the absence of the AL, has largely rejected the NCC's key reform proposals, instead favoring a return to electoral politics without overhauling existing institutions. The BNP has consistently pushed for early national elections, initially agreeing to a mid-February 2026 date in a meeting between Tarique Rahman, the acting chairman of BNP and Yunus in London. In contrast, JI and the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), which comprises student leaders of the July uprising, insist that justice must precede elections. They demand prosecution of those involved in the violent state crackdown during the uprising and a commitment to structural reforms before the nation goes to the polls. These parties have backed most of the NCC's recommendations and have even called for a constitutional referendum and the formation of a constituent assembly, ideas the BNP opposes. The divide over reforms also extends to how they should be implemented. The BNP prefers parliamentary procedures, while JI supports direct public referendums, and the NCP advocates for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. These disagreements reveal a deeper philosophical clash over where democratic legitimacy should stem from in a post-Hasina Bangladesh. Analysts suggest that the BNP's reluctance stems from strategic calculations. Historically, JI has never contested national elections alone, and its calls for systemic change are often dismissed by centrist actors. The NCP, on the other hand, is increasingly seen as receiving state support, as evidenced by the tight security at its rallies and the interim government's apparent responsiveness to its demands. This has led critics to label it a potential 'king's party.' Tensions between the BNP and JI have escalated. Jamaat leaders have accused the BNP of extortion and corruption, while BNP supporters have branded JI as collaborators for their role in the 1971 war. These public exchanges have nearly led to confrontations on the streets, suggesting that the old alliance between the two is rapidly deteriorating. Meanwhile, JI has moved to form a new coalition with other Islamist parties, including Islami Andolon Bangladesh and Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish and other islamist parties. The BNP's absence from a massive gathering arranged by JI in Dhaka on July 19, where the NCP and other parties were present, further underscored the growing isolation of the BNP within the broader opposition landscape. The situation became even more volatile when, during the NCP's 'Desh Gorte July Podojatra' (July March to Build the Nation) campaign, its procession was attacked in Gopalganj. In a rare move, members of the armed forces, police, and Border Guard Bangladesh reportedly opened fire on AL-affiliated assailants, killing four. NCP activists were then escorted out of the district in military armored vehicles. The lack of post-mortem examinations for the deceased and their rushed burials sparked widespread condemnation and raised serious human rights concerns. For many, this was a grim reminder that even in a post-autocratic era, extrajudicial violence and state-sanctioned abuses remain possible. With just months to go before the proposed February election, the lack of political consensus risks plunging the country back into chaos. If the opposition fails to reconcile its differences and agree on a common reform roadmap, the dream of democratic transformation born from the July Uprising may be lost to renewed polarization, elite dominance, and public disillusionment. Women Fought, Men Rule During the uprising, women were on the frontlines. They organized protests, shared resistance stories on social media, and even faced bullets alongside their male peers. For many, it was a rare moment of empowerment. The country watched in awe as mothers brought food to students, young women led processions, and an entire generation demanded both democracy and equality. But a year on, those promises ring hollow. Not only has gender-based violence sharply increased, but women remain politically sidelined. The reserved seats in Parliament, originally intended to ensure representation, now serve as a token gesture. Most political parties agree on reserving 100 seats for women in the upcoming national election. However, there is disagreement over how these seats should be filled – Although the BNP and some parties favor the current nomination-based system rather than direct polls to fill women's seats. That means women must rely on party nominations for reserved slots, reinforcing the idea that women belong in politics only when handpicked by male leaders. Even in the ongoing national consensus dialogues, where parties debate electoral reforms and the future of governance, women are barely present. Out of dozens of delegates, only a handful are women – and none hold central negotiating power. This exclusion is not a coincidence, but a reflection of how deep-rooted patriarchy still controls decision-making in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, attempts at reform have faced fierce pushback. Earlier this year, the National Women's Commission proposed legal amendments to expand protections for survivors of domestic and sexual violence. But within days, Islamist groups staged protests, calling the proposals 'anti-Islamic' and 'Western propaganda.' Under pressure, the interim administration quietly shelved the proposal, signaling that the fear of offending religious hardliners still outweighs the political will to defend women's rights. Statistically, the situation is worsening. A total of 441 rape cases were reported in just the first half of 2025, already surpassing the total number for all of 2024. Incidents such as mob lynching of women for wearing Western clothing or on allegations of prostitution have also occurred in several places inside the country. What began as a hopeful chapter for women during the uprising has now become a cautionary tale. Bangladesh may have ousted its autocratic regime, but its patriarchal structure remains intact, and women's voices have been silenced once again. Is Freedom of Speech Truly Free? Although the initial protests in July began over the discriminatory quota system in government jobs, it did not take long for the movement to escalate into a full-fledged anti-government uprising. Two key reasons drove this transformation. First, the state's violent crackdown – especially the killing of protesters by law enforcement – outraged the public. Second, pent-up frustration from the past 15 years, during which citizens were denied a fair election since 2008, finally exploded. Under the AL's prolonged rule, freedom of speech gradually eroded. From opposition leaders to ordinary citizens, anyone who dared to criticize the government faced harassment, arrest, or digital surveillance. The Digital Security Act 2018 was widely used to silence dissent, creating an atmosphere of fear. However, following the fall of Hasina in August 2024, some changes began to emerge. People started speaking more openly against the government without the immediate threat of state retaliation. The notorious cyber laws were no longer weaponized as before. Critics of the interim leadership and independent media found more space to operate. That said, the promise of free expression is far from universally fulfilled. Questions are now being raised about the freedom of speech of AL supporters, many of whom claim they are being targeted or silenced. Moreover, the recent incident in Gopalganj raised serious concerns as four people were reportedly killed, and their bodies were buried without any autopsy. Such incidents suggest that while Bangladesh has taken significant steps forward since the collapse of Hasina's regime, true nationwide freedom of speech and accountability remain elusive. The road to democratic recovery is evidently still under construction.
