US's F-47, China's J-35, or Russia's Su-57: Which is the most advanced fighter jet in the world? Its speed is.., top features include...
Due to the ongoing tensions across the globe, several countries are continuously updating their defence mechanism, weapons, and military technologies. Fighter jets are among the most powerful symbols of a nation's military might in modern warfare.
Several countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are continuously advancing their fifth- and sixth-generation fighter programs to enhance their air superiority. But is America's F-47 truly the most advanced of them all? Or do Russia's Su-57 and China's J-35A outperform it in key areas?
Expected to be ready for action by 2029, the F-47 is the United States' next big leap in fighter jets. It is a cutting-edge sixth-generation stealth aircraft currently in the early stages of development. Built by Boeing as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, this jet is designed to redefine what aerial combat means and keep the US ahead in the skies.
F-47 (NGAD)
Known to be the successor to the F-22 Raptor, this sixth-generation stealth fighter has been in Boeing's works since 2020. Interestingly, prototypes of the aircraft took to the skies back in 2019 and 2022, showing promising progress. The plan is to have it fully ready and operational sometime between 2025 and 2029, bringing a new era to air combat.
Speaking about its speed, the F-47 can fly at speeds exceeding Mach 2 (about 2,470 km/h) and has a combat radius of over 1,000 nautical miles—around 70% farther than the F-22's range. Nicknamed 'Stealth++,' its stealth technology outperforms both the F-22 and F-35, making it incredibly hard to detect by radar or infrared sensors.
The F-47 is powered by advanced turbofan engines such as the Pratt & Whitney XA103 or GE XA102.
It is equipped with a modular weapons system that allows for long-range missile launches and even drone control. On top of that, it incorporates advanced sensor fusion, AI-powered data networking, and coordinated drone operations, making it a truly next-generation fighter.
The F-47 is built to work as part of a 'system of systems,' meaning it can team up with two to five cooperative combat drones like the YFQ-42 and YFQ-44 to take on missions together. However, this advanced capability comes with a hefty price. Surprisingly, each jet costs between $160 and $300 million, which is a lot more than the F-35. While it promises impressive potential, its true combat performance is still waiting to be tested in the field.
Speaking about Russia's Su-57 Felon, it is a fifth-generation stealth fighter that first took to the skies back in 2010. Later in 2020, it was inducted into the Russian Air Force. It can reach speeds above Mach 2 and even supports supercruise, meaning it can fly at supersonic speeds without needing afterburners.
One of its strengths is its impressive range—it can fly up to 3,500 km without refueling and extend that to 4,500 km using external tanks. However, its stealth isn't quite as advanced as some rivals; with a radar cross-section between 0.1 and 0.5 square meters, it's easier to detect than jets like the F-35.
The Su-57 is powered by two AL-41F1 engines, each producing 35,000 pounds of thrust, and it carries a wide range of weapons on 12 hardpoints, including internal bays. Due to thrust vectoring technology, it's incredibly agile and excels in maneuverability.
It's also much more affordable, costing between $35 and $50 million per jet. However, production has been limited to fewer than 40 units, with output slowed down by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. So far, its combat experience is limited, mostly involving missions in Syria.
China's J-35A is an advanced version of the Shenyang FC-31, built as a fifth-generation stealth fighter specifically for naval missions. It made a striking debut at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow and can reach speeds up to Mach 1.8 (around 2,200 km/h), with a range close to 2,000 km.
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It boasts active and passive electronic warfare systems, highly advanced AESA radar and a wide range of precision-guided munitions. India's acquisition of Rafales has significantly enhanced its deterrent capability in the region. In contrast, the J-10, while equipped with surface-level improvements in its C variant, lacks the operational pedigree and real-world performance history of the Rafale. The aircraft's dependency on the AL-31 engine also makes it vulnerable to foreign supply constraints—a vulnerability that the Rafale's wholly indigenous development avoids. Strategic trap: Dependency and influence China's defence export strategy is increasingly aimed at selling its weapons as 'affordable alternatives' to Western systems. However, these exports come with strings attached. For recipient nations like Indonesia, entering the Chinese military ecosystem could mean sacrificing independence in defence planning and opening up to Chinese influence in critical areas of military doctrine and procurement. Moreover, there is an inherent asymmetry in the seller-buyer relationship when it comes to maintenance, software updates and upgrades. Indonesia may find itself beholden to Chinese suppliers, particularly in the event of geopolitical tension. These vulnerabilities can have long-term strategic consequences, making what appears to be an affordable choice today a costly liability tomorrow. A question of strategic prudence Indonesia's inclination to purchase the Chinese J-10 represents more than a defence acquisition. It signals a potential shift in regional alignment. At a time when great power competition is intensifying in the Indo-Pacific, countries must choose their defence partners carefully—not only based on price and immediate availability but also on long-term implications for sovereignty, reliability and capability. China's J-10 may offer Indonesia a quick fix, but it is a flawed platform born of outdated design philosophies and geopolitical expediency. In contrast, India's unwavering stance on retaining top-tier fighters like the Rafale and its refusal to acknowledge any fabricated combat losses, highlights a clear commitment to quality, credibility and strategic autonomy. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD If Indonesia follows through with this deal, it may risk compromising its defence integrity and becoming another node in China's growing web of influence. The real cost of the J-10 may not lie in the transaction—but in the trap that follows.
