Shifting sands of power: The message from Trump's big Gulf trip – and what that means for India

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23-05-2025

In February 2024, US President Donald Trump called it 'one of the greatest trade routes in all of history'. In April, a US-Italy joint statement referred to it as 'one of the greatest economic integration and connectivity projects of this century '. All of which made it even more striking that, over the course of a four-day visit to West Asia – with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE – Trump appeared to make little mention of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
The IMEC was announced in September 2023 with much fanfare by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit, with the aim of building a trade corridor that would rival China's Belt and Road Initiative.
When conflict broke out in Gaza the following month, its implementation – heavily dependent on Saudi normalisation with Israel – appeared to be consigned to the backburner, although India, the UAE and several European nations continued to drum up support for the initiative, as we discussed here:
Moreover, IMEC appeared to be one of the rare multi-lateral initiatives that Trump – never a fan of group assignments, especially ones that include the European Union or those championed by his predecessor – was willing to embrace. Not only did he assert in February that the US was 'going to be spending a lot more ' to make it happen, Trump also said that he along with Modi would convene IMEC partners for a summit midway through the year in order to ' announce new initiatives.'
(Perhaps most surprisingly, he hasn't yet sought to rebrand this Biden-era project, even though – given Trump's preferred aesthetic – the (new) 'Golden Road ' is right there for the taking. Maybe that was intended for the summit?)
Against this background, it was rather interesting that IMEC didn't find mention in Trump's grand Riyadh speech outlining his vision for the region, which has made news in part for his critique of 'so-called nation-builders, neocons or liberal nonprofits ' and for his assertion that he doesn't believe in ' permanent enemies '. He even seemed to cue himself up for a mention of IMEC towards the end of the speech:
'We're still just at the dawn of the bright new day that awaits for the people of the Middle East, the great, great people of the Middle East. If the responsible nations of this region seize this moment, put aside your differences and focus on the interests that unite you, then all of humanity, will soon be amazed at what they will see right here in this geographic centre of the world.…
For the first time in a thousand years, the world will look at this region not as a place of turmoil and strife and war and death, but as a land of opportunity and hope, just like you've done right here – a cultural and commercial crossroads of the planet…
In the United States, we've launched the Golden Age of America. It's the Golden Age. We see it. We see it with all that money, trillions and trillions of dollars pouring in, hundreds of thousands of jobs coming in with it. And with the help of the people of the Middle East and the people in this room, partners throughout the region, the golden age of the Middle East can proceed right alongside of us.'
But ultimately there was no mention, and IMEC didn't seem to make its way into any headlines or into the White House handouts following Trump's visits to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (Abu Dhabi, in its press release, did make a passing mention of both the proposed corridor and ' I2U2 ', the India-Israel-US-UAE minilateral that began meeting following the Abraham Accords.).
Why the omission from Trump?
The most straightforward answer is that, despite all the talk of it being the 'greatest project of the century', there were more immediate deals to be made: economically (with claims of $2 trillion in agreements with Gulf nations, even if those numbers may not stand up to scrutiny), diplomatically (including the remarkable decision to lift sanctions on Syria, and continue negotiations with Iran) and personally (with the Trump family involved in everything from towers and golf courses to crypto ventures in the region).
The bigger picture answer may have to do with Trump's evolving approach to Israel. For long, Israel has been the linchpin of US policy in the region it calls the Middle East (West Asia in Indian parlance), with this principle even enshrined in American law at the military level. This has meant an unprecedented level of bipartisan support for Israel regardless of its actions – to a fault – while also making friendship with Tel Aviv a condition for other countries in the region to build ties with the US.
This was even the case for India, as Nicolas Blarel recounted in his 2015 book about India-Israel relations, which we discussed here.
Over the course of Trump's current Gulf tour, however, it has seemed as if Netanyahu's stubborn unwillingness to end the war in Gaza, among other things, has finally led to a turning point. The US is beginning to see Israel, rather than the Arab states, as an obstacle to achieving its own ends in the region.
Jonathan Freedland writes:
'Until this week, a cornerstone of the US-Israel relationship was a US guarantee that Israel would always enjoy military superiority over its neighbours. That looks much less certain now. Indeed, Trump declared that the US has 'no stronger partner' than Saudi Arabia, a status that used to belong to Israel alone.
What's more, Trump showed Riyadh all this love with none of the previous strings attached. None of it was conditional on Saudi 'normalisation' of relations with Israel. Trump said Prince Mohammed could do that when he was good and ready, free of US pressure.
Trump is now in the business of cutting the deals he wants, regardless of the needs of the US's one-time key ally…
As loudly and clearly as he can, Trump is telling Netanyahu that he is no longer No 1 and that he will not get in the way of whatever Trump decides best serves US, and his own, interests. Part of this is born of frustration with Netanyahu for failing to play his part in getting the Middle East to the stability, and therefore prosperity, that Trump thinks is possible and potentially profitable for the US.'
What attracted the US to IMEC in the first place? After all it is a corridor connecting India to Europe – not the US – via the Middle East. So what explains Washington's interest?
For one, it was seen as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Given fears of weaponised supply chains, IMEC seemed of a piece with a Biden-era policy toolkit including friend-shoring, de-risking and China+1 efforts, coupled with a desire to extend American influence even if its benefits would accrue to allies rather than the US directly.
How much does Trump subscribe to this? It's hard to say, given his administration's wildly contradictory policy moves, especially on trade. On the one hand, Trump described IMEC as the project of the century. On the other, he told Apple CEO Tim Cook this week company should not be moving manufacturing to India from China, since he wants those factories back in the US.
What use is a global logistics project if all the supply chains are (theoretically) in the US? Or, more realistically, will Trump really want to invest in a project to de-risk far from home, when he's willing to work on trade deals directly with China?
The other element of IMEC had to do with the US's Israel policy. The corridor has been described as the ' child of the Abraham Accords ', in which Trump brokered the normalisation of relations between several Arab nations and Israel. IMEC was seen as a way to force the Gulf and Israel (with Jordan presumed to be on board) into an ever-closer economic relationship that would act as a countervailing force to the hostilities that have historically characterised the region ever since the nakba.
Gulf countries still have an obvious interest in building IMEC: It would make them players in trade routes that currently bypass the region altogether (either sending goods through the Suez Canal or overland via the Iran-Türkiye 'Southern Corridor ') in part because consistent conflict and land borders have come in the way of trade integration. But if Israeli normalisation is no longer a vital element of US policy in the region, why would Washington expend energy on attempting to solve one of the fundamental conflicts in the region?
The Atlantic Council's William F Weschler described US interest in IMEC in this way:
'A completed overland route would reduce the number of ships traveling through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and thus the requirements for the US Navy to defend against Houthi attacks on shipping, something presumably appealing to the Trump team. It would help counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, diminish Tehran's regional influence, reinforce the Abraham Accords – perhaps the most important foreign policy achievement of Trump's first term – and help set the conditions for eventual Saudi-Israel normalisation.'
If, given a trade deal with China, there is no need to counter the Belt and Road initiative; if diminishing Tehran were less of an issue following a US-Iran deal; if countering the Houthis required simply concluding a ceasefire with them; if reinforcing the Abraham Accords and setting conditions for Saudi-Israel normalisation were less important, given that Trump is willing to deal directly with the Gulf rather than by way of Tel Aviv, then what interest remains in putting political (if not also financial) capital into a project that rests on the unlikely scenario of goods being able to make their way smoothly between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel?
Weschler suggests what that interest may be: 'Perhaps most appealing to Trump, US taxpayers would not be on the hook to finance this project, and US infrastructure companies could be major beneficiaries of the money that others spend.'
But even that may not be appealing enough, given the business success of Trump's Gulf tour, and the president's desire to see ground broken on projects in the US, rather than elsewhere.
Moreover, Trump's other moves in the region – lifting sanctions on Syria, coordinating Syria policy with Türkiye, and working on a deal with Iran – all create the space for alternate trade routes that don't require solving the knotty problem of Israel-Saudi normalisation, even if they each come with their own complciations.
Of course, this doesn't meant that Trump will suddenly pull out of IMEC.
First, none of Trump's moves in the Gulf rest on any principles, other than perhaps, profit. As Marc Lynch noted, were he to completely undo all of his major current efforts – Syria normalisation, the Iran negotiations, distance from Israel – few would be surprised. Moreover, his desire to get to Saudi-Israel normalisation (in pursuit, perhaps, of a Nobel) may eventually become more urgent. Even in Riyadh, he said that 'it's my fervent hope, wish and even my dream that Saudi Arabia… will soon be joining the Abraham Accords,' and then pictured what that may look like – before adding a vital, new qualifier, which I've highlighted in italics:
'It will be a special day in the Middle East, with the whole world watching when Saudi Arabia joins us and you'll be greatly honoring me and you'll be greatly honoring all of those people that have fought so hard for the Middle East. And I really think it's going to be something special, but you'll do it in your own time.'
This also doesn't mean that IMEC won't happen. India, the UAE, Israel and several European countries – particularly France, Italy and Greece – all seem committed to the idea and are pushing ahead on it. One question to perhaps ask is if these countries, backed by the European Union, might be sufficient to give it momentum against the context of a distracted US?
GMF South's Kristina Kausch writes:
'Unsurprisingly, however, pressure unleashes centrifugal forces among EU member states. As initial plans to establish Greece's Piraeus port as IMEC's main entry point to Europe have been challenged due to Chinese majority ownership in it, France (Marseille) and Italy (Trieste) have been competing for the role. Both have appointed special envoys for IMEC and are engaged in active shuttle diplomacy with the signatory partners. Competition among Southern European countries focusing on national economic gain risks diverting attention away from the bigger picture of the corridor's long-term transformative significance for European strategic autonomy and competitiveness.
And then, of course, Europe's geopolitical coming-of-age also means empty coffers. Whether European governments will be able to mobilize the necessary funds for IMEC (current cost estimates are at €500 billion) while simultaneously building European defense capabilities and updating industries and infrastructure at home is doubtful… Similarly, the European private sector, strained by the tariff nuclear bomb, without solid guarantees might be reluctant to invest in a project whose short- and mid-term security and economic profitability is uncertain.'
Luckily for India, its element of the proposed corridor – connecting its Western ports with the Gulf – does not face obstacles quite as vexed as the question of Saudi-Israel normalisation, and indeed Indo-Gulf relations are only likely to continue their massive expansion. (It was, however, noteworthy that the Pahalgam terror attack, which led to India-Pakistan clashes earlier this month, forced Modi to cut short what was expected to be a transformative visit to Saudi Arabia, with Gulf states subsequently playing a role, albiety more quietly than Trump, in the ceasefire that followed). Moreover, some of Trump's other moves – most notably with Iran – may even open up the space for India to revisit other grand connectivity plans that have been stalled because of regional issues.