China-Pakistan axis: The dragon-scorpion squeeze
In the years that have elapsed since South Asia emerged from the long twilight of British colonialism, the region has been gripped by a persistent instability – neither the disordered anarchy of stateless zones nor the cold equilibrium of an established balance of power, but something more ambiguous: a fluctuating, brittle order, always one crisis away from unraveling. Nowhere is this more evident than in the enduring antagonism between India and Pakistan that has matured into a more protean and perilous confrontation. Yet to view this rivalry in its traditional binary form is to miss the evolution of its real strategic character. As developments since the
Pahalgam
terror attack have demonstrated, the Indo-Pakistan conflict has not merely persisted; it has been transformed, gradually but inexorably, into a trilateral configuration in which China, once a peripheral observer, now looms as a latent but decisive actor.
This metamorphosis warrants a more nuanced interrogation. Historically, Pakistan's reliance on foreign backers has been a fixture of its strategic posture. During the Cold War, the United States saw Pakistan as a geopolitical lever against Soviet influence, providing arms, funds, and legitimacy. But where America once sought alignment through ideology, China now pursues influence through infrastructure, arms sales, and algorithmic entanglement. The transition is less a case of old dependencies continuing in new dress than it is of an evolving strategic fusion.
As the latest episode of India-Pakistan conflict shows, the Sino-Pakistani nexus is not just diplomatic; it is operational. The integration of Chinese military platforms into Pakistan's arsenal is a cautionary tale of deeper entanglement. This increasingly seamless military and doctrinal convergence has birthed what one might term the 'dragon-scorpion axis': a symbiotic arrangement wherein the scorpion – Pakistan – delivers the sting through asymmetric terror, while the dragon – China – provides both the venom and the armour. The interoperability of systems, the shared training regimes, and the strategic alignment of objectives are the sinews of this new axis, one that is fast reshaping South Asia's security calculus.
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It is a development reminiscent, in structural terms, of Soviet influence over the Warsaw Pact states – though with subtler means and in an age where digital infrastructure and surveillance capabilities amplify the reach of hegemonic ambition. Where the Soviet Union once asserted its dominance through the visible apparatus of military occupation and ideological enforcement, Beijing now extends its reach through dual-use infrastructure projects, arms sales, and economic inducements that come with strings attached.
Fighter jets, development loans, and digital platforms serve as the modern equivalents of commissars and armored divisions – tools for shaping behaviour, limiting autonomy, and binding Pakistan into a sphere of influence without the formal trappings of empire. The latest agreement to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan underscores this strategy, embedding infrastructure and investment as instruments of geopolitical alignment. By drawing Afghanistan into its orbit, Beijing seeks to create a buffer zone and secure a secondary axis of influence that fortifies Pakistan's strategic posture. This quiet coordination with Pakistan – 'clandestine compact' – functions as a deliberate mechanism of pressure – one aimed at constraining India's strategic bandwidth, shifting the balance of power through the cumulative effect of economic leverage, military entanglement, and narrative control.
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This reconfiguration renders India's strategic predicament more acute and multidimensional. It is no longer merely a matter of deterring a hostile but inferior neighbour. Rather, India confronts a composite adversary – Pakistan as the immediate provocateur, and China as the hidden architect of escalation. The much-invoked 'two-front' threat seems to have matured into what might more aptly be termed a 'Proxy Pincer': a calibrated architecture of coercion in which Pakistan functions as the overt executor of disruption, while China maneuvers with calculated ambiguity from the flanks – eschewing attribution, yet resolute in shaping outcomes. The geometry of pressure is deliberate, the silence between actions as strategic as the actions themselves.
And herein lies the most insidious development: in a future crisis, the locus of decision-making in Islamabad may be so enmeshed with Chinese strategic imperatives that distinctions between national will and foreign influence become indistinguishable. Pakistan, in effect, has become Beijing's Trigger Finger – an appendage through which China can apply pressure without bearing responsibility, exert force without crossing thresholds, and deny involvement while shaping outcomes.
What we confront now is an asymmetrical entanglement, in which China's ability to influence the tempo and tenor of a South Asian crisis enables it to shape outcomes without entering the battlefield. This is not mere ideological alignment; it is the operationalization of a plausible provocation pact – a tacit understanding that escalations can be engineered below the threshold of formal war, while plausible deniability is preserved.
Such choreography is most evident in the post-Pahalgam milieu. The ghastly terror attack unfolded not merely as an act of violence, but as a moment of strategic theatre. India's restrained but firm military response was followed by a flurry of international statements – none more telling than those emanating from Washington and Beijing. The United States, ever eager to claim the mantle of crisis manager, framed the ceasefire as a diplomatic victory. Yet this performative diplomacy belied a deeper shift: China's silent choreography behind the scenes. The sudden halt in cross-border drone intrusions, a spate of ambiguous official statements, and the conspicuous tempering of Pakistani belligerence bore the unmistakable imprint of Beijing's strategic choreography. At its core was a calculated reminder: that strategic equilibrium in South Asia no longer hinges solely on Western mediation, but now rests, increasingly, on the tacit acquiescence – and latent leverage – of Beijing.
This maneuver – subtle in its blend of opportunism and statecraft – aims to recast the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as a local disturbance to be managed by a disinterested overseer. What emerges is an axis of ambiguity, where power is projected through proxies, where escalation is modulated through influence, and where accountability vanishes into the fog of denial.
What makes this architecture particularly pernicious is that it seeks to erode India's agency while simultaneously casting China as a stabilizer. The rhetorical inversion is complete: India's self-defense becomes provocation; its deterrence, escalation. The tragic triangle that now defines South Asia – India under constant psychological pressure, Pakistan as a pliable executor, and China as a puppeteer cloaked in neutrality – must be acknowledged for what it is: a strategic trap.
This is an agonizing clash of values – India's insistence on sovereign equality and transparency pitted against China's preference for hierarchical ambiguity and covert coercion. It is not a contest of force alone, but of narrative and perception, of who gets to define legitimacy in a crowded geopolitical theatre.
And yet, within this fog lies opportunity. India must not merely react to these constraints. It must shape the terrain of engagement. The first imperative is doctrinal: deterrence must be reframed not in terms of punishment alone, but of unpredictability, denial, and disruption. India must build the capacity not only to retaliate, but to pre-empt, confuse, and outmaneuver.
The second imperative lies in diplomacy. India must craft a narrative that extracts it from artificial entanglement that binds its image to Pakistan's provocations. This requires deepening ties with like-minded partners, particularly within the Indo-Pacific, but with a realistic understanding that the West's appetite for justice is often eclipsed by its addiction to stability.
History does not reward victimhood; it rewards agency. The task before India is not simply to withstand the Dragon-Scorpion axis, but to render it obsolete – through the steady construction of resilience, through alliances that privilege transparency over ambiguity, and through strategic patience informed by long memory.
Vinay Kaura is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Rajasthan
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