US Navy's carrier drone delay handing the domain to China
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that Rear Admiral Michael 'Buzz' Donnelly of the US Navy's Air Warfare Division outlined a restrained approach to Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) at the recent Sea Air Space symposium in Washington, DC.
While working with the US Air Force and Marine Corps, the Navy prioritizes the MQ-25 Stingray tanker drone and its operational integration over carrier-based CCAs. Donnelly explained that the Air Force leads in air vehicle and autonomy development, while the Marines emphasize manned-unmanned teaming via the F-35B.
The Navy, trailing its US military counterparts, focuses on infrastructure and autonomy insights gained from the MQ-25. Carrier-specific integration challenges continue to hinder deployment despite the high potential of CCAs.
Donnelly projected that initial CCA designs might emerge by the 2030s, contingent on the MQ-25's operational success. He noted the Navy favors more affordable, disposable drones over the Air Force's costly high-end CCAs. However, progress on classified Navy drone initiatives remains largely opaque.
China's rapid advances in stealth unmanned carrier-based aircraft underscore the urgency for the US Navy to accelerate its efforts. Donnelly's remarks also raise concerns about the timeline for the F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter, envisioned to operate alongside CCAs. The delays reflect broader challenges in adapting unmanned systems to naval aviation.
According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, the Navy's CCAs will share a common architecture with the Air Force to enable greater interoperability. Yet, the unique demands of carrier operations present serious obstacles.
In a November 2022 article for the Drones peer-reviewed journal, Zixuan Liu and co-authors underscore that aircraft carrier decks are more constrained, risk-prone and complex than land-based airfields.
They note the necessity for precise coordination of aircraft categories, support equipment, and launch-recovery sequences to reduce collision risks, which are magnified when incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Liu and colleagues stress that these constraints will require highly automated and optimized scheduling systems, especially as UAVs become more autonomous and numerous in carrier environments.
Despite these challenges, the US Navy is taking preliminary steps toward integration. In August 2024, the Navy Times reported that the USS George H W Bush was outfitted with the first Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC) to support MQ-25 operations.
Similar upgrades are planned for the USS Carl Vinson, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Ronald Reagan, signaling an institutional shift toward unmanned platforms.
Following the MQ-25's full integration into carrier operations—projected for 2026—a 'Stingray to the Fight' program will expand the drone's capabilities, including the addition of an internal mission bay, according to Sam LaGrone in an April 2023 USNI News article.
In the long term, the Navy aims for drones to comprise up to 60% of its carrier air wings, as Rear Admiral Gregory Harris noted in an April 2021 TWZ article.
For now, the MQ-25 is the lynchpin of the Navy's unmanned aviation efforts. In a January 2025 TWZ article, Lew Callaway emphasizes the MQ-25's tanker role as critical to extending the range and persistence of carrier-based strike aircraft like the F/A-18.
He points out that China's sophisticated air defenses and long-range missiles make traditional aerial tankers and island-based refueling stations increasingly vulnerable. The MQ-25 offers a more survivable alternative to sustain carrier operations deep into contested areas of the Pacific.
However, the MQ-25's limitations as a strike platform are equally significant. In a July 2023 Proceedings article, Josh Hano notes that the drone was not designed for speed, stealth, or agility.
While the aircraft could theoretically carry precision weapons in an internal bay, its structure and systems are ill-suited to evolve into a frontline unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).
Hano instead argues that the MQ-25 should evolve into a multirole support platform—performing anti-submarine operations (ASW), electronic warfare (EW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), or even acting as a decoy launcher to confuse enemy defenses.
Strategically, the delay in the F/A-XX program casts a shadow over CCA development. Developing a complementary unmanned wing without the F/A-XX as a manned command aircraft doesn't make strategic sense.
The F/A-XX is planned to replace the F/A-18 and serve as the backbone of future US carrier air wings, which are expected to enter service in the 2030s, but its timeline faces uncertainty.
In March 2024, Breaking Defense reported that the Navy deferred approximately US$1 billion in FY2025 funding for F/A-XX research and development, citing a need to prioritize current fleet readiness. The decision reflects a broader struggle to balance immediate operational needs with long-term modernization.
Part of the reluctance to commit significant funding may stem from recent procurement misfires. In a December 2024 article for 1945, Robert Farley links US Navy caution on the F/A-XX to a string of troubled programs, including the Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), Zumwalt-class destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and Constellation-class frigates.
These projects were all plagued by cost overruns, shifting requirements and underwhelming performance, making policymakers wary of another costly gamble.
Farley also suggests that the future of the F/A-XX is entangled with existential questions about aircraft carrier relevance. He references lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, where large warships proved vulnerable and manned aircraft had limited operational impact.
Such developments fuel skepticism about investing heavily in a carrier-based fighter that might lack a viable mission.
The delays and hesitations risk handing the technological initiative to China. In a February 2022 Pacific Forum article, Loro Horta writes that no military now integrates drones as systematically as the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
China treats drones as integral to its combat architecture, using them to compensate for weaknesses in manned platforms and to saturate adversaries with cost-effective systems.
Conversely, US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks acknowledged in a MIT Technology Review interview this month that the US faces difficulties in integrating drones into joint force operations and scaling production at the level China can achieve.
In December 2023, TWZ reported that China's GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV had been observed at a PLA carrier test facility near a mockup of the Fujian-class carrier.
The GJ-11's stealth profile, large internal bays and mission versatility (ISR, EW and strike) indicate it is a key element in China's naval drone plans. Launching such aircraft would require catapult-equipped carriers, such as the Fujian.
PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyer commander Chi Jianjun, quoted in The Maritime Executive in January 2025, confirmed that drone platforms are being deployed across China's warships—from carriers and destroyers to amphibious assault vessels like the Type 75 and Type 76 classes.
This widespread rollout reflects a coordinated effort to integrate unmanned systems into naval operations fully.
As the US Navy treads carefully, slowed by strategic caution and budgetary friction, China's aggressive pursuit of stealthy naval drones threatens to redefine carrier warfare. Without a more decisive shift, the US risks falling behind in a domain it once dominated.
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